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1 
Framework paper 
 
 
1. University growth, competitiveness, and reforms 
 
Today, universities represent fundamental institutions, one could say constitutive elements, 
of industrialized countries all over the world. In the last century, they have experienced an 
unprecedented growth and major organizational changes, due, essentially, to the rapid 
technological progress and the “massification” of higher education (see e.g. Teichler 1998). 
Since the end of World War II, higher education has evolved from an elite system, where 
only a very small percentage of the population had access to universities, to a universal 
system in which more than 50 percent of young adults attend a form of tertiary education 
(Trow 2007). The growing demand for higher education and the increasing role of 
knowledge in people’s everyday life have made universities an integral part of societies, 
overcoming once and for all their image as “ivory towers” inhabited by few scholars only 
weakly connected to their surrounding communities (Barry et al. 2001).  
The importance of universities is not confined to education and training but 
comprises their role as research institutions and their “third mission”, i.e. their contribution 
to economic development and social welfare (Martin 2012). Technology-based economies 
rely on scientific progress and research at the technological frontier to remain innovative and 
competitive, and to secure the basis for long-lasting growth (see e.g. Stephan 2012). Analytic 
frameworks like the National Innovation System approach (Freeman 1995, Lundvall 1992, 
Nelson 1993), the Triple Helix approach (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000), and the Mode 
2 of science approach (Gibbson et al. 1994) thus include universities as key elements of 
successful economies. Research universities train highly skilled employees, conduct a large 
part of basic and applied research, secure new generations of scholars, and take active steps 
towards collaboration with industry and technology transfer (Rosenberg & Nelson 1994). 
They have therefore become a decisive factor influencing both the competitiveness of an 
economy and the attractiveness of a country or a region for international high-technology 
companies.  
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However, the growing costs of universities caused by their exceptional growth has 
led to funding problems, especially in countries where universities are strongly dependent 
on public resources (Trow 1999). Moreover, the increasing international competition among 
research systems has called for a more effective allocation of public funds (Bonaccorsi 2007, 
Jacobs and van der Ploeg 2006). For these reasons, most industrialized countries and many 
developing ones have implemented reforms to increase the efficiency of their higher 
education and research system and its responsiveness to external demands. As in other public 
domains, such as health or transport, these reforms have relied on the New Public 
Management discourse and have introduced new steering approaches, i.e. external 
instruments and institutional arrangements that shape organizational governance and 
academic behaviors within higher education institutions (Ferlie et al. 2008). 
These new steering approaches are based on two interrelated principles, autonomy 
and competition, which have both been shown to significantly influence the performance of 
research universities (Aghion et al. 2010). First, following the idea that self-organization 
leads to better results, many governments have granted universities more autonomy in 
strategic, organizational, financial, and personnel matters (Estermann and Nokkala 2009). 
At the same time, they have introduced new accountability mechanisms in order to ensure 
the quality of university services and the proper use of public funds (see e.g. Paradeise et al. 
2009, Whitley and Glaeser 2007). These developments have led to the rise of “new 
managerialism” approaches in higher education (Deem & Brehony, 2005), the 
professionalization of management functions within universities, and an increasing focus on 
institutional performativity (Ollsen & Peters, 2005).  
Second, several reforms have been implemented with the aim of increasing 
competition for funds among universities, in the belief that market-mechanisms lead to a 
more efficient allocation of resources (van der Ploeg and Veugelers 2008). In many 
countries, funding has been linked to performance indicators (see e.g. Butler 2010, Hicks 
2012). Similarly, the share of institutional funding, i.e. state funding allocated directly to 
universities, has been reduced, while the importance of competitive project funding and 
funding from industry has increased (Lepori et al. 2007, Perkmann et al. 2013). The growing 
focus on the returns of research spending has also led many governments to expand the share 
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of research oriented towards societal, economic, and political needs at the expenses of free 
academic research (see e.g. Morris 2000). 
One of the culminating goals of all these reforms is to create – and promote – a new 
type of higher education institutions, which has been called the “emerging global model” of 
research universities (Mohram et. al 2008). These universities are characterized by a strong 
orientation on research and by a high degree of internationalization. They are engaged in a 
worldwide competition for the best international students, high-profile researchers, and 
partners both from within the academic world, i.e. other universities and research 
institutions, and from outside academia, such as high-technology firms, government and 
private non-profit-organizations, and foundations (Marginson 2006). Competition thereby 
strongly builds on the reputation of universities, which is directly associated to their research 
performance (Horta 2009). Thus, increasing the competitiveness of universities essentially 
means giving them the means to conduct high quality education and research, and providing 
an adequate environment and the right incentives for them to fully unfold their potential.  
 
 
2. Previous and ongoing research 
 
The many reforms implemented may affect the future development of universities in various 
ways. A better understanding of the chances and challenges of the new steering approaches 
and their intended and unintended consequences is crucial for the future design of policies, 
the governance of higher education and research systems, and the management of 
universities. These topics have consequently received a great amount of attention in 
academia. They have been analyzed from very different perspectives, including historical, 
sociological, educational, policy, management, and economic approaches. Their relevance 
is reflected in the growth of this highly interdisciplinary field of study, the creation of 
specialized journals, and the establishment of thematic associations and regular conferences.  
The literature on the reforms in higher education and research is so broad and diverse 
that a full review would go far beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, by focusing on 
the specific research objects rather than the disciplinary perspectives and methodologies, 
referring only to selected studies, and making no claim to completeness, one can identify six 
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groups of contributions to the ongoing academic discourse. A first group of studies analyzes 
the implications of the reforms for the internal management and organization of universities. 
These studies focus on, among other things, how New Public Management approaches have 
been implemented in universities (Bleiklie 1998, Boden et al. 2006), how management 
models from industry and business can be applied to the higher education system (Buckland 
2009), and whether such models truly increase the efficiency of universities (Schubert 2009). 
Other relevant topics are the emergence of professional management positions in universities 
(Blaschke et al. 2014) and the many accountability mechanisms introduced by the state 
(Whitley and Glaeser 2007).  
A second group of studies focuses on the implications of current developments for 
teaching and learning at universities. The risk of a loss of quality due to the massification of 
higher education, increased administrative workload, and performance incentives 
exclusively oriented towards research (Mcinnis 2000) has made quality assurance in 
teaching and learning a highly relevant topic (Harvey and Newton 2004, Massaro 2010). Of 
particular interest are questions relating to the applicability of quality assurance models from 
business (Becket and Brookes 2008) and the changing expectations of society about the 
competences that students should acquire (Knight and Yorke 2003, Moore and Morton 
2015). Moreover, specific educational reforms, such as the curricula changes introduced by 
the Bologna Process, have received substantial attention (Keeling 2006). 
A third group of studies discusses the implications of the new steering approaches 
for research at individual level. The increasing reliance on project funding and the 
importance of performance indicators have been criticized for compromising scientific 
progress in the long run (Geuna 2001, Nedeva & Boden 2006). Many scholars have argued 
that quantitative measures for research output set problematic incentives that significantly 
affect the behavior of scientists (see e.g. Ringelhan et al. 2015 for an overview). Other 
studies have analyzed the impact of different types of funding on the research performance 
of individual scholars (see e.g. Arora and Gambardella 2005, Beaudry and Allaoui 2012), 
identifying features of funding schemes that are particularly well suited for science (Azoulay 
et al. 2011, Laudel & Glaeser 2014). Finally, the implications of the increasing reliance of 
public research on private funding has also attracted considerable attention in the literature 
(Gulbrandsen and Smeby 2005, Muscio et al. 2013). 
 
 
5 
A fourth group of contributions analyzes whole universities or university 
departments. Besides the paper of Aghion et al. (2010) on autonomy and competition, only 
a few studies have tried to assess whether competitive funding is positively associated with 
the research output of universities in terms of publications and citations (see e.g. Bolli and 
Somogyi 2011). Special attention has been given to the assessment of university 
performance and in particular to the validity and the limitations of university rankings, which 
regularly gain high visibility in public media (Hazelkorn 2015). Another stream of the 
literature has focused on productivity and efficiency issues, applying both parametric and 
non-parametric frontier analysis techniques to higher education institutions. Scholars have 
analyzed how university efficiency has evolved over time, how it varies across countries, 
and which conditions are associated with higher efficiency (for an overview see Nigsch and 
Schenker-Wicki 2015).  
A fifth group of studies takes a broader perspectives and examines whole university 
and research systems in different countries. A small number of studies has assessed whether 
more competitive environments display higher scientific output (Auranen and Nieminen 
2010), and have identified further elements affecting the success of research systems (Crespi 
and Geuna 2008). Special attention has also been given to the governance of university and 
research systems (see e.g. Braun 2008), coordination modes in science (Lepori 2011), and 
the relationship between the government, the scientific community, and intermediary 
organizations (Braun 1993, van der Meulen 1998). Moreover, scholars have described and 
discussed the overall changes in policies in several countries, such as trends in funding 
approaches and the emergence of new funding mechanisms (Lepori et al. 2007).  
A final group of studies is not directly concerned with the reforms in higher education 
but rather with the general structural changes that accompany these processes. Several 
contributions have discussed the diversification of higher education, as reflected by the 
increasing diversity of the student population, the specialization of existing universities on 
specific profiles, and the emergence of new types of institutions (Fumasoli and Huisman 
2013, Horta et al. 2008). Another growing stream of the literature investigates the interaction 
of universities and the business world, the advantages and disadvantages of common 
research projects with industry, academic entrepreneurship, and other related aspects (Geuna 
and Muscio 2009, Markman et al. 2004). Finally, several scholars have investigated the 
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ongoing internationalization processes in science and, more specifically, the creation of a 
common European Research Area (Marginson 2006, Luukkonen and Nedeva 2010, Teichler 
2004). 
 
 
3. The contribution of this dissertation 
 
Higher education systems are in continuous development and despite the fact that scholars 
have provided numerous valuable studies and contributions, many questions still remain to 
be answered. The present dissertation analyses selected aspects related to the new steering 
approaches in science, complementing several existing literature streams. It deals with 
questions relating to quality management and accountability, to the changing funding 
approaches in research, and to the overall governance of higher education systems. The three 
dissertation papers are connected by the common goal of identifying chances and challenges 
for the promotion of internationally successful research universities in the context of the 
recent reforms. 
Given that the research field is highly multi-disciplinary, the dissertation draws on 
several approaches that comprehend, apart from the main management perspective, elements 
from economics and political science. Many previous studies have been qualitative and 
theoretical, and the aim of this contribution is to enrich the ongoing discussion by providing 
quantitative empirical evidence for assumptions about current developments and causal 
relationships, and by proposing new points of view. It thereby takes a strong international 
perspective, with all papers representing cross-national studies.  
 
3.1 International accreditations and quality management systems 
 
The first paper entitled “Shaping performance: Do international accreditations and quality 
management really help?” explores issues related to the introduction of business-like quality 
management systems in higher education and, in particular, of institutional accreditations, 
which have become increasingly popular both as internal quality development tools and as 
external quality assurance and accountability mechanisms (Stensaker 2011). Among 
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business schools, international accreditations granted by prestigious organizations such as 
the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) in the United States 
and the European Foundation for Management Development (EFMD), which grants EQUIS 
accreditation, have become common quality labels that considerably contribute to the 
reputation of an institution and its ability to attract international students and researchers.  
While the process of acquiring an international accreditation may help business 
schools improve their organizational processes and their strategic planning, thus enhancing 
their performance (Zammuto 2008), it also involves high costs, the risk of increasing 
bureaucratization and a loss of flexibility and innovative capacity (Julian & Ofori-Dankwa, 
2006). As in the case of other forms of quality management systems adapted from the 
business world, the overall effects of international accreditations are thus highly disputed in 
academia. Given that empirical evidence based on international quantitative studies is 
largely missing, the present study uses results from an international survey to assess how the 
acquisition of an AACSB or EQUIS accreditation and other quality management approaches 
are related to the reputation of business schools as measured by their research output.  
The results point to a positive association of international accreditations with 
research performance. This association remains significant when one controls for the size of 
a business school, its expenditures per student, the availability of PhD programs, and the 
offer of Executive Education, which are all positively related to research performance. In 
contrast, other types of quality management systems do not exhibit any significant 
relationship to the performance measure used. These findings suggest that specific standards 
required by AACSB and EQUIS accreditations, such as having a coherent strategy and 
employing highly qualified personnel, may help business schools to enhance their 
performance and, consequently, their international reputation. 
 
3.2 Distributional and productivity effects of competitive university funding 
 
The second paper entitled “Differentiation or convergence? The allocation of external funds 
among German and Swiss universities and its consequences for scientific production” 
focuses on the increasing relevance of external project funding and the ways this tendency 
may affect universities. Competition for project funding is generally assumed to foster a 
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concentration of resources in the best institutions, forcing universities to specialize in certain 
domains and thus promoting differentiation within the system (Abramo et al. 2012, Horta et 
al. 2008). At the same time, competition may also spur imitation and mutual learning, 
leading to a convergence of acquisition strategies among universities (see e.g. Jha and 
Lampel 2014). The question whether funding reforms truly foster differentiation among 
universities and a concentration of resources in the strongest research-oriented universities 
is highly relevant for policy makers. 
Apart from this distributional effect, external project funding is also expected to 
increase the productivity of research, as it is usually granted to the best projects and the most 
talented researchers. However, this assumption does not necessarily apply to all types of 
external funds, the most common being research grants from national and international 
funding agencies, research contracts with government and industry, and contributions from 
foundations. These types of funding differ considerably in terms of their objectives and their 
requirements for applicants, and may lead to very different research outcomes. While several 
studies have analyzed the effects of single funding instruments at individual level (see e.g. 
Jacob & Lefgren 2011, Beaudry and Allaoui 2012), systematic analyses that account for the 
different types of external funding at university level are largely missing. 
This paper contributes to the debate by analyzing five categories of external 
university funds in Germany and Switzerland, tracking their evolution over the last 10 years. 
In a first step, it assesses whether competition has led to a differentiation or rather a 
convergence of resource acquisition patterns. In a second step, it analyses how different 
types of funding are associated with scientific production in universities and universities of 
applied sciences. Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis of converge rather than 
differentiation, pointing to possibly unintended effects of the funding reforms. The results 
also suggest that association patterns of external funding and research performance vary 
considerably depending on the type of funding and the type of university. For instance, funds 
from national funding agencies prove to be positively related to the research performance of 
universities, while a negative association can be observed in the case of government 
contracts. In contrast, government contracts are positively associated with the research 
output of universities of applied sciences.  
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3.3 Identifying best practices among funding agencies in Europe 
 
The third paper entitled “Setting the stage for university research: Varying approaches and 
best practices among funding agencies in Europe” investigates the consequences of the new 
steering approaches from a different perspective. Instead of analyzing universities, it focuses 
on funding agencies, which have become central players in science policy due to their task 
of allocating research funds competitively. In the course of the reforms, many governments 
have created new funding agencies, reformed existing ones, and expanded their budgets, 
often requiring an increase in thematic funding, i.e. funding directed towards previously 
defined research topics, at the expense of investigator-driven projects (Lepori et al. 2007). 
However, these developments have varied considerably across countries (Slipersaeter et al. 
2007). As a result, funding agencies differ considerably in terms of their governance, their 
organization, and their funding schemes. 
In the light of this great diversity, a highly relevant question is whether some models 
of funding agencies are better suited to fostering research at universities, and whether best 
practices can be identified. To date, several important conceptual and qualitative studies on 
funding agencies have been conducted (see e.g. Braun 1998, Benner and Sandström 2000). 
However, there is a lack of systematic comparative studies at the international level based 
on quantitative data and focusing on different types of agencies. To address the lack of 
comparative data, the paper develops a framework for categorizing funding agencies based 
on their specific funding profiles, and applies it to western European agencies. 
In a second step, it investigates best practices for the promotion of university research 
at country level. The analysis identifies four causal combinations of agency characteristics 
and context factors associated with successful university research systems. With regard to 
the funding profile of agencies, a focus on investigator-driven project funding, on 
fellowships, or on large excellence programs seems promising, while a focus on thematic 
funding proves to be negatively related to research performance. With regard to the context 
factors, the results stress the importance of a high funding level of universities. These 
findings are not only important for national governments aiming at fostering their research 
universities, but may also prove relevant in view of the increasing role of international 
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funding, since the European Framework Programs are still directed, to a large extent, 
towards thematic funding. 
 
 
4. Overall conclusions and outlook 
 
The three dissertation papers deal with several topics that are of interest to both university 
managers and policy-makers in charge of higher education and research. They draw on a 
rich literature on university reforms and aim at complementing it by providing empirical 
evidence based on quantitative international data. These quantitative approaches proved very 
useful, as they confirmed or rejected previous assumptions, allowed for more differentiated 
investigations, and brought some novel insights. The dissertation thus contributes to a better 
understanding of the reform processes underway and of their consequences for such 
multifaceted organizations as universities are. The various findings in the three papers entail 
suggestions that may help optimize both management and steering mechanisms, leading to 
a better resource allocation and – in the end – promoting strong research universities and 
enhancing their international competitiveness.  
At the same time, the studies only represent first attempts to analyze the new steering 
approaches in science using quantitative methods, and can be further developed in several 
ways. Universities and higher education and research systems are extraordinary complex and 
diverse, and several simplifications had to be made in the course of the analyses. Specific 
aspects of the research topics may be analyzed separately and investigated more deeply. If 
more data are available in the future, the models may also be expanded to include additional 
observations or other variables. Due to the absence of viable alternatives, all three studies 
focus on traditional indicators for research performance, such as publication counts and 
rankings, being aware of the well-known limitations of these measures. While research 
performance remains the main factor affecting an institution’s reputation, analyses 
investigating other important tasks of universities, namely, teaching, knowledge transfer, 
and other contributions to society, are also of great interest. 
Finally, as most other quantitative studies, the present analyses had to deal with 
several data issues. Not all data of interest could be gathered, and not all of it was available 
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at the desired level of detail. Comparability problems also arose with internationally 
collected data and required serious efforts to be solved. Moreover, endogeneity represented 
a challenge that could not always be fully addressed with the information at hand. New data 
may thus help to optimize the models used, and to increase the robustness of the results. 
Given the relevance of university reforms and the high amount of public money invested in 
higher education and research, additional efforts to improve the quality of the data and its 
availability seem justified, and will open the doors to further exciting research. 
 
 
  
 
 
12 
References 
 
Abramo, G., Cicero, T., & D’Angelo, C. A. (2012). The dispersion of research performance 
within and between universities as a potential indicator of the competitive intensity 
in higher education systems. Journal of Informetrics, 6, 155-168. 
Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M., Hoxby, C., Mas-Colell, A., & Sapir, A. (2010). The 
governance and performance of universities: Evidence from Europe and the US. 
Economic Policy, 25(61), 7-59.  
Arora, A., & Gambardella, A. (2005). The impact of NSF support for basic research in 
economics. Annales D’Économie et de Statistique, 79/80, 91-117. 
Auranen, O., & Nieminen, M. (2010). University research funding and publication 
performance: An international comparison. Research Policy 39, 822-834. 
Azoulay, P., Graff Zivin, J. S., & Manso, G. (2011). Incentives and creativity: evidence from 
the academic life sciences. RAND Journal of Economics, 42(3), 527-554. 
Barry, J., Chandler, J., & Clark, H. (2001). Between the ivory tower and the academic 
assembly line. Journal of Management Studies, 38(1), 87-101. 
Beaudry, C., & Allaoui, S. (2012). Impact of public and private research funding on 
scientific production: the case of nanotechnology. Research Policy, 41, 1589-1606. 
Becket, N. & Brookes, M. (2008). Quality management practice in higher education: What 
quality are we actually enhancing? The Journal of Hospitality, Leisure, Sport and 
Tourism, 7(1), 40-54. 
Benner, M., & Sandström, U. (2000). Institutionalizing the Triple Helix: Research Funding 
and Norms in the Academic System. Research Policy, 29, 291-301. 
Blaschke, S., Frost, J., & Hattke, F. (2014). Towards a micro-foundation of leadership, 
governance, and management in universities. Higher Education, 68, 711-732. 
Bleiklie, I. (1998). Justifying the evaluative state: New Public Management ideals in higher 
education. European Journal of Education, 33(3), 299-316. 
Boden, R., Cox, D., & Nedeva, M. (2006). The appliance of science? New Public 
Management and strategic change. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 
18(2), 125-141. 
 
 
13 
Bolli, T., & Somogyi, F. (2011). Do competitively acquired funds induce universities to 
increase productivity? Research Policy, 40, 136-147. 
Bonaccorsi, A. (2007). Explaining poor performance of European science: institutions 
versus policies. Science and Public Policy, 34(5), 303-316. 
Braun, D. (1993). Who governs intermediary agencies? Principal-agent relations in research 
policy-making. Journal of Public Policy, 13, 135-162. 
Braun, D. (1998). The role of funding agencies in the cognitive development of science. 
Research Policy, 27, 807-821. 
Braun, D. (2008). Organizing the political coordination of knowledge and innovation 
policies. Science and Public Policy, 35(4), 227-239. 
Buckland, R. (2009). Private and public sector models for strategies in universities. British 
Journal of Management, 20, 524-536. 
Butler, L. (2010). Impacts of performance-based research funding systems: A review of the 
concerns and the evidence. In: OECD. Performance-based Funding for Public 
Research in Tertiary Education Institutions: Workshop Proceedings. Paris: OECD. 
Crespi, G. A., & Geuna, A. (2008). An empirical study of scientific production: A cross 
country analysis, 1981-2002. Research Policy, 37, 565-579. 
Deem, R., & Brehony, K. J. (2005). Management as ideology: The case of ‘new 
managerialism’ in higher education. Oxford Review of Education, 31(2), 217-235. 
Estermann, T, & Nokkala, T. (2009). University Autonomy in Europe I: Exploratory Study. 
Brussels: European University Association. 
Etzkowitz, H., Leydesdorff, L. (2000). The dynamics of innovation: from National Systems 
and “Mode 2” to a Triple Helix of university-industry-government relations. 
Research Policy, 29, 109-123. 
Ferlie, E., Musselin, C., & Andresani, G. (2008). The steering of higher education systems: 
A public management perspective. Higher Education, 56, 325-348. 
Freeman, C. (1995). The “National System of Innovation” in historical perspective. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 19, 5-24. 
Fumasoli, T., & Huisman, J. (2013). Strategic agency and system diversity: Conceptualizing 
institutional positioning in higher education. Minerva, 51, 155-169. 
 
 
14 
Geuna, A. (2001). The changing rationale for European university research funding: Are 
there negative unintended consequences? Journal of Economic Issues, 35(3), 607-
632. 
Geuna, A., & Muscio, A. (2009). The governance of university knowledge transfer: A 
critical review of the literature. Minerva, 47(1), 93-114. 
Gibbson, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwartzman, S., Scott, P, & Trow, M. (1994). 
The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in 
Contemporary Societies. London: Sage. 
Gulbrandsen, M., & Smeby, J.-C. (2005). Industry funding and university professors’ 
research performance. Research Policy, 34, 932-950. 
Harvey, L., & Newton, J. (2004). Transforming quality evaluation. Quality in Higher 
Education, 10(2), 149-165. 
Hazelkorn, E. (2015). Rankings and the Reshaping of Higher Education: The Battle for 
World-Class Excellence. 2nd Edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Hicks, D. (2012). Performance-based university research funding systems. Research Policy, 
41, 251-261. 
Horta, H. (2009). Global and national prominent universities: Internationalisation, 
competitiveness and the role of the state. Higher Education, 58(3), 387-405. 
Horta, H., Huisman, J., & Heitor, M. (2008). Does competitive research funding encourage 
diversity in higher education? Science and Public Policy, 35(3), 146-158. 
Jah, P. P., & Lampel, J. (2014). Performance feedback, competitive repertoire simplicity, 
and technological evolution in a televised design contest. Research Policy, 43, 403-
413. 
Jacob, B. A., & Lefgren, L. (2011). The impact of NIH postdoctoral training grants on 
scientific productivity. Research Policy, 40, 864-874. 
Jacobs, B., & van der Ploeg, F. (2006). Guide to reform of higher education: a European 
perspective. Economic Policy, July 2006, 535-592. 
Julian, S. D., & Ofori-Dankwa, J. C. (2006). Is accreditation good for the strategic decision 
making of traditional business schools? Academy of Management Learning & 
Education, 5(2), 225-233. 
 
 
15 
Keeling, R. (2006). The Bologna Process and the Lisbon Research Agenda: The European 
Commission’s expanding role in higher education discourse. European Journal of 
Education, 41(2), 203-223. 
Knight, P. T., & Yorke, M. (2003). Employability and good learning in higher education. 
Teaching in Higher Education, 8(1), 3-16. 
Laudel, G., & Glaeser, J. (2014). Beyond breakthrough research: Epistemic properties of 
research and their consequences for research funding. Research Policy, 43, 1204-
1216. 
Lepori, B. (2011). Coordination modes in public funding systems. Research Policy, 40, 355-
367. 
Lepori, B., van den Basselaar, P., Dinges, M., Potì, B., Reale, E., Slipersaeter, S., Thèves, 
J., & van der Meulen, B. (2007). Comparing the evolution of national research 
policies: what patterns of change? Science and Public Policy, 34(6), 372-388. 
Luukkonen, T., & Nedeva, M. (2010). Towards understanding integration in research and 
research policy. Research Policy, 39, 674-686. 
Lundvall, B. (Ed.) (1992). National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation 
and Interactive Learning. London: Printer Publishers. 
Marginson, S. (2006). Dynamics of national and global competition in higher education. 
Higher Education, 52(1), 1-39. 
Markman, G. D., Gianiodis, P. T., Phan, Ph. H., & Balkin, D. B. (2004). Entrepreneurship 
from the ivory tower: Do incentive systems matter? Journal of Technology Transfer, 
29, 353-364. 
Martin, B. R. (2012). Are universities and university research under threat? Towards an 
evolutionary model of university speciation. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 36, 
543-565. 
Massaro, V. (2010). Cui bono? The relevance and impact of quality assurance. Journal of 
Higher Education Policy and Management, 32(1), 17-26. 
Mcinnis, C. (2000). Changing academic work roles: The everyday realities challenging 
quality in teaching. Quality in Higher Education, 6(2), 143-152. 
Mohrman, K., Ma, W., & Baker, D. (2008). The research university in transition: The 
emerging global model. Higher Education Policy, 21, 5-27. 
 
 
16 
Moore, T., & Morton, J. (2015). The myth of job readiness? Written communication, 
employability, and the “skills gab” in higher education. Studies in Higher Education, 
1-19. 
Morris, N. (2009). Science policy in action: Policy and the researcher. Minerva, 38(4), 425-
451. 
Muscio, A., Quaglione, D., & Vallanti, G. (2013). Does government funding complement or 
substitute private research funding to universities? Research Policy, 42, 63-75. 
Nedeva, M., Boden, R. (2006). Changing science: The advent of Neo-Liberalism. 
Prometheus: Critical Studies in Innovation, 24(3), 269-281. 
Nelson, R. (Ed.) (1993). National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Nigsch, S., & Schenker-Wicki, A. (2015). Frontier efficiency analysis in higher education. 
In: Welpe, I. M., Wollersheim J., Ringelhan S., & Osterloh M. (Eds.). Incentives and 
Performance: Governance of Research Organizations. Cham: Springer. 
Ollsen, M., & Peters, M. A. (2005). Neoliberalism, higher education and the knowledge 
economy: From the free market to knowledge capitalism. Journal of Education 
Policy, 20(3), 313-345. 
Paradeise, C., Reale, E., Bleiklie, I., & Ferlie, E. (2009). University Governance: Western 
European Comparative Perspectives. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Perkmann, M., Tartari, V., McKelvey, M., …, & Sobrero, M. (2013). Academic engagement 
and commercialisation: A review of the literature on university-industry relations. 
Research Policy, 42, 423-442. 
Ringelhan, S, Wollersheim, J., & Welpe, I. M. (2015). Performance management and 
incentive systems in research organizations: Effects, limits and opportunities. In: 
Welpe, I. M., Wollersheim J., Ringelhan S., & Osterloh M. (Eds.). Incentives and 
Performance: Governance of Research Organizations. Cham: Springer. 
Rosenberg, N., & Nelson, R. R. (1994). American universities and technical advance in 
industry. Research Policy, 24, 323-348.  
Schubert, T. (2009). Empirical observations on New Public Management to increase 
efficiency in public research – Boon or bane? Research Policy, 38, 1225-1234. 
 
 
17 
Slipersaeter, S., Lepori, B., & Dinges, M. (2007). Between policy and science: research 
councils’ responsiveness in Austria, Norway and Switzerland. Science and Public 
Policy, 34(6), 401-415. 
Stensaker, B. (2011). Accreditation of higher education in Europe: Moving towards the US 
model? Journal of Education Policy, 26(6), 757-769. 
Stephan, P. E. (2012). How Economics Shapes Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Teichler, U. (1998). Massification: A challenge for institutions of higher education. Tertiary 
Education and Management, 4(1), 17-27. 
Teichler, U. (2004). The changing debate on internationalization in higher education. Higher 
Education, 48(1), 5-26. 
Trow, M. (1999). From mass higher education to universal access: The American advantage. 
Minerva, 37, 303-328. 
Trow, M. (2007). Reflections on the transition from elite to mass to universal access: Forms 
and phases of higher education in modern societies since WWII. In: Forest, J. J. F., 
& Altbach, Ph. G. (Eds.). International Handbook of Higher Education. Dordrecht: 
Springer. 
van der Meulen, B. (1998). Science policies as principal-agent games: institutionalization 
and path dependency in the relation between government and science. Research 
Policy, 27, 397-414. 
van der Ploeg, F., & Veugelers, R. (2008). Towards evidence-based reform of European 
universities. CESifo Economic Studies, 54(2), 99-120. 
Whitley, R., & Glaeser, J. (Eds.) (2007). The Changing Governance of the Sciences: The 
Advent of Research Evaluation Systems. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Zammuto, R. F. (2008). Accreditation and the globalization of business. Academy of 
Management Learning & Education, 7(2), 256-268. 
 
 
  
 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Appendix: Papers included in the dissertation 
 
 
  
 
 
19 
 
 
A.1 
Shaping performance: do international accreditations 
and quality management really help?*† 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In recent years, international accreditations have become an important form of 
quality management for business schools all over the world. However, given 
their high costs and the risk of increasing bureaucratization and control, 
accreditations remain highly disputed in academia. This paper uses quantitative 
data to assess whether accreditations can help a business school to foster its 
research performance and consequently its reputation. On the basis of an 
international survey, we analyze how being accredited by AACSB or EQUIS 
affects the institutions’ position in the Top 1000 Business School Ranking of the 
Social Science Research Network. We find that international accreditations are 
positively related to research performance, while other approaches to quality 
management do not exhibit any significant relationship to ranking positions. 
These results point to the importance of specific standards required by AACSB 
and EQUIS accreditations such as having a coherent strategy and employing 
highly qualified personnel. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The rise of quality management has been one of the most important transformations in higher 
education over the last 30 years. Two interrelated trends underlie this development. First, 
the emergence of “new managerialism” approaches in higher education (Deem and Brehony 
2005) and the increasing focus on institutional performativity (Ollsen and Peters 2005) have 
led universities to implement internal quality management systems based on concepts and 
models from the business world. Second, many governments have started promoting external 
quality assurance in higher education as an accountability tool in order to ensure that public 
funds are properly invested (Massaro 2010, Harvey and Newton 2004).  
In this context, institutional accreditations have become increasingly popular both as 
internal quality management approaches and as external quality assurance tools (Stensaker 
2011). Among business schools in particular, voluntary accreditations by prestigious 
international organizations have spread worldwide. Today, being accredited by one of the 
two main agencies in this field, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business 
(AACSB) in the United States and the European Foundation for Management Development 
(EFMD, responsible for the EQUIS accreditation), considerably contributes to a business 
school’s reputation. These “international” accreditations serve as a quality label and as a 
competitive advantage in the struggle for the best students and most outstanding researchers 
(Trapnell 2007, Urgel 2007).  
However, the effect of accreditations remains highly disputed in academia. Many 
scholars see accreditations as a restriction on academic freedom, a fruitless bureaucratic 
burden, and an impediment to adaptation and innovation (Harvey 2004, Julian and Ofori-
Dankwa 2006, Scheele 2004). Others view accreditations positively and stress their 
contributions to strategic planning and organizational effectiveness (Zammuto 2008, 
Lejeune and Vas 2009). In both cases, sound empirical evidence for the effect of 
accreditations is scant. Lejeune and Vas (2009) have analyzed the effect of EQUIS 
accreditations with quantitative survey data and found that accreditations positively 
influence organizational culture and effectiveness. However, their results were solely based 
on the perceptions of the business schools’ deans and did not account for objective 
performance measures. Similarly, relatively few studies have provided empirical evidence 
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for the positive or negative effects of other forms of quality management in higher education 
(Kleijnen et al. 2011). Notably scarce are quantitative international studies and contributions 
that focus on quality management in research, as opposed to merely teaching and learning 
(Harvey and Williams 2010).  
In the present study, we address these gaps and use quantitative data to analyze 
whether international accreditations and other forms of quality management truly help a 
business school to improve its performance. Since research has become crucial for the 
overall reputation of higher education institutions, we focus on research performance as a 
dependent variable. Business schools doing quality research are able to attract leading 
scholars and high-performance students, enabling them to successfully compete at the 
international level. Moreover, research performance strongly affects the institutions’ 
position in international university rankings (Buela-Casal 2007, Horta 2009). Despite being 
criticized for their methodology (see for example Toutkoushian et al. 2003), these rankings 
have a relevant social impact (Meredith 2004, Bowman and Bastedo 2011). Hence, we state 
our research question as follows: How does the acquisition of an international accreditation 
affect a business school’s reputation - measured as research performance - compared with 
other quality management approaches? 
Currently, the various activities related to quality management within higher 
education institutions require significant financial and personal resources (Stensaker 2003, 
Heriot et al. 2009). It is therefore important to assess how different forms of quality 
management may contribute to an institution’s performance. Knowing which approaches 
accompany the best results may help governments and higher education managers to 
optimize their strategies for quality assurance and quality development, improving the 
reputation, productivity, and cost-efficiency of business schools and other higher education 
institutions. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Following Grant et al. (2004), we define quality management as all activities and processes 
deliberately carried out to design, evaluate and improve teaching, learning, research and 
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administrative functions within higher education institutions. Quality management has 
always existed in academia (Newton 2007). However, with the diffusion of new public 
management approaches and the growing need for external accountability, many higher 
education institutions have begun to implement quality management systems based on 
concepts and models from the business world. Most of these systems follow the philosophy 
of Total Quality Management (Becket and Brookes 2008) and many of them adopt either the 
Malcolm Baldrige Criteria, the Excellence Model of the European Foundation for Quality 
Management (EFQM) or the ISO-9000 standards. Quality management systems based on 
concepts from business have the advantage of being easily accepted by external stakeholders 
(Brookes and Becket 2007). However, they do not always account for elements specific to 
higher education institutions, such as academic freedom (Thalner cit. in Houston 2008, p. 
65).  
The effect of quality management systems on the overall performance of higher 
education institutions remains disputed in academia (Tambi et al. 2008). According to 
Brennan and Shah (2000), the introduction of new quality management systems has been 
accompanied by a shift in power from the basic unit to the institutional level. Other studies 
have observed that new forms of quality management lead to higher bureaucratization 
(Kogan et al. 2000) and cause disproportionate costs compared to unclear effects (PA 
Consulting 2000). Lomas (2004) points out the issue of opportunity costs: the high amount 
of financial resources needed to implement and maintain a quality management system may 
be otherwise better invested. Among the positive effects of the new forms of quality 
management, scholars often mention increased transparency (Stensaker 2003). 
Parallel to the diffusion of quality management systems based on concepts from 
business, accreditations have become an important way of ensuring the quality of higher 
education institutions (Stensaker 2011). The term “accreditation” describes a process by 
which an institution obtains the authorization to conduct educational programs recognized 
by the state or by another authority. This process makes use of a benchmarking method, 
refers to specific standards, and aims at a “yes or no” verdict (Haakstad 2001). Accreditations 
may focus on a specific educational program or an institution as a whole. In many European 
countries, higher education institutions need to be accredited by a national authority, while 
in the United States private agencies can grant accreditations. Some of these private 
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agencies, such as AACSB and EFMD, focus on excellence rather than merely providing a 
“right to exist” (Schwarz and Westerheijden 2005, p. 2) and offer their services 
internationally. Achieving such a prestigious accreditation may thus increase a business 
school’s international reputation (Trapnell 2007, Urgel 2007). 
Similarly to other forms of quality management, the true effects of accreditations are 
disputed in academia. For example, Harvey (2004, p. 207), based on a qualitative survey 
among academics and managers in Britain, the United States, and Canada, concluded that 
the accreditation process can be “a power struggle that impinges on academic freedom”, 
imposing extensive bureaucratic burdens in some cases. Accreditations may also limit 
innovation opportunities: Julian and Ofori-Dankwa (2006), who focus their analysis on 
AACSB accreditations, argue that the accreditation process hinders a business school’s 
capability to adapt to a “discontinuous” and “turbulent” environment characterized by 
technical innovations and increasing competition from corporate and virtual universities.  
In contrast, Romero (2008) states that AACSB accreditations encourage flexibility 
and creativity. Although the author admits a “lack of published, hard and systematic data” 
on the effects of accreditation (Romero 2008, p. 246), he argues that accreditations provide 
incentives for strategic development, which may in turn improve performance (Miller and 
Cardinal 1994). Proitz et al. (2004), who analyzed EQUIS reports and recommendations, 
conclude that institutional accreditations foster diversity rather than standardization, and 
focus on improvement rather than control. The authors go as far as to question whether 
EQUIS standards are actually too weak to justify the amount of bureaucratization the 
accreditation process requires. 
So far, only few studies have assessed the impact of accreditations using quantitative 
empirical data. Roller et al. (2003) conducted a survey among deans of North American 
business schools, and compared the perception of AACSB and other common accreditation 
agencies in the U.S. Among their results, they find that AACSB accreditation is particularly 
apt to promote excellence in research. On the basis of a survey among 31 deans and directors 
of EQUIS-accredited schools, Lejeune and Vas (2009) assert that accreditations improve a 
business school’s program development, its social openness and its ability to acquire 
resources, particularly qualified faculty and academic partners. In a later study, Lejeune 
(2011) presents a capability-based model to explain how international accreditations enable 
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continuous improvement. He states that EQUIS accreditations foster three core-capabilities 
of business schools: strategizing, changing resources and activities, and branding. 
 
 
3. Hypotheses 
 
In line with Romero (2008) and Lejeune and Vas (2009), we expect that international 
accreditations will help business schools to improve their research performance. Although 
AACSB and EQUIS accreditations focus on teaching, they set clear standards that concern 
the strategic management of business schools, their organizational processes and the quality 
of faculty (AACSB 2012, EFMD 2012). Business schools applying for an accreditation need 
to take specific measures in order to meet these requirements and engage in a learning 
process that may increase quality and overall performance. We identified six ways in which 
accreditations can lead to a higher research performance.  
1. Strategizing: Both AACSB and EQUIS require a clear mission statement that is 
known and shared by all business schools’ faculty and collaborators. Developing a vision 
about the services they offer and the market they serve will improve the business schools’ 
ability to compete successfully (Zammuto 2008). Moreover, mission statements should 
include a clear commitment to high quality research, which may lead business schools to 
promote research activities. Accredited institutions also need to develop clear strategies for 
reaching their goals and investing their resources (Lejeune 2011). According to the strategic 
management literature, having a good strategy is central to the success of an organization 
(see for example Pearce II et al. 1987, Mosakowski 1993). For instance, in the context of 
higher education, the presence of a research council responsible for an institution’s long-
term strategy positively affects research efficiency (Schubert 2009).  
2. Effective management: EQUIS expects a business school to have “effective and 
integrated organization for the management of its activities” (EFMD 2012, p. 7). Similarly, 
“AACSB accreditation forces a business school to effectively manage its resources 
consistent with its mission” (Trapnell 2007, p. 69). Different management approaches may 
indeed have different effects on an institution’s research activities. In a quantitative empirical 
study on the effects of new public management, Schubert (2009) finds that operative 
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flexibility, resource control, the strength of deans and presidents, and the introduction of 
goal agreements are among the factors that positively influence research performance. 
Furthermore, effective management may release faculty members and scientific 
collaborators from administrative tasks, and create an environment that fosters good 
research. 
3. Data collection: In order to meet the accreditation requirements, business schools 
must systematically collect data that reflects in detail the quality of teaching, learning, and 
research at their institution. In terms of organizational control theory, the use of such 
performance measures as a form of output control is particularly useful when task 
programmability is low, as in the case of research (Johnson 2011). By means of data 
collections, business schools may recognize their strengths and weaknesses and find out 
where further optimization is needed. Moreover, they can set specific incentives to promote 
performance and avoid underperformance. Taylor (2006), who analyzed research 
management in six leading research universities, states that all institutions in his study collect 
and use performance indicators.  
4. Faculty quality: Both AACSB and EQUIS set high standards concerning the 
qualification of faculty in teaching and research. As a result, business schools applying for 
accreditation may recruit high-profile academics, paying them accordingly. Hedrick et al. 
(2010) found that in faculties with AACSB accredited programs, researchers were paid more 
and performed better than in those without accreditation. AACSB also requires “well-
documented and communicated processes in place to manage and support faculty members 
over the progression of their careers consistent with the school’s mission” (AACSB 2012, 
p. 53). Such formal mechanisms represent a further incentive for a scholar to join a business 
school and may foster research productivity. Faculty recruitment is a form of input control, 
which, again, is important when task programmability is low (Johnson 2011). According to 
Liefner (2003), the quality of the academic staff is the most important factor for the long-
term success of a higher education institution.  
5. Openness: EQUIS and AACSB expect that business schools foster connections 
with other higher education institutions and the corporate world. External cooperation may 
initiate learning processes and serve as a source of new ideas both in teaching and research, 
contributing to faculty development and productive research (Lejeune and Vas 2009). 
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Moreover, EQUIS in particular emphasizes internationalization of student body and faculty 
(Proitz et al. 2004). While international students and scholars may enrich the academic 
environment, a business school also needs to adapt to international standards in teaching and 
research if it wants to compete at the international level successfully. In doing so, it may 
need to further improve the quality of its services and its productivity. 
6. Reputation: Finally, international accreditations may also foster research 
performance through their direct effect on reputation. As postulated by signaling theory (see 
for example Connelly et al. 2011), the main function of AACSB and EQUIS accreditations 
is to inform a business school’s customers and partners about the quality of its services. For 
example, part-time working students and international students in particular use international 
accreditations as a quality differentiator (Zammuto 2008). Once accreditation has been 
achieved, the label’s prestige and branding effects can make a business school more 
attractive to leading scholars and help to find appropriate partners (Temponi 2005). In doing 
so, accreditations reinforce the effects previously described, further increasing a business 
school’s research performance. 
We need to bear in mind that research is to some extent a prerequisite for international 
accreditation. Business schools that already have a high research performance may thus be 
more likely to apply for and achieve accreditation. However, AACSB adopted mission-
oriented standards in 1991, making it possible for smaller institutions with less focus on 
research to be accredited (Heriot et al. 2009). Moreover, in recent surveys, business school 
deans and directors stressed that accreditations increase scholarly activity and organizational 
effectiveness (Roller et al. 2003, Lejeune and Vas 2009). Accreditation standards may thus 
indeed serve as incentives for improving an institution’s performance. Given that both the 
process of seeking accreditation and the reputation effect after obtaining it may lead to a 
higher research performance, we state our main hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Business schools that have achieved one or more international 
accreditations exhibit higher research performance.  
 
Outside the context of accreditations, the implementation of a quality management 
system may contribute to higher research performance. In most cases, these systems imply 
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the creation of a separate entity within the business school charged with coordinating various 
quality management activities. Drawing on the principal-agent theory of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), we expect such an entity to make sure that academic and administrative 
staff fulfil their tasks according to the management’s expectations. One of the main 
approaches to assure compliance is output control by means of performance indicators. As 
in the case of accreditations, systematic data collection may help the business school’s 
managers to identify potential areas for further improvement.  
Although quality management systems often involve a high degree of 
bureaucratization (Kogan et al. 2000), they are reported to improve the efficiency of 
administrative processes (Brookes and Becket 2007). Again, we observe a similar effect as 
in the case of accreditations: increased administrative efficiency may enable academic 
personnel to devote more time to research, in turn contributing to higher research 
performance. As accreditations and quality management require systematic data collection 
and improve organizational processes, we also expect the two approaches to be positively 
correlated with each other. However, a clear cause-effect relationship is difficult to assess. 
For example, a functioning quality management system could ease the accreditation process. 
At the same time, achieving accreditation may serve as an incentive for a business school to 
introduce a quality management system. 
To ensure that quality management processes are not limited to teaching and learning 
evaluations, we consider only quality management systems that explicitly include research 
activities and administrative processes.  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Business schools that have implemented a quality management system 
covering research activities exhibit higher research performance. 
Hypothesis 2b: Business schools that have implemented a quality management system are 
more likely to have achieved international accreditation. 
 
Finally, evaluating and discussing research projects within a business school’s 
faculty is another important form of quality management. According to Kaufmann (2009), 
regular meetings or mentoring as well as informal and spontaneous feedback contribute to 
quality assurance and quality development in higher education. Owen-Smith (2001), who 
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analyzed such interactions in a multidisciplinary neuroscience laboratory, concludes that, 
besides its evaluative function, “scientific skepticism” also serves as a control and 
coordination mechanism.  
We call this form of quality management “feedback loops” and expect it to improve 
a business school’s research performance. In the higher education literature, the concept of 
feedback loops generally refers to the opinion of external stakeholders and course 
evaluations by students (Venkatraman 2007, Becket and Brookes 2006). However, in the 
present study we consider only faculty-internal feedback loops for research projects. Since 
engaging in an accreditation process may foster communication and cooperation within a 
business school (Lejeune and Vas 2009), we also expect such feedback loops to positively 
correlate with the achievement of an AACSB or EQUIS accreditation.  
 
Hypothesis 3a: Business schools with internal feedback loops for research projects exhibit 
higher research performance. 
Hypothesis 3b: Business schools with internal feedback loops for research projects are 
more likely to have achieved international accreditation.  
 
 
4. Methods 
 
For our statistical population, we used the higher education institutions registered in the Top 
1000 Business School Ranking of the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) in June 
2010. On the SSRN website, researchers from all over the world can publish their research 
results at an early stage as working papers. Since 2005, the SSRN has analyzed these 
publications in order to measure and compare the performance of higher education 
institutions. SSRN rankings are based on the number of papers posted by a higher education 
institution in the SSRN eLibrary and the frequency with which these papers are downloaded. 
The rankings are updated monthly and freely accessible.  
By the end of 2010, we had contacted more than 1'250 school directors via e-mail 
and invited them to participate in an online survey. Of these, 99 responded in the first round. 
In a second round in spring 2011, we contacted 75 school directors from the top 250 business 
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schools by telephone and obtained 18 additional feedbacks. The total of 117 responses 
corresponds to a feedback rate of nearly 10 per cent, which is rather low for online 
questionnaires in organizational research (Baruch and Holtom 2008). 
Of the 117 institutions in the final sample, 41 were actually economic departments 
of universities registered as business schools on the SSRN website. The majority of the 
business schools (79 per cent) were public institutions. Their size ranged from a few dozen 
students to more than 14'000 and their budgets accordingly from 80'000 to over 300 million 
USD. On average, the business schools had around 2'100 full time students and a budget of 
26.8 million USD. 42 per cent of the institutions were located in Europe, 37 per cent in the 
USA, 12 per cent in Asia and 9 per cent in other regions (Latin America, Africa and 
Oceania). Half of the business schools (59 to be exact) were accredited either by AACSB or 
EQUIS, or had achieved both international accreditations. Among the participating 
institutions, 46 had implemented quality management systems covering research activities, 
including administrative processes and chair planning. In order to measure feedback loops 
for research projects, we asked if research contributions by faculty members were regularly 
evaluated and results discussed within the faculty. 88 business schools said they had this 
type of feedback loops. 
Using a similar approach to Aghion et al. (2010), we compared the research 
performance of business schools with their position in the SSRN Top 1000 Business School 
Ranking. Black and Caron (2006) analyzed the SSRN ranking of law schools as a measure 
of research performance. They concluded that SSRN rankings represent a valid and 
transparent instrument for measuring one important form of research output. By focusing on 
working papers, these rankings offer real time data and favor younger scholars and emerging 
schools. The SSRN rankings can therefore be seen as “leading” indicators of a faculty’s 
influence, while traditional indicators such as reputation surveys and citation counts have a 
more “lagging” character (Black and Caron 2006, p. 112). 
A problem that persists with the SSRN rankings is their high volatility in the lower 
positions. Just a few downloads of a working paper can cause an upward shift of 75 positions. 
For this reason, we randomly chose three monthly rankings between May 2010 and April 
2011 to calculate an average ranking. Additionally, to test our model we needed only to 
consider the business schools that participated in the survey. Following Currie and Pandher 
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(2011), who analyzed rankings of finance journals, we created four categories and classified 
the higher education institutions in our sample according to their absolute position in the 
entire ranking. Our four categories correspond to the classification used by the Academic 
Journal Quality Guide (Harvey et al. 2010) and represent the best 10 per cent (world elite), 
the following 25 per cent (above average ranking), the middle 40 per cent (average ranking) 
and the last 25 per cent (rather low ranking). 
In our analysis, we controlled for the size of the business schools – operationalized 
with the number of full-time students – and the operating budget per student. Moreover, as 
business schools with little focus on research may have few publications on SSRN despite 
being internationally accredited, we needed to control for the institution’s research 
orientation. We expected business schools offering a PhD program to be more research-
oriented. Finally, we included the offer of specific programs for managers and chief officers 
(Executive Education) in our analysis. Executive Education can allow for synergies between 
research and practice. New research insights may be presented in the courses and critically 
questioned by students who have sound experience outside academia. This feedback can 
help optimize teaching and contribute to further research (Tushman et al. 2007). Executive 
Education also enables business schools to widen their financial base and acquire more 
resources. Moreover, it may boost public awareness of the business school and contribute to 
its reputation. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
Since our dependent variable is ordinal, we used an ordered-logit regression to test our 
hypotheses (see for example Agresti 2010). The ordered-logit regression estimates the 
influence of independent factors on the probability of a business school being in a certain 
ranking category. For the results to be meaningful, independent factors should not exhibit 
strong multicollinearity and have the same coefficients across all ordinal categories of the 
dependent variable. Both conditions were met by our data. In order to better interpret the 
effects of our accreditation and quality management variables, we analyzed five models that 
differed in the number of independent factors included (see table 1). 
 
 
31 
 
Table 1: Results of the ordered-logit regression 
 
 
 
The factors for the acquisition of an international accreditation (X1) and the presence 
of internal feedback loops for research projects (X3) proved to be positively and significantly 
related to business schools’ ranking positions. Similarly, all four control variables (C1 to 
C4) exhibited mostly significant coefficients that pointed in the expected direction. In 
contrast, the effect of having a quality management system implemented (X2) was close to 
zero and not significant in either model 2 and 4. With a pseudo R2 value of 0.584 in model 
3 and 4, we can conclude that international accreditations, feedback loops and control 
variables explain to a large extent variation in the dependent variable. The results of the 
likelihood-ratio test proved to be highly significant, implying that our independent variables 
significantly improve the model.  
 
Variables 
(measurement level) 
Model 0  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
β (SE)  β (SE)  β (SE)  β (SE)  β (SE) 
X1 
 
International accreditation 
(dummy) 
  
1.811*** 
(0.468) 
 
1.803*** 
(0.469) 
 
1.632*** 
(0.479) 
 
1.632*** 
(0.479) 
X2 
 
Quality management system 
(dummy) 
    
0.118 
(0.379) 
   
-0.008 
(0.386) 
X3 
 
Feedback loops 
(dummy) 
      
1.275*** 
(0.474) 
 
1.276*** 
(0.477) 
C1 
 
Number of students 
(in thousands, interval) 
0.636*** 
(0.126) 
 
0.562*** 
(0.129) 
 
0.561*** 
(0.130) 
 
0.552*** 
(0.130) 
 
0.553*** 
(0.130) 
C2 
 
Budget-per-student 
(in U.S. Dollars, interval) 
0.093*** 
(0.026) 
 
0.064** 
(0.026) 
 
0.064** 
(0.026) 
 
0.068*** 
(0.025) 
 
0.068*** 
(0.025) 
C3 
 
PhD 
(dummy) 
0.254 
(0.405) 
 
1.299*** 
(0.490) 
 
1.302*** 
(0.490) 
 
1.378*** 
(0.502) 
 
1.378*** 
(0.502) 
C4 
 
Executive Education 
(dummy) 
0.968** 
(0.416) 
 
0.904** 
(0.420) 
 
0.894** 
(0.421) 
 
0.881** 
(0.426) 
 
0.881** 
(0.426) 
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke) 0.475  0.552  0.552  0.584  0.584 
Dependent variable: 4 SSRN ranking categories. 
Significance levels * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01 
Standard errors in brackets. 
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In order to test our hypotheses about the relationship between international 
accreditations and other forms of quality management (hypotheses 2b and 3b), we needed to 
estimate the correlations among independent factors (see table 2). As expected, international 
accreditations proved to be strongly correlated with feedback processes. However, we did 
not find any correlation between international accreditations and the implementation of a 
quality management system.  
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix 
 
Variables Rank X1 X2 X3 C1 C2 C3 
X1 Int. accred. 0.424***       
X2 QM system 0.137 0.133      
X3 Feedback loops 0.322*** 0.302*** 0.178*     
C1 Students 0.442*** 0.182** 0.020 0.160*    
C2 Budget 0.436*** 0.288*** 0.163* 0.071 0.020   
C3 PhD 0.297*** -0.302*** -0.025 -0.070 0.236** 0.245***  
C4 Ex. Education 0.323*** 0.112 0.119 0.045 -0.041 0.319*** 0.237** 
Significance levels: * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01 
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
Our results indicate that business schools with one or two international accreditations 
outperform other institutions in terms of ranking positions. This result holds true even when 
controlling for a business school’s size and operating budget. Empirical evidence thus 
supports our first hypothesis: business schools that have obtained an international 
accreditation exhibit a higher research performance. Although many business schools 
already performed well before engaging in the accreditation process, international 
accreditations can further improve research performance through their effect on strategic 
management, resource allocation, openness and reputation. Since research performance 
affects reputation and reputation further increases research performance by making a 
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business school more attractive to leading scholars and potential partners (Temponi 2005), 
the two factors may mutually reinforce each other.  
The analysis did not provide any empirical evidence for a correlation between quality 
management systems and a business schools’ research performance, so hypothesis 2a could 
not be confirmed. Similarly, our data did not support hypothesis 2b regarding the correlation 
between quality management systems and international accreditations. These results reflect 
some of the critical literature on quality management (see for example Lomas 2004; Temple 
2005). Positive effects of quality management systems, such as increased efficiency of 
organizational processes and higher transparency (Stensaker 2003) may be outweighed by 
expanded bureaucratization (Kogan et al. 2000). Moreover, unlike international 
accreditations, quality management systems do not necessarily contribute to strategy 
development nor improve a business school’s attractiveness to renowned researchers and 
external partners.  
Besides the effects of international accreditations, internal feedback loops for 
research projects are significantly related to a business school’s ranking position. Our 
analysis supported hypothesis 3a, confirming the importance of faculty members evaluating 
one another’s research projects as a form of quality management (Kaufmann 2009, Owen-
Smith 2001). As predicted in hypothesis 3b, these feedback loops are also positively 
correlated to international accreditations. Empirical evidence thus endorses the assumption 
that international accreditations foster faculty integration and cooperation within business 
schools (Lejeune and Vas 2009). The inclusion of feedback loops in the ordered-logit 
regression slightly decreases the coefficient of the factor for international accreditations (see 
model 4), which suggests that feedback loops partly act as a mediating variable on the 
relationship between accreditation and research performance.  
Among the control variables, all of our factors proved to be significantly related to 
research performance in the way we expected. A business school’s size and relative access 
to resources positively affect its position in the SSRN ranking. Moreover, the number of 
students and the budget-per-student variables positively correlate with achievement of 
international accreditations. Bigger and richer business schools are thus more likely to be 
accredited by AACSB or EQUIS. Finally, the positive and significant coefficient for our 
Executive Education variable supports the assumption that Executive Education programs 
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contribute to the research performance of business schools (Tushman et al. 2007). The 
positive correlation between Executive Education and budget per student reflects the 
assumption that Executive Education may influence research performance by providing 
additional financial resources. 
According to Shah (1997), the impact of quality management on changes in higher 
education cannot be easily separated from the effect of other factors. In our analysis, we 
could not directly consider the knowledge and skills of the academic personnel, which is 
likely to have a relevant impact on research performance and accreditation (Liefner 2003). 
Another problem that has to be addressed is causality. Our ordered-logit model does not 
indicate if it is the supposedly independent variable that affects the dependent one or vice 
versa. As previously described, causality may be a problem especially in the case of 
international accreditations: since higher education institutions must meet specific standards 
of education and research in order to be accredited, research performance may influence the 
probability of achieving accreditation. In order to test whether accreditations truly foster 
research performance one would need to compare the research performance of a business 
school before it seeks international accreditation to its performance after it has obtained one. 
Unfortunately, with the data at hand we were not able to conduct such an analysis. 
Finally, a major limitation of this study was the survey’s relatively low response rate, 
which makes it difficult to generalize the results. As statistical information about the 
business schools registered on SSRN was unavailable, we could not exactly assess to what 
extent our sample matched the population. We only know that AACSB and EFMD have 
accredited together more than 700 business schools (AACSB 2013, EFMD 2013). Assuming 
that most of them are among the 1,250 institutions in the SSRN ranking, the 50 per cent 
share of accredited business schools in our sample may correspond quite well to their 
proportion in the population. Moreover, an overview of the SSRN ranking confirmed that, 
as suggested by our sample, most business schools were located in Europe and the USA. 
 
  
 
 
35 
7. Conclusions 
 
In the context of increasing international competition (Marginson 2006, Teichler 2004), 
research performance has become a central factor influencing a higher education institution’s 
reputation and its ability to recruit the best students and most outstanding faculty. This study 
used quantitative empirical data to analyze whether international accreditations and other 
forms of quality management contribute to a business school’s research performance as 
measured by ranking position. While international accreditations proved to be positively and 
significantly related to research performance, we did not find any empirical evidence for a 
relationship between quality management systems and ranking positions. Although the 
survey’s low response rate makes the findings difficult to generalize, our results suggest that 
international accreditations provide specific incentives that can help to improve a business 
school’s research performance. Among the relevant factors, we may point out the high 
standards concerning a coherent strategy and the quality of faculty as well as the 
accreditations’ branding effect (Romero 2008, Lejeune 2011). Unlike international 
accreditations, many quality management systems do not cover these areas and focus instead 
on data collection, organizational effectiveness and control.  
In this study we focused on business schools and took a broad international 
perspective. Further contributions might investigate the impact of accreditations and quality 
management in other types of higher education institutions and in single countries or regions. 
It would also be interesting to look at single variables in more detail and analyze, for 
example, differences between AACSB and EQUIS accreditations. A further differentiation 
of quality management systems may also be relevant since such systems vary greatly among 
higher education institutions (Billing 2004, Houston 2008). A new survey would need to 
include specific definitions and explanations in order to better distinguish different 
approaches to quality management and account for the existing diversity.  
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A.2 
Differentiation or convergence? 
The allocation of external funds among German and Swiss 
universities and its consequences for scientific production* 
 
 
Abstract 
One of the goals of higher education and research policy in Europe is to increase 
university performance through market-like steering mechanisms and a stronger 
focus on competitive external funds. However, the effect of such policies on the 
structure of national research systems and scientific production are disputed in 
academia. This study first assesses how increasing competition has affected 
resource acquisition by universities in Germany and Switzerland, two countries 
with similar higher education systems but different policy approaches at the 
federal level. In a second step, it analyzes how the specialization on different 
types of external funding – namely research grants from national and 
international funding agencies, government and industry contracts, and 
contributions from foundations – is related to the scientific production and 
consequently the reputation of a university. Empirical evidence supports the 
hypothesis of convergence towards similar patterns of resource acquisition, 
rather than increasing differentiation. It also suggests that scientific production 
is strongly associated with specialization on single types of funding, and that 
these association patterns differ depending on the type of university. These 
results have important implications for both university managers and policy 
makers. 
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44 
1.  Introduction 
 
Most universities in continental Europe are public and funded primarily by the state through 
direct core contributions. External funding, which is funding from private or public sources 
acquired autonomously by researchers in competition with others, has traditionally played a 
minor role (see e.g. Jongbloed & Vossensteyn 2001, Lepori et al. 2007a, Lepori 2011). In 
the last 20 years, however, resource scarcity due to the exceptional growth of universities in 
both student numbers and research expenditures, and underperformance in research as 
compared to leading US universities (Bonaccorsi 2007, Jacobs and van der Ploeg 2006) have 
called for a more effective allocation of public funds. To achieve this goal, many European 
governments have implemented reforms aimed at increasing university autonomy, 
improving accountability, and creating a market-like environment (see e.g. de Boer et al. 
2002, Kogan et al. 2006, Paradeise et al. 2009). The belief that funds should be allocated 
more selectively has led to an increasing focus on external, competitive public funding, and 
a growing importance of private funding (Geuna & Muscio 2009, Perkmann et al. 2013).  
The effects of these policy approaches are contested in academia (see e.g. Hicks 
2012). While some scholars stress the importance of fostering competition in order to 
modernize the European higher education system (van der Ploeg and Veugelers 2008), others 
have criticized such reforms as compromising scientific progress in the long run (Geuna & 
Martin 2003, Hicks & Katz 2011). Besides the new institutional frameworks introduced, 
such as the growing need for accountability and the use of performance indicators, funding 
reforms, and specifically the growing reliance on competitive funding, may affect the future 
development of higher education and research in several ways.  
On the one hand, competitive funding has an impact on the allocation of resources 
among universities and, consequently, on the structure of national university systems 
including their inherent dynamics and power relations. The rationale behind funding reforms 
is that competition would lead to higher selectivity and a concentration of resources in the 
best institutions, increasing inequality among universities and forcing them to specialize in 
specific domains (Abramo et al. 2012, Horta et al. 2008). At the same time, competition 
often spurs imitation and mutual learning, particularly if the same benchmarks are used to 
assess performance (see e.g. Jha & Lampel 2014, Marginson 2002). Universities may thus 
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take similar strategies and obtain comparable results. So far, empirical evidence on the 
effects of competition on resource allocation has been inconclusive, with both increasing 
(Xie 2014) and decreasing inequality (Halffman and Leydesdorff 2010, Ville et al. 2006) 
being documented.  
On the other hand, external funding may also affect the scientific output of 
universities, their productivity, efficiency, and effectivity. Advocates of market-like steering 
mechanisms stress that competition sets incentives for quality, selects the best works, and 
optimizes the performance at the system level (Herbst 2007, cited in Hicks 2012). Other 
scholars point to negative unintended consequences, stressing that a high dependency on 
external funds may lead to research that is less innovative, with a weaker long-term impact 
(Geuna 2001, Butler 2003). Overall, empirical evidence is ambiguous again. At the national 
level, Auranen and Nieminen (2010) found no convincing evidence that political reforms 
aimed at increasing competitiveness leads to higher research performance.  
A possible reason for the lack of empirical evidence is that the impact of competitive 
funding on universities varies depending on the type of funding. A variety of forms of 
external funding exist, the most common being research grants from national and 
international funding agencies, research contracts with government and industry, and 
contributions from foundations. These types of funding differ considerably in their 
objectives and requirements to applicants, and set different incentives for researchers, 
possibly leading to varying research outcomes. So far, several studies have analyzed external 
funding either at the level of single funding instruments (see e.g. Benavente et al. 2012, 
Chudnovsky et al. 2008, Jacob & Lefgren 2011) or differentiating the broad categories of 
public grants and private contracts (Beaudry and Allaoui 2012, Cherchye and Vanden 
Abeele 2005, Bolli and Somogyi 2011). However, systematic analyses at university level 
that account for the varying importance of different types of external funding are missing.  
In this study, we contribute to the debate by analyzing five categories of external 
funds in Germany and Switzerland, tracking their evolution and their association with 
scientific production. These two countries are excellent examples of higher education 
systems with a long tradition of basic state funding and an increasing share of external funds. 
They both enjoy a high international reputation with several universities ranked among the 
best in Europe (CWCU 2015, THE 2015). Germany is also the largest economy in Europe 
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and ranks fourth worldwide in number of scientific publications and third in citations, after 
the U.S. and the U.K. (SCImago 2013). Switzerland is much smaller but has a high share of 
excellent universities and is considered one of the most innovative and competitive countries 
worldwide (Dutta et al. 2014, Schwab 2014).  
Our first research question relates to the debate on funding allocation and can be 
stated as follows: how did the distribution of external funds among universities in Germany 
and Switzerland evolve and are there any differences for single types of external funds? Our 
second question concerns the relation between external funds and scientific production: how 
are different types of external funding associated with scientific production and what 
consequences may a change in the composition of external funds have for universities? So 
far, no studies have comparatively analyzed differences between the main categories of 
external funding with respect to their effects on resource allocation and their association with 
scientific production. Empirical evidence providing a differentiated insight into possible 
consequences of the growing competition for funding is highly relevant for policy-makers, 
who need to know whether reforms have led to the expected outcomes and which measures 
may be taken to obtain better results. Knowing which types of funding are associated with 
scientific production is also essential for university managers that aim at increasing the 
reputation of their institutions.  
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we 
present our theoretical framework and review previous findings. In section three, we present 
the higher education and research systems of Germany and Switzerland and analyze their 
development in the last 15 years by means of descriptive statistics. In section four, we test 
whether concentration of external funding, and thus inequality among universities, has 
increased using Gini coefficients and Balassa’s index of revealed comparative advantage. 
Section five presents the econometric analysis for identifying association patterns between 
university specialization on specific types of external funding and scientific production, as 
measured by number of publications per person. We discuss our findings in section six and 
conclude in section seven by hinting at some policy implications.  
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2. Theoretical background and literature review 
 
The increasing importance of external funds in European higher education is tightly related 
to the introduction of reforms linked to the concept of New Public Management (NPM) (de 
Boer et al. 2007, Ferlie et al. 2009). NPM emphasizes the efficiency gains of public service 
delivery through privatization and quasi-market competition, and shifts the focus of 
government steering approaches from inputs to outputs by introducing performance 
indicators and evaluations (Hallfman and Leydesdorff 2010). In the academic sector, NPM 
approaches have led to three broad consequences in university management and governance. 
First, governments have granted universities more autonomy with respect to the use of core 
funds, their internal organization, recruitment procedures and the definition of study 
programs and research activities (Estermann and Nokkala 2009, Estermann et al. 2011). This 
increase in autonomy came along with the introduction of managerial approaches and the 
“professionalization” of administrative functions within universities (Blaschka et al. 2014). 
Second, NPM implies growing competition for students and funds, which is reflected – 
among other things – in the increasing share of external funding to the total university budget 
(Geuna 1999, Lepori et al. 2007a). Third, the emphasis on output steering has led to the 
introduction of a number of performance measures and assessments that are partly relevant 
for future funding (see e.g. Whitley and Glaeser 2007). This tendency is also reflected in the 
increasing wish of sponsors to define research topics in advance and spur research towards 
societal and economic needs (Lepori et al 2007a).  
 
2. 1 Convergence and differentiation in resource allocation 
 
The overall effect of these reforms on the structure of national higher education and research 
systems has been widely discussed in terms of institutional differentiation (see e.g. Huisman 
1995). Differentiation is seen as the main solution for many challenges in higher education 
and research, such as growing student numbers, increasing diversity of the student 
population, the need to foster research performance, and to produce more socially relevant 
results (van Vught 2008, Rossi 2010). 
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Market-like steering mechanisms and competition are generally expected to foster 
differentiation, as resources are not distributed equally and the gap between successful and 
unsuccessful institutions widens. Autonomously acting universities will tighten their 
profiles, focus on their strengths, find market niches, and specialize (Fumasoli and Lepori 
2011, Fumasoli and Huisman 2013). Consequently, competitive research funding is assumed 
to lead to a concentration of resources in few institutions that have the necessary size, 
organizational structure, incentive system, and research culture to attract such funds (Horta 
et al. 2008). In the end, these processes will facilitate the emergence of large research 
oriented universities competing at the global level for world-class status (Abramo et al. 2012, 
Teichler 2008).  
However, the complex interactions between agents at different levels of the system, 
and the many dimensions involved make it difficult to achieve consensus on the causes and 
dynamics of organizational diversity in higher education (Rossi 2010). While Horta et al 
(2008) and Xie (2014) present evidence of resource concentration among U.S. and U.K. 
universities, Shibayama (2011) does not find any relevant changes in the case of the Japanese 
National Research Grant. Halffman and Leydesdorff (2010) observe a weak tendency 
towards less inequality among the top 500 universities ranked in the Shanghai ranking and 
cannot confirm the hypothesis of emerging elite universities. Similarly, Ville et al. (2006) 
point to a decreasing inequality among Australian universities in terms of research 
performance, and Wu (2015) shows that funding of the Chinese Science Foundation has 
been distributed more equally over the years.  
Hence, competition may also lead to the convergence of strategies and funding 
patterns, rather than differentiation. From a management perspective, such processes can be 
illustrated by the concept of strategic simplicity or, more precisely, competitive repertoire 
simplicity (see Chen and Miller 2012). In competitive dynamics theory, competitive 
repertoires consist of all actions that an organization uses to attract, serve, and keep 
customers, i.e. concrete market decisions such as price changes, product line or service 
alteration, and changes in the scope of operations (Miller and Chen 1996).1 As managers 
                                                 
1 Competitive dynamics is a subfield of the strategic management literature that goes back to the seminal works of Baum 
and Korn (1996) and Smith et al. (1992). It studies rivalry between organizations by means of specific competitive actions 
and reactions, their strategic and organizational contexts, and their drivers and consequences (see Chen and Miller 2012 
for an overview).  
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tend to focus on actions that have proved successful in the past, competition can lead to less 
diverse competitive repertoires and thus strategic simplicity (Jah and Lampel 2014). Such 
processes may be the result of narrowly focused collective “lens of experience” and skewed 
information and learning systems (Miller 1993 cited in Ferrier & Lyon 2004). Considering 
successful organizations as a benchmark for evaluating performance may lead to imitation 
and thus strategic simplicity among the less successful organizations (Fiegenbaum et al. 
1996, Giachetti and Lampel 2010). 
If we consider universities as autonomous organizations competing in an increasingly 
market-like environment (Whitley and Glaeser 2014), we can apply the concept of 
competitive repertoire simplicity to illustrate how competition may lead to convergence of 
resources acquisition rather than differentiation. Scientific reputation is mainly based on 
research performance (Horta 2009), which can be measured as the number of publications 
and, more specifically, their impact, i.e. the number of citations (Toutkoushian et al. 2011). 
In this context, universities striving for higher reputation may adopt the same models as 
successful universities, trying to acquire more external funds in order to foster their research 
performance. In other words, universities will adapt to the increasingly competitive 
environment by imitating the strategies of successful institutions and learning from best 
practices (van Vught 2008).  
These processes are also captured by the concept of institutional isomorphism 
proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Besides mimetic isomorphism, which is based on 
imitation and deliberate adoption of successful models, the authors identify forms of 
coercive and normative isomorphism, which may also be relevant in the case of universities. 
Coercive isomorphism originates from formal and informal pressures exerted by external 
organizations or by cultural expectations in society. Public universities are often required by 
law to conduct research and governments may exert pressure by setting the rules for resource 
allocation and limit the level of core funding. In contrast, normative isomorphism results 
from the professionalization of a specific domain, i.e. the definition and diffusion of a shared 
cognitive base and common working conditions among its representatives. From this 
perspective one can argue that acquiring external funds and publishing novel research have 
become integral tasks for all scholars, independently of the institution they are working in.  
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2.2 External funding and scientific production 
 
The relationship between external funding and scientific production is ambiguous and 
strongly depends on the type of funding under consideration and, more specifically, on two 
distinct sets of features: first, on the way the selection process is organized and the 
requirements applicants need to fulfil; and second, on the organizational setting of the 
research conducted, including the objectives of funding and the degree of autonomy granted 
to researchers. 
The selection process serves to identify the right candidates for research funding in 
order to increase the success probability of the research project and to maximize the returns 
of the money invested. The main problem of the selection process is that the sponsor does 
not always have the knowledge needed to assess the quality of a research project and depends 
on the scientific community for choosing the right candidates (Braun 1993). Moreover, as 
the outcomes of a project cannot be assessed in advance, the evaluation of proposals is 
always coupled to uncertainty. In the absence of other reliable criteria, the reputation of 
candidates and their previous academic achievements often serve as indicators for the 
chances of a project and thus play an important role in funding decisions (Viner et al. 2004). 
Resource allocation based on previous performance will create incentives for applicants to 
achieve better results (Auranen and Nieminen 2010). Depending on how heavily previous 
reputation weighs in the selection process, external funding may be associated with varying 
degrees of scientific production. 
  Concerning the organizational setting of external funding we distinguish three broad 
objectives that allow for a categorization into academic, thematic and innovation oriented 
funding instruments (Lepori et al. 2007b). Academic funding emphasizes scientific 
excellence, grants the researchers a high degree of autonomy and expects them to share their 
results with the scientific community through publications or conference presentations. This 
is the traditional setting for academic research that drives reputation at individual and 
university level, as most performance assessments and university rankings are based on 
publications, citations, or prizes (Horta 2009). In contrast, thematic and innovation-oriented 
funding serve more policy-oriented issues and stress the applicability of research. They can 
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be seen as a general category of user-oriented funding that is transferred to society or 
industry and has a lower academic impact in terms of academic publications.  
Depending on the type of external funding, the selection process and the 
organizational settings vary significantly, influencing scientific output and reputation. First, 
traditional academic grants from national or international funding agencies are highly 
competitive, with selection almost exclusively based on peer reviews and the reputation of 
candidates often playing a crucial role. Although user-orientation has become increasingly 
important, the majority of such grants serve purely academic projects and the promotion of 
young talents.2 Previous studies have found a positive, though not always strong impact of 
academic grants on scientific production at the individual level, for example in the U.S. 
(Jacob & Lefgren 2011, Arora and Gambardella 2005, Azoulay et al. 2011), Canada 
(Beaudry and Allaoui 2012), Italy (Arora et al. 1998), Argentina (Chudnovsky et al 2008) 
and Chile (Benavente et al. 2012). Empirical evidence also suggests that academic grants are 
associated with higher efficiency (Cherchye and Vanden Abeele 2005) and more cooperation 
among researchers (Ubfal and Maffioli 2011). 
Second, public research funds directly allocated by the government through state 
contracts are less selective and less dependent on academic reputation (Grimpe 2012). They 
are mostly user-oriented and address social or economic challenges rather than purely 
academic research, leading to output with lower academic impact. In a study on government 
contracting in the aeronautic domain, Goldfarb (2008) found that researchers maintaining a 
relationship with the sponsor experienced a decrease in publications. Other studies 
concluded that, although funds directly distributed by the U.S. congress were positively 
associated with publications, no such relationship could be found for citations (Payne 2002, 
Payne & Siow 2003).  
Third, industry contracts are also very user-oriented, but their degree of selectivity 
varies considerably. Connolly (1997) and Blume-Kohout et al. (2009) argue that industry 
allocates resources to the universities that do the highest quality research. While this is true 
                                                 
2 International grants, more specifically research grants from the European Union, display a high share of user-oriented 
funding. For instance, out of the total budget of the Seventh Framework Program of the EU (ca. 50 billion Euros without 
Euratom), 24 percent (12 billion Euros) were spent on the two academic oriented programs, Ideas and People, which 
include the grants from the European Research Council and the Marie Curie fellowships (European Commission 2015). 
Nonetheless, EU framework programs have also been found to be positively associated with scientific production 
(Defazio et al. 2009). 
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for large multinational corporations (MNC), many small or medium size enterprises (SME) 
operating at regional level tend to work with less-known and more locally-oriented 
universities. The association of industry contracts and scientific production thus remains 
ambiguous. On the one hand, there seem to be complementarity effects between the 
acquisition of private funds from industry and other academic activities (see e.g. Connolly 
1997, Muscio et al. 2013, Blume-Kohout et al. 2014). On the other hand, several studies did 
not find any positive effect of private funding on scientific production (Beaudry and Allaoui 
2012, Cherchye and Vanden Abeele 2005), at least not when industry contracts make up an 
important share of research funding (Bonaccorsi et al. 2006).3  
Finally, donations and private grants from foundations are not necessarily granted on 
a highly selective basis and do not always depend on previous performance. At the same 
time, they are less user-oriented than state or industry contracts and may provide the 
researcher with a high degree of autonomy. For this reason, it is possible that such types of 
funding are associated with high scientific production. 
Summing up, we expect that universities with a large amount of grants from national 
funding agencies will exhibit higher scientific production. Such association patterns are also 
likely to occur with international funds and grants from foundations. In contrast, we do not 
expect universities specialized in state contracts to be academically highly productive, while 
in the case of industry contracts the situation is probably ambiguous. Table 1 summarizes 
our assumptions. It lists the different categories of external funding and indicates the type of 
selection, the type of objectives, and the expected association with research performance. 
Needless to say, this rough classification only captures general trends and does not account 
for the many existing exceptions.  
 
 
  
                                                 
3 Bolli and Somogyi (2011) conclude that public external funds positively affect research productivity, whereas private 
funds are positively related to patent applications. 
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Table 1:  Types of external funding, their main sources, characteristics, and association 
  with research performance  
 
Type of 
external funding 
Main funding 
source 
Characteristics 
 
Consequences on 
output 
    
Academic 
grants 
National & 
international 
agencies 
Selection: high selection strongly 
based on previous reputation 
Objectives: academic 
 
Associated with high 
research performance 
    
User-oriented 
grants 
National & 
international 
agencies 
Selection: high selection partly 
based on previous reputation 
Objectives: user-oriented 
 
Weakly associated 
with high research 
performance 
    
State contracts National and 
regional 
governments, public 
organizations 
Selection: rather low selection, 
reputation not always playing a 
central role 
Objectives: user-oriented 
 
Not associated with 
high research 
performance 
    
Private contracts Business  
(MNC and SME) 
Selection: both high selection  
(for MNC) and low selection 
(for SME) possible 
Objectives: user-oriented 
 
Only MNC funding 
associated with high 
research performance 
    
Donations, 
grants from 
foundations 
Individuals, 
foundations  
Selection: both high and low 
selection possible  
Objectives: rather academic 
oriented 
 
Associated with 
medium to high 
research performance 
    
 
 
3. External funding in Germany and Switzerland 
 
3.1  Funding responsibilities 
 
In both Germany and Switzerland, educational responsibility is almost exclusively located 
at the level of the member states (the Länder in Germany and the Cantons in Switzerland), 
with universities receiving most of their basic funding from the local government.4  
                                                 
4 Switzerland has also introduced a compensation system that grants universities additional funds from other cantons and 
from the federal state according to their number of students and – to a small degree – their research activities. Moreover, 
Switzerland has two federal institutes of technology that have the status of technical universities and are funded primarily 
by the central state. 
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As opposed to education, the promotion of research lies within the purview of both 
the central government and the member states, with most competitive funding mechanisms 
being located at the federal level. The German Research Foundation (Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) and the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) are the 
two main research funding agencies. The DFG is the largest funding agency of its type in 
Europe and the main source of public external funding in the German higher education sector 
(DFG 2013b). In 2012, it had a total budget of 2.52 billion Euros, two thirds of which were 
provided by the central government and one third by the member states (DFG 2013a). The 
SNSF plays a similar role for Swiss universities. In 2013, it had a budget of about 780 million 
Euros, which – as opposed to the DFG – were almost exclusively provided by the central 
government (96.6 per cent) (SNSF 2014). 
Besides the two main funding agencies, universities in Germany and Switzerland 
acquire considerable research funding from other, more applied state agencies, from 
contracts with the governments at both national and regional level, from cooperation with 
industry, and from foundations. Moreover, with the creation of the European Research Area, 
a new supranational level of funding has been established in Europe. Within less than 30 
years, the annual budget of the European framework programs for research and development 
has expanded from around 600 million Euros in 1984 to almost 10 billion Euros in 2013 
(State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation 2013), making international 
funding an integral part of national research systems. Initially, European funding was 
conceived as a complement to national research funding with a focus on research projects 
that had a “European added value” (see e.g. Annerberg et al. 2010). In the last years, 
however, European funding has increasingly begun competing with national funding 
schemes.   
While exhibiting several similarities, the German and Swiss research systems have 
also considerable differences. First, a large part of public research in Germany takes place 
in non-university research institutions, among which the Max-Planck-Society is by far the 
largest and the one that is best known internationally. In Switzerland, although a few public 
research institutes exist, most public research takes place in universities. The second main 
difference between the two countries is that the German central government, together with 
the Länder, has recently begun a large-scale program promoting cutting-edge research and 
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making selected German universities internationally more competitive (Hartmann 2006). 
This so-called Excellence Initiative is highly competitive, with funds being allocated in 
collaboration with the DFG. Like similar programs in other countries, such as the project 
985 in China (see Zhang et al. 2013), the initiative aims at concentrating a great amount of 
resources in a small number of excellent universities, increasing their reputation and 
visibility. For this reason, we expect a higher concentration of public competitive funds in 
Germany than in Switzerland. 
 
3.2  Types of universities 
 
Two main types of institutions characterize the higher education systems of Germany and 
Switzerland: universities and universities of applied sciences (Fachhochschulen). 
Universities offer broad education at the Bachelor and Master level and are usually research-
oriented. Universities of applied sciences were initially conceived as focused on teaching 
and practice-oriented training. In the last 20 years, however, they have started conducting 
research and development, which are generally more applied than in universities. 
Universities of applied sciences do not award PhD degrees, though they have increasingly 
been involved in PhD programs with universities and have a growing number of PhDs 
among their staff and faculty. Other types of higher education institutions include – 
particularly in Germany – universities of education, colleges of art and music, and colleges 
of theology. Due to their specific tasks, the different kinds of universities and colleges are 
not easily comparable. Therefore, this study focuses on public universities and universities 
of applied sciences. 
 
3.3  Descriptive statistics 
 
For German universities, most of the data stems from different university reports and surveys 
conducted by the German federal office of statistics (Destatis). Destatis presents parts of 
these figures at an aggregate level in its regular reporting series (see for example Federal 
Statistical Office of Germany 2013). However, data at university level is not published and 
had to be requested separately at several divisions of the federal office. For Swiss 
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universities, collection proved to be easier, as most figures at university level are available 
online on the website of the Federal Statistical Office. All figures were then adjusted and 
matched into a single dataset. To collect publication data, we used Elsevier’s online 
bibliographic database, Scopus. With about 21,000 sources, of which 20,000 are peer-
reviewed academic journals (Scopus 2013), Scopus covers about 20 percent more items than 
Thomson Reuter’s Web of Science (Falagas et al. 2008). Moreover, Scopus is less focused 
on English-speaking journals and thus more suitable for an analysis of German and Swiss 
universities.5 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis for the years 
2000 and 2012, separately for universities and universities of applied sciences in Germany.6 
As we see, there are both common trends and differences between the two types of 
institutions. Universities are on average much larger than universities of applied sciences, 
counting three times more students, a higher number of scientific staff, and a budget about 
six times larger than universities of applied sciences. Both universities and universities of 
applied sciences have considerably grown between 2000 and 2012, although the latter ones 
have been growing at a higher pace, catching up to some extent with universities. 
With respect to funding, we see that external funds have grown at a higher pace than 
the overall budget of universities and their expenditures. The share of external funding to 
total expenditures has thus increased from 17 to 24 percent for universities and from 5 to 11 
percent for universities of applied sciences. Figures 1 and 2 present the evolution of the five 
main types of external funding graphically. For universities, DFG grants represent the main 
source of external funding and have strongly increased after 2006, presumably as a 
consequence of the excellence initiative. In contrast, they are almost non-existent for 
universities of applied sciences. The relative importance and evolution of other types of 
funding is similar for both types of universities. We note that public funding from the federal 
government has increased more than the other types of funding, surpassing industry contracts 
as the main source of external funds apart the DFG. 
 
                                                 
5 The Scopus database is available online by subscription at www.scopus.com. With the Affiliation search option, one 
can identify all publications from a specific university and further differentiate them by scientific field. 
6 The statistical analysis, figures and graphs in chapter 3 and 4 have been computed using the statistical software R (R Core 
Team 2014). 
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Table 2: Summary statistics for German universities 
 
 2002  2012 Change  
of mean 
N  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Universities 
Students 17'533 12'732  19'551 12'773 12% 77 
Scientific staff 2'225 1'524  2'932 2'074 32% 77 
Publications 711 589  1'464 1'199 106% 77 
Total expenditures 201'985 130'533  240'227 163'358 19% 77 
Total external funds (EF) 37'005 31'603  61'353 53'892 66% 77 
EF to total expenditures 17% 6  24% 8 41% 77 
   
    
 
Universities of applied sciences 
        
Students 4'494 3'043  5'996 3'428 33% 93 
Scientific staff 341 223  530 327 55% 93 
Publications 5 8  25 34 400% 93 
Total expenditures 32'725 19'296  41'771 23'867 28% 93 
Total external funds (EF) 1'623 1'266  4'358 3'091 169% 93 
EF to total expenditures 5% 3  11% 6 120% 93 
 
  
 
  
 
 
Total expenditures and total external funds are measured in 1'000 Euro at constant prices (2012 prices). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of types of external funds 1998-2012: universities 
 (in 1'000 Euro and 2012 prices) 
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Figure 2: Evolution of types of external funds 1998-2012: universities 
 of applied sciences (in 1'000 Euro and 2012 prices) 
 
 
 
Traditional performance indicators of universities such as the number of publications 
and citations vary considerably depending on the scientific field under consideration (see 
e.g. Nederhof 2006). To illustrate these differences, table 3 reports descriptive statistics at 
the level of discipline groups for German universities. As expected, major differences exist. 
Whereas the number of students is larger in the social sciences and humanities, the 
operational expenses and external funds acquired are higher in the natural sciences and in 
engineering. Moreover, the natural sciences produce considerably more publications. These 
differences need to be taken into account when assessing the performance of whole 
universities.7  
 
  
                                                 
7 Very similar patterns are found in Switzerland. Descriptive statistics for Swiss universities and universities of applied 
sciences are presented in appendix 1 and 2. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics for groups of disciplines in Germany 
 
                
 
Humanities 
 
Social 
Sciences 
 
Natural 
Sciences 
 
Agric. & 
Forestry 
 
 
Engineering 
 2002 2012  2002 2012  2002 2012  2002 2012  2002 2012 
Universities 
                              
Students 6'010 6'146  4'941 4'948  3'886 4'507  907 1'219  3'061 4'471 
Academic staff 440 582  239 344  584 777  166 194  537 648 
Publications 23 68  24 99  430 844  81 161  70 187 
Total expenditures 24'000 26'643  14'524 17'472  52'673 62'118  17'198 17'610  52'826 59'250 
Total external funds (EF) 3'774 5'717  2'365 3'300  13'632 21'703  3'945 5'270  18'563 26'935 
EF to total expenditures 14% 20%  19% 19%  23% 32%  20% 29%  31% 37% 
              
Observations 67 68  75 75  70 73  23 21  40 45 
              
Universities of applied sciences 
                              
Students 574 428  1'834 2'229  747 890  719 826  1'860 2'702 
Scientific staff 58 66  116 169  50 80  62 85  146 205 
Publications 0 2  0 3  2 15  2 5  2 8 
Total expenditures 1'910 1'997  4'653 6'544  3'193 3'725  3'565 4'698  10'872 12'684 
Total external funds (EF) 61 96  246 601  189 484  359 668  708 1'705 
EF to total expenditures 3% 3%  6% 9%  7% 12%  12% 13%  7% 14 
               
Observations 14 17  90 89  55 75  22 24  90 90 
              
Total expenditures and total external funds are measured in 1'000 Euro at constant prices (2012 prices). 
 
 
4. External funding and diversity 
 
We investigate possible consequences of increasing competition by analyzing the evolution 
of resource allocation both at the level of the higher education system and at the level of 
single universities. First, to test whether a concentration of external funding has taken place 
at the system level, we analyze the evolution of Gini coefficients over the years 2000 to 
2012. In a second step, we turn to universities and investigate how their specialization on 
different types of external funding has changed by means of Balassa indexes.  
 
4.1 Structural changes in external funding allocation 
 
Gini coefficients are a measure of inequality proposed by Italian statistician and sociologist 
Corrado Gini and are often used to analyze income inequality among individuals or families 
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within a country, or to compare countries in terms of wealth distribution (see for example 
Chin and Culotta 2014, Ravallion 2014). Gini coefficients take values between zero, in case 
every observed unit disposes of the same resources, and one, when only one unit has 
everything.8 We follow Halffman and Leydesdorff (2010) and use a normalized Gini 
coefficient to allow for comparison of samples of different size. The formula can be stated 
as follows:  
 𝐺𝑁  =  ∑ (2𝑖 − 𝑛 − 1)𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑖=1(𝑛 − 1) ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑖=1  
 
where 𝑛 is the number of observation units, in our case universities, and 𝑥𝑖 is the amount of 
resources, for example external funds, of university 𝑖 in the previously ordered sample. As 
an overall measure of inequality, the Gini coefficient does not say anything about the 
distribution of inequality within a sample. We therefore include Gini coefficients for the 
highest and the lowest quartiles in the analysis to assess whether concentration processes 
differ among the universities with more resources and those with less. Moreover, in order to 
examine the dynamics underlying concentration processes we report the share of the single 
quartiles to the total resources in the system at the beginning and at the end of the observed 
period (see Halffman and Leydesdorff 2010 for a similar approach).9  
Figure 3 shows the evolution of Gini coefficients for total external funds, the number 
of publications, and the number of citations of traditional universities in Germany. Against 
the common expectation that higher competitiveness leads to a concentration of external 
funds, the distribution of resources has not become more unequal over the years. The overall 
Gini coefficients for external funds, publications, and citations have been rather constant at 
a level of about 0.5 over the years. However, we observe major differences between the 
highest and lowest quartiles. Among the best universities, inequality has kept constant or, as 
                                                 
8 Gini coefficients are based on the so-called Lorenz curve, which cumulatively plots the resources of all units, from the 
one with the least resources to the one with the most. In case all units disposed of the same resources, the Lorenz curve 
would be a straight line, and the Gini coefficient corresponds to the surface between this hypothetical line and the 
observed Lorenz curve (Halffman and Leydesdorff 2010). 
9 For example, if an increase in concentration within a quartile were due to the best universities improving their 
performance, the share of the corresponding quartile to total resources would increase. By contrast, if the increase in 
concentration were due to the worst performing universities becoming even weaker, the share of the quartile to total 
resources would decrease. 
(1) 
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in the case of publications, has slightly increased over the years. In contrast, the lowest 
quartile displays a notable decrease in inequality.10 
 
Figure 3:  Distribution of external funds, publications and citations among German 
 universities: Gini coefficients and share of single quartiles, 2000 to 2012 
 
 
 Evolution of Gini coefficients 
 
 Total external funds  Publications  Citations 
   
 all universities  lowest quartile  highest quartile 
 
 Share of single quartiles to total (in percent) 
 
  Total external funds     Publications     Citations  
  1998 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ  
 
Q1 3.20 3.95 0.75   2.33 3.83 1.50   1.55 2.13 0.58 
 
Q2 13.44 14.58 1.14   13.36 13.93 0.57   11.21 11.02 -0.19 
 
Q3 24.29 25.14 0.85   31.31 29.75 -1.56   28.69 27.14 -1.55 
 
Q4 59.07 56.34 -2.73   53.00 52.49 -0.51   58.55 59.72 1.17 
 
 
 
We also observe that the two upper quartiles account for more than 80 percent of 
total external funds and scientific output, indicating that the higher education system was 
already highly differentiated in 1998. While these differences have kept rather constant over 
time, there has been a slight tendency of the lower quartiles to increase their share of external 
funds and – to a less extent – publications at the expenses of the most successful universities. 
                                                 
10 One needs to be careful when comparing Gini coefficients for the upper and lower quartiles, and the magnitude of their 
evolution, as they are based on figures of different size. In absolute terms, the same difference among units will have a 
larger effect in the lower quartiles, as it affects the relative distance between units more. For this reason, Gini coefficients 
for the lower quartiles are generally larger and their changes more pronounced.  
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These trends are more pronounced in the case of universities of applied sciences. As 
displayed in figure 4, the overall Gini coefficients for external funds, publications, and 
citations have declined among all universities of applied sciences. Notably, inequality of 
research output has also decreased among the best performing institutions.11 The share of 
single quartiles to total funding confirm that these changes are due to the lower quartiles 
considerably increasing their shares at the expenses of the highest quartile.  
 
Figure 4:  Distribution of external funds, publications and citations among German  
universities of applied sciences: Gini coefficients and share of single 
quartiles, 2000 to 2012 
 
 
 Evolution of Gini coefficients 
 
 Total external funds  Publications  Citations 
   
 all universities  lowest quartile  highest quartile 
 
 Share of single quartiles to total (in percent) 
 
  Total external funds     Publications     Citations  
  1998 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ  
 
Q1 4.18 8.50 4.32   0 0 0   0 0 0 
 
Q2 13.41 16.90 3.49   0 4.72 4.72   0 8.13 8.13 
 
Q3 26.05 25.99 -0.06   6.24 17.51 11.27   13.43 21.76 8.33 
 
Q4 56.37 48.61 -7.76   93.76 77.78 -15.98   83.67 68.63 -15.04 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 We note that among universities of applied sciences, the relative distribution of publications and citations is particularly 
uneven, with many institutions not publishing at all. For this reason, figure 4 does not display the Gini coefficients for 
the lowest quartile of universities of applied sciences, as the results may be biased by the presence of many institutions 
without any publications or citations. 
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Appendix 3 and 4 report corresponding figures for the different types of external 
funding, and appendix 5 those of single discipline groups within universities. The overall 
trend of convergence rather than differentiation can be confirmed. Among the single types 
of external funding, a notable decrease of inequality in the case of EU-funding allocation 
stands out. Grants from the European Union are becoming an important funding source for 
a growing number of universities and are increasingly recognized as a central part of national 
funding systems.   
Finally, these general trends also apply to Switzerland (see appendix 6 and 7).12 A 
notable difference between German and Swiss universities concerns the distribution of 
federal funds and funds from the main national funding agency. While in Germany there has 
been a slight increase in concentration of these funds among the best performing universities 
after 2006, no such tendency is observable in Switzerland. This result may be directly related 
to the German Excellence initiative, i.e. the government’s attempt to concentrate resources 
in few, internationally highly reputed institutions. Such explicit concentration attempts at the 
federal level do not exist in Switzerland.  
Summing up, we note that overall external funds, the number of publications, and the 
number of citations have not been subject to notable concentration in the period 1998-2012. 
The higher education systems in Germany and Switzerland were already highly 
differentiated in the years 1998 and 2000 and the assumption that increasing competition for 
external funds and political discourse in favor of more focused funding leads to more 
inequality cannot be confirmed empirically. Especially among the least performing 
universities and the universities of applied sciences, inequality has clearly decreased: more 
institutions seem to have entered the competition for external funds and to have started 
publishing research results more actively. Accordingly, these preliminary findings at the 
system level rather support the hypothesis that competition has led to converging 
competitive strategies and institutional isomorphism.  
 
 
                                                 
12 In the case of Switzerland, we only considered traditional universities, as data for universities of applied sciences was 
not available for the period before 2006. Moreover, since there are only 12 Swiss universities, we divided the institutions 
in a lower and an upper half instead of quartiles. 
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4.2 University specialization on external funding 
 
To assess whether university strategies for resource acquisition have significantly 
converged, we compute Balassa indexes that measure the relative specialization of 
universities in acquiring different types of funding (Balassa 1965). For each university, the 
Balassa index measures the share of a specific type of external funds in relation to the share 
of the same type of funding in the whole population (for a similar approach, see Bonaccorsi 
et al. 2013). The index is computed as follows: 
 𝐵𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗 ∑ 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗𝑗 ( ∑ 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗𝑖∑ 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗𝑖,𝑗 )−1 
 
Where 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗 is the amount of type 𝑗 of external funding acquired by university 𝑖. The 
Balassa index ranges between 0 and infinity. An index smaller than 1 indicates that a 
university is less specialized on a type of external funding than the average of all universities, 
while an index larger than one indicates an above-average specialization.  
Table 4 presents averages of Balassa indexes for different quartiles of German 
universities in the years 2002 and 2012. The indexes are computed relatively to the whole 
population of traditional universities and universities of applied sciences. Moreover, the 
quartiles in 2012 are divided according to the values of 2002 in order to track the 
development of the same groups of universities. Again, we note a tendency towards 
convergence of acquisition patterns for different types of external funding. While 
universities with the lowest specialization reduced the gap to the national average, the 
Balassa indexes of those universities with the highest specialization decreased. Both the 
paired t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test confirm that many changes, especially those 
among universities in the highest and lowest quartiles, are significant.13 The only exception 
are grants from the DFG, for which acquisition patterns have not changed significantly.  
 
 
                                                 
13 The Wilcoxon signed-rank test relaxes the t-test’s normality assumption for distributions, which is not fulfilled for all 
types of external funding. 
(2) 
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Table 4: Mean of Balassa indexes for different quartiles of German universities 
  by type of external funding, 2002 (reference year for quartiles) and 2012 
 
 
 Balassa index 2002  Balassa index 2012  Δ Mean  Significance tests  
  mean sd   mean sd      t  WSR    
           
Total external funds 
          
Q1 0.582 (0.160)  0.673 (0.301) 0.091  1.294 64  
Q2 0.901 (0.073)  0.994 (0.246) 0.094  1.762 * 68  
Q3 1.139 (0.087)  1.064 (0.284) -0.074  -1.179 125 *  
Q4 1.511 (0.198)  1.345 (0.308) -0.166  -2.637 ** 171 **  
          
Federal state 
          
Q1 0.477 (0.201)  0.753 (0.726) 0.276  1.794 * 56 *  
Q2 0.918 (0.118)  0.824 (0.406) -0.093  -1.089 135  
Q3 1.186 (0.059)  0.892 (0.338) -0.294  -3.893 *** 156 ***  
Q4 1.731 (0.471)  1.534 (0.556) -0.197  -1.339 142  
          
DFG 
          
Q1 0.350 (0.216)  0.425 (0.314) 0.074  1.723 69  
Q2 0.920 (0.116)  0.840 (0.400) -0.080  -0.990 139  
Q3 1.223 (0.067)  1.274 (0.452) 0.051  0.469 85  
Q4 1.628 (0.253)  1.490 (0.487) -0.139  -1.599 144  
          
International/EU 
          
Q1 0.314 (0.150)  0.892 (0.856) 0.578  2.884 * 24 ***  
Q2 0.680 (0.100)  1.197 (1.150) 0.516  1.923 * 40 **  
Q3 0.997 (0.116)  1.258 (1.173) 0.261  1.020 118  
Q4 2.017 (0.774)  1.133 (0.496) -0.884  -4.162 *** 201 ***  
          
Business 
          
Q1 0.183 (0.142)  0.516 (0.306) 0.333  4.509 *** 14 ***  
Q2 0.499 (0.092)  0.595 (0.268) 0.096  1.557 65  
Q3 0.934 (0.175)  1.158 (0.549) 0.224  1.647 61  
Q4 1.908 (0.573)  1.545 (0.826) -0.363  -2.086 * 158 **  
          
Foundations 
          
Q1 0.164 (0.190)  0.991 (0.673) 0.827  4.762 *** 8 ***  
Q2 0.740 (0.120)  0.893 (0.729) 0.153  0.908 96  
Q3 1.211 (0.253)  0.919 (0.520) -0.292  -2.189 ** 157 **  
Q4 3.381 (2.224)  1.771 (1.142) -1.610  -2.810 ** 178 ***  
             
In both 2002 and 2012, universities are divided in quartiles according to Balassa indexes in 2002. 
 
These results confirm that universities without any remarkable research activities 
have adopted similar strategies as more research-oriented universities and have started 
acquiring different types of external funding in order to foster their research performance. 
Again, these trends are even stronger among German universities of applied sciences (see 
appendix 8). Most universities of applied sciences were not specialized in the acquisition of 
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external funds in 2002, as indicated by the low means of Balassa indexes for all quartiles. 
Consequently, in the case of total external funds, even institutions in the first quartile 
managed to increase their degree of specialization. Again, the only exception are funds from 
the DFG that keep playing a negligible role for universities of applied sciences.14 
Similar conclusions can be drawn for Swiss universities (see appendix 9). However, 
as there are only 12 observations in Switzerland, the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
do not always provide significant results.  
 
5. External funding and scientific production 
 
Analyzing association patterns between types of external funding and scientific output at 
university level is challenging because cause-effect relationships cannot be observed directly 
and may be affected by multiple framework conditions. In order to enhance the explanatory 
power of our model, we therefore combine the panel structure of the data with an 
instrumental variable approach and apply a two-stage least square (2SLS) regression with 
fixed effects.15 
 
5.1 Model specification 
 
As a measure for scientific production, we use the number of publications (𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙) from a 
university divided by the average number of academic staff employed at the same university 
one year earlier. This approach accounts for the time lag between the research process itself 
and the publication of its scientific findings that results from the writing of the article, the 
peer reviewing, and the revision process (see e.g. Cherchye and Vanden Abeele 2005). This 
time lag may vary depending on – among other factors – the scientific field of a publication 
and the journal type, and amounts from several months to a couple of years. At the aggregate 
                                                 
14 In the case of foundations, the Balassa indexes vary considerably between 2002 and 2012, indicating a high dynamic in 
the distribution of this type of external funding among universities of applied sciences. 
15 The econometric models include both German and Swiss universities. For this reason, total expenditures and external 
funds of universities in Switzerland were converted to Euro and standardized according to the different price levels in 
the two countries.  
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level of a university, accounting for scientific output published one year after research 
funding has been spent seems a practicable approximation.16  
As our main explanatory variable we use the average amount of external funds 
acquired per academic staff (𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑). We examine different types of external funding 
separately in six different models, each taking into account total external funds, funds from 
the federal state, from the two national agencies (DFG and SNSF), from international 
organizations including the European Commission, from business, and from private 
foundations. The remaining part of the model is always kept constant. In doing so, we can 
assess how much the explanatory power of a model changes depending on the type of 
external funding included.17 
The model also includes several control variables that are expected to influence the 
number of publications and citations per person. First, the size of a university, as measured 
by the number of students (𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑), may affect scientific production through economies of 
scale (Dundar & Lewis 1995, 1998) or at least because in many scientific fields a critical 
mass is needed to conduct high quality research (von Tunzelmann et al 2003). Moreover, 
larger universities may profit from higher visibility and extensive internal resources, 
including the diversity of disciplines and potentials for interdisciplinary research. Second, 
the expenditures per academic staff (𝑒𝑥𝑝) is an indicator of the amount of available 
resources, the quality of the infrastructure, and the financial opportunities a university has, 
and should positively affect research performance (see e.g. Aghion et al 2008).18 Third, the 
number of students per academic staff (𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓) approximates the teaching load of 
scholars and indicates how much teaching-oriented a university is. We thus expect the 
variable to correlate negatively with research production. Finally, as shown in table 3, natural 
                                                 
16 Counting the number of publications is a recognized measure for scientific output (Toutkoushian et al 2003). Similar to 
other bibliometric indicators, such as the number of citations, it has, however, several well-known limitations that we 
cannot discuss in detail in this study (see e.g. Haustein & Larivière for an overview). A potential problem of our measure 
for scientific output is that it does not allow for a differentiation of the overall number of authors and their relative 
contribution to a publication – or in other words – their order of appearance in the authors list. In bibliometric studies, 
such a differentiation is often used to measure research performance at the level of individual scholars (Abramo et al 
2013). However, at the aggregate level of a university it is less crucial, as cross-institutional publications largely outweigh 
each other. 
17 Most variables measuring the amount of different types of external funding per academic staff were normally distributed, 
with the only exceptions being the share of external funds from business and from private foundations. These two 
indicators were thus recoded into intervals of equal size that can be assumed to be approximately metric.  
18 To avoid double counts we subtracted the amount of external funds included in the model from total expenditures when 
computing the measure for expenditures per academic staff. 
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and life sciences are more oriented towards publication of scientific results in international 
journals.19 We control for the disciplinary profile of a university by including the share of 
expenditures in the social sciences, humanities, and arts (𝑠𝑜𝑐_ℎ𝑢𝑚) to the total 
expenditures.20 
A common problem in empirical social research is endogeneity, which arises when 
the explanatory variable is correlated with the error term (see e.g. Wooldridge 2013). 
Endogeneity may be due to unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variables, simultaneity 
and measurement errors. In our model, unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity are 
particularly relevant. On the one hand, both the number of publications per person as 
dependent variable and the share of external funds as independent variable may be correlated 
to unobserved variables such as the skills and the reputation of academic staff, or the 
internationality of the university. Though we partly account for the quality of staff by 
including expenditures per personnel, we cannot exclude that unobserved variables affect 
the correlation coefficients. For this reason, we use a fixed effects panel regression that 
eliminates the effect of constant unobserved variables.21  
The other possible cause of endogeneity, simultaneity, occurs when both the 
dependent and the independent variables affect each other. In our model, such a problem 
arises if scientific production in terms of publications and citations per person affects the 
ability to acquire external funding. This may especially be the case for funding from the 
DFG, as such grants are given on the basis of, among other things, reputation and previous 
publication performance, which in turn depend on earlier funding (see e.g. Beaudry and 
Allaoui 2012). Such simultaneity issues can be addressed by using a two stage least squares 
regression model (2SLS), in which the endogenous variable, in our case external funding, is 
first predicted by a third variable, the instrument, and then replaced by its predicted values 
in the original regression model (see e.g. Bolli and Somogyi 2011 for a similar approach). 
                                                 
19 In the social sciences, the humanities, and the arts, academic contributions are less covered by databases such as Scopus 
or Web of Science, because of alternative publication types (i.e. books and edited volumes) or simply because they are 
published in German and thus less perceived at the international level. 
20 We do not include the share of natural and medical sciences because almost half of the universities do not have 
expenditures for these disciplines and the variables are far from being normally distributed. Moreover, to ensure that all 
variables in the models – including the controls – are normally distributed, we take their natural logarithm. This requires 
a minimal recoding of the variables in very small intervals to account for the few observations taking values of zero. 
21 The fixed effects model does not account for those unobserved variables that change over time. However, significant 
changes at the level of whole universities, such as the establishment of a high international reputation, only occur in the 
long-run (Salmi 2011) and we assume that unobserved variables do not change significantly over the considered period. 
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Instrumental variables should be good predictors of the endogenous variable, in our 
case external funding, without directly affecting the dependent variable. Following Aghion 
et al (2010), we use variables that reflect specific policy changes, namely the shifts in 
funding allocations over the years. To measure them we take the share of different types of 
funding at the national level (𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝑛𝑎𝑡) to the overall expenses for research and 
development. These variables have a direct effect on the availability of different types of 
external funds and consequently on the ability of universities to acquire them. At the same 
time, they are not a direct predictor of the research performance of single institutions. The 
data mostly stems from the Eurostat database. Funding from the two national agencies was 
measured by collecting financial figures from their annual reports.  
Summing up, our first stage model is defined as follows: 
 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0 +  𝜃1𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝜃2𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃5𝑠𝑜𝑐_ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
 
where 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 represents the endogenous variables, which are the different types of external 
funding acquired by university 𝑖 in the time-period 𝑡. The constant is given by 𝜃0, while 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 is the instrumental variable, 𝜇𝑖 is the time-invariant part of the error term, and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the time-variant part of the error term. Accordingly, the second stage model can be 
formulated as: 
 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑓𝑢𝑛?̂?𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑠𝑜𝑐_ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
 
with 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑡+1 indicating the dependent variable, i.e. scientific production as measured by 
number of publications per academic staff, and 𝑓𝑢𝑛?̂?𝑖𝑡 being the predicted values for the 
different types of external funding from the first stage equation. The time-invariant error 
term is 𝛼𝑖 and its time-variant part 𝜖𝑖𝑡. As different association patterns of external funding 
and scientific production are possible for different types of universities, we apply the 
estimation model to both universities and universities of applied sciences separately.  
 
(3) 
(4) 
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5.2 Results 
 
Tables 5 and 6 present correlation coefficients of the variables included in the model for the 
year 2011.22 Most types of external funding are positively associated with publications per 
person for both universities and universities of applied sciences. Among universities, funds 
from the national agencies display by far the strongest correlation to research production 
(see table 5). Since this type of external funds is almost inexistent in universities of applied 
sciences, the corresponding coefficient is small and non-significant for these institutions (see 
table 6). In contrast, the coefficient for international funds is positive and significant for 
universities of applied sciences, but not significant in the case of traditional universities.  
As for the control variables, all bivariate correlations could be confirmed in the 
expected direction for universities.23 The number of students and the expenditure per staff 
proved to be positively related to research production, while a high teaching load and a 
stronger focus on the social sciences and the humanities are negatively associated with the 
number of publications per person. It is important to note, however, that many control 
variables are correlated among each other and/or with the variables for external funding. For 
example, in the social sciences and humanities the student to teacher ratio is rather high, 
while research expenditures and the amount of external funding are low due to the absence 
of expensive lab equipment. These multiple correlations need to be taken into account when 
analyzing the multivariate regression models. 
Tables 7 and 8 present the results of the simple fixed effects regression and the second 
stage of the 2SLS regression for the six different models.24 Among traditional universities, 
the positive association of total external funds and funds from the national agencies with 
scientific production stands out (see model 1 and model 3 in table 7). As shown by the 
adjusted R2 values of 0.355 and 0.277, the two fixed effects models have the highest 
explanatory power, and none of the coefficients changes significantly when applying the 
instrumental variable approach. In contrast, the coefficient for funding from the state 
                                                 
22 We restrict the correlation matrix to one year in order to account for cross-sectional variation only and exclude 
correlations across time. The same correlation matrices were computed for other years, yielding very similar results. 
23 In the case of universities of applied science, these associations are not so evident and not significant, which may point 
to the different context in which research takes place in these institutions. 
24 All models have been estimated using the statistical software Stata (StataCorp. 2011). The first stage results of the 2SLS 
regression are presented in Appendix 10 and 11. 
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changes from positive to negative in the 2SLS model, remaining highly significant and 
pointing to a negative association of external funding from the central state with publications 
per person. As for the other types of external funding, we observe a positive and significant 
association with scientific production in the 2SLS models. However, this result comes with 
a loss of significance of several other coefficients, pointing to possible shortcomings of the 
instrumental variable and reducing the reliability of the models.25 
Apart from these few cases, the coefficients of the control variables keep constant 
across the different models and largely correspond to the expectations. The only exception 
is the share of social sciences and humanities, which displays very small and mostly non-
significant coefficients. The reason for this may be that the overall disciplinary profile of the 
universities is widely accounted for by the fixed effects, and changes towards more or less 
social sciences and humanities are very small in the period under consideration.26 
In the case of universities of applied sciences, the explanatory power of the fixed 
effects models strongly diminishes, with adjusted R2 values raging between 0.117 and 0.166. 
Again, total external funds prove to be positively related to scientific production in both the 
fixed effects and the 2SLS models. In contrast to traditional universities, external funds from 
the federal state are positively related to the number of publications in universities of applied 
sciences, with all coefficients keeping roughly constant across both regressions (see Model 
2 in table 8). 
As for the other types of external funds, those from international funding agencies 
and from business display a significant coefficient that points to a positive association with 
publications per person. The positive coefficient of international grants confirms that the 
European Framework Programs have become an important source of research funding for 
universities of applied sciences. In the case of industry contracts, the evidence is less clear, 
as the result comes along with a loss of significance of other coefficients in the 2SLS model, 
pointing to possible shortcomings of the instrumental variable. 
                                                 
25 For instance, such problems may occur if the instrument is highly correlated with the control variables and only weakly 
correlated to the endogenous variable, i.e. the different types of external funding. In the case of funding from industry, 
the low value of the F-test of excluded instruments points to the weakness of the instrument variable. 
26 Another possible reason may be the relatively high correlation among control variables observed in the correlation 
matrices. 
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Table 5:  Correlation table for universities 
 
Variables 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  
                        
1 Publications per pers. 1.000                     
2 Ext. funding total 0.487 *** 1.000                   
3 Ext. funding state 0.229 ** 0.759 *** 1.000                 
4 Ext. fund. nat. agencies 0.627 *** 0.674 *** 0.303 *** 1.000               
5 Ext. fund. int. agencies 0.067  0.515 *** 0.318 *** 0.020  1.000             
6 Ext. fund. business 0.268 ** 0.643 *** 0.416 *** 0.256 ** 0.176 1.000           
7 Ext. fund. foundations 0.116  0.202 * 0.074  0.233 ** 0.163 -0.209 * 1.000         
8 Students 0.334 *** 0.027  -0.019  0.308 *** -0.179 * -0.111  -0.031  1.000       
9 Expenditures per pers. 0.545 *** 0.453 *** 0.423 *** 0.435 *** 0.127  0.474 *** 0.137  -0.016  1.000     
10 Students per pers. -0.270 ** -0.137  0.043  -0.159  -0.144 -0.200 * 0.214 ** -0.119  0.137 1.000   
11 Share of soc. & hum. -0.642 *** -0.592 *** -0.515 *** -0.390 *** -0.198 * -0.493 *** -0.101  -0.152  -0.604 *** 0.186 * 1.000  
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Table 6: Correlation table for universities of applied sciences 
 
Variables 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  
                        
1 Publications per pers. 1.000                     
2 Ext. funding total 0.286 *** 1.000                   
3 Ext. funding state 0.287 *** 0.710 *** 1.000                 
4 Ext. fund. nat. agencies 0.070 0.384 *** 0.362 *** 1.000               
5 Ext. fund. int. agencies 0.214 ** 0.654 *** 0.411 *** 0.408 *** 1.000             
6 Ext. fund. business 0.171 * 0.502 *** -0.033  -0.116 0.091 1.000           
7 Ext. fund. foundations -0.138 0.229 ** 0.053  -0.034 0.088 0.126  1.000         
8 Students -0.023 -0.198 ** -0.121  -0.128  -0.202 ** -0.044  -0.250 ** 1.000       
9 Expenditures per pers. 0.090 0.339 *** 0.356 *** 0.171 * 0.345 *** 0.022  0.151  -0.079  1.000     
10 Students per pers. 0.078 0.372 *** 0.319 *** 0.079 0.290 *** 0.006  0.266 *** -0.043  0.798 *** 1.000   
11 Share of soc. & hum. -0.184 -0.148  -0.384 *** -0.052 -0.072 0.022  0.006  0.149  -0.341 *** -0.264 *** 1.000  
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Table 7: External funds and publication performance among universities 
 
Variables Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
 FE  2SLS   FE 2SLS   FE  2SLS   FE  2SLS   FE  2SLS   FE  2SLS  
                                                         
Constant -13.840 *** -13.930 ***  -15.960 *** -16.930 ***  -14.670 *** -12.580 ***  -15.190 *** -2.529  -15.790 *** -9.230***  -15.780 *** -13.130 *** 
 (0.687)  (0.696)  (0.748) (0.88)  (0.759)  (0.970)  (0.758)  (3.827)  (0.748)  (3.308)  (0.738)  (1.595)  
log(fund_tot) 0.573 *** 0.511 ***                          
 (0.038)  (0.084)                          
log(fund_state)      0.046 *** -0.220 ***                     
      (0.017) (0.070)                     
log(fund_nat_ag)           0.157 *** 0.408 ***                
           (0.022)  (0.068)                
log(fund_int_ag)                0.054 *** 0.832***           
                (0.010)  (0.198)           
log(fund_busin)                     0.036 * 1.454**      
                     (0.020)  (0.588)      
log(fund_found)                          0.063 *** 1.050 *** 
                          (0.018)  (0.201)  
log(stud) 1.193 *** 1.210 ***  1.372 *** 1.460 ***  1.296 *** 1.156 ***  1.305 *** 0.191  1.359 *** 0.791***  1.367 *** 1.422 *** 
 (0.066)  (0.070)  (0.070) (0.082)  (0.070)  (0.083)  (0.071)  (0.343)  (0.071)  (0.295)  (0.070)  (0.142)  
log(exp) 0.213 *** 0.245 ***  0.745 *** 0.897 ***  0.572 *** 0.301 ***  0.694 *** -0.260  0.734 *** -0.143  0.728 *** 0.152  
 (0.069)  (0.079)  (0.075) (0.093)  (0.077)  (0.108)  (0.075)  (0.319)  (0.075)  (0.410)  (0.075)  (0.191)  
log(stud_staff) -0.447 *** -0.469 ***  -0.701 *** -0.722 ***  -0.658 *** -0.581 ***  -0.626 *** 0.505  -0.683 *** -0.171  -0.690 *** -0.792 *** 
 (0.070)  (0.075)  (0.072) (0.080)  (0.071)  (0.079)  (0.073)  (0.350)  (0.072)  (0.279)  (0.071)  (0.145)  
log(soc_hum) -0.013  -0.012  0.008 -0.079 **  -0.016  -0.057 **  -0.005  -0.059  0.000  0.170**  -0.003  -0.020  
 (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.020) (0.031)  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.019)  (0.054)  (0.019)  (0.085)  (0.019)  (0.039)  
                              
                                                            
N 1036  1036   1036 1036   1036  1036   1036  1036   1036  1036   1036  1036  
adjusted R-sq. 0.355     0.251    0.277     0.265    0.246    0.255    
Instrument coeff.   345.50 ***   77.30 ***    55.33 ***    114.20***    3.51***    179.60 *** 
F-test of excl. instr.   243.33    75.73     125.03     18.04     6.93     32.89  
                             
The FE models present the results of the fixed effects panel regression and the 2SLS models the second stage results of the instrumental variable approach (equation 4). In the latter case, the fund-variables 
correspond to predicted values of the explanatory variables. The dependent variable is log(publ) in all models. The instrumental coefficient and the F-test of excluded instrument refer to the first stage of 
the 2SLS regression (equation 3, presented in Appendix 10 and 11). Standard errors are given in parentheses and significance levels are: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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Table 8: External funds and publication performance among universities of applied sciences 
 
Variables Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
 FE  2SLS   FE  2SLS   FE 2SLS   FE  2SLS   FE  2SLS   FE  2SLS  
                                                         
Constant -17.390 *** -13.660 ***  -20.89 *** -20.44 ***  -22.170 *** -13.950  -21.700*** -14.950 ***  -21.120 *** -9.797 ***  -22.150 *** -41.900*** 
 (1.308)  (2.545)  (1.230)  (1.43)  (1.219) (9.310)  (1.244)  (3.378)  (1.238)  (3.215)  (1.253)  (15.05)  
log(fund_tot) 0.442 *** 0.828 ***                          
 (0.053)  (0.230)                          
log(fund_state)      0.108 *** 0.152 **                     
      (0.022)  (0.073)                     
log(fund_nat_ag)           -0.014 6.393                
           (0.065) (6.598)                
log(fund_int_ag)                0.061* 0.998 **           
                (0.035)  (0.414)           
log(fund_busin)                     0.068 *** 1.022 ***      
                     (0.019)  (0.195)      
log(fund_found)                          0.001  -0.879  
                          (0.013)  (0.659)  
log(stud) 1.498 *** 1.044 ***  1.896 *** 1.848 ***  2.017 *** 0.823  1.970*** 1.214 ***  1.924 *** 0.621 *  2.015 *** 3.472*** 
 (0.140)  (0.300)  (0.128)  (0.151)  (0.128) (1.295)  (0.130)  (0.372)  (0.130)  (0.354)  (0.129)  (1.130)  
log(exp) 0.142  -0.002  0.336 ** 0.299 **  0.477 *** -0.382  0.478*** 0.691 ***  0.390 *** 0.284  0.476 *** 1.201* 
 (0.125)  (0.153)  (0.131)  (0.144)  (0.131) (0.978)  (0.130)  (0.193)  (0.128)  (0.236)  (0.131)  (0.621)  
log(stud_staff) -0.226  -0.188  -0.225  -0.176  -0.367 ** 0.761  -0.375** -0.611 ***  -0.317 ** -0.286  -0.365 ** 0.270  
 (0.159)  (0.164)  (0.164)  (0.181)  (0.162) (1.271)  (0.162)  (0.235)  (0.161)  (0.296)  (0.162)  (0.604)  
log(soc_hum) 0.072 ** 0.068 *  0.076 ** 0.074 **  0.078 ** 0.196  0.078** 0.071  0.072 * 0.002  0.079 ** 0.125  
 (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037) (0.170)  (0.037)  (0.049)  (0.037)  (0.070)  (0.037)  (0.093)  
                              
                                                            
N 1159  1159   1159  1159   1159 1159   1159  1159   1159  1159   1159  1159  
adjusted R-sq. 0.166     0.135     0.117    0.120     0.125     0.118   
Instrument coeff.   343.60 ***    158.90 ***   38.94    251.60 ***    367.50 ***    -282.1  
F-test of excl. instr.   62.66     102.70    1.05    12.77     35.28     2.20  
                             
The FE models present the results of the fixed effects panel regression and the 2SLS models the second stage results of the instrumental variable approach (equation 4). In the latter case, the fund-variables 
correspond to predicted values of the explanatory variables. The dependent variable is log(publ) in all models. The instrumental coefficient and the F-test of excluded instrument refer to the first stage of 
the 2SLS regression (equation 3, presented in Appendix 10 and 11). Standard errors are given in parentheses and significance levels are: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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6. Discussion 
 
The results from the regression models – especially those for traditional universities – are in 
line with the findings of previous studies at the individual level conducted in other countries. 
For instance, the positive association of academic grants from the National Science 
Foundation in the United States (Arora and Gambardella 2005) or the Fund for Scientific 
and Technological Research in Argentina (Chudnovsky et al. 2008) with the publication 
performance of single researchers could be confirmed at the aggregate level of whole 
universities in Germany and Switzerland. Similarly, academic grants from international 
organizations seem to be positively related to scientific output, matching for example the 
findings of Defazio et al. (2009).  
At the same time, the analysis reveals important differences between universities and 
universities of applied science. While funds from the federal state are negatively related to 
the research output of universities, a positive association can be found for universities of 
applied sciences. The reason for this difference might be the small amount of core 
contributions that the latter receive for research (see e.g. Lepori 2008). Universities of 
applied sciences are thus more dependent on external funding than traditional universities 
for conducting research and publishing. Since they focus on applied and user-oriented 
projects (De Weert 2011, Lepori and Kyvik 2010), researchers in universities of applied 
sciences do not fully match the requirements for academic grants and tend to acquire more 
funds from the federal state.  
A similar argument of a lack of core funding and limited alternative funding options 
may also apply to industry contracts. Although empirical evidence is less clear in this case, 
external funds from business seem to be positively related to the scientific production of 
universities of applied sciences, while no such relationship is found for universities. 
However, the lack of empirical evidence may also be caused by the non-linearity of 
association patterns between external funds from business and scientific output. As shown 
by Bonaccorsi et al. (2006), small shares of industry contracts may positively affect the 
number of publications, while a large share of such contracts has a negative effect. 
Summing up, the overall positive association of the total amount of external funding 
with publications per person observed for both universities and universities of applied 
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sciences confirms the productivity effect that an increase in the share of external funds might 
have. At the same time, these association patterns vary considerably across different types 
of external funding and different types of universities. Policy-makers should be aware of 
these differences when considering on which funding sources to focus in order to foster the 
research performance of universities.  
Moreover, the distributional effects of an increase in competition also need to be 
considered. As shown in the first part of the empirical analysis, both external funds and 
scientific output have not been subject to notable concentration from 1998 or 2000 to 2012. 
The higher education systems in Germany and Switzerland were already highly 
differentiated at the beginning of the observation period (see also Huisman et al. 2007) and 
the increase in competition has rather led to the convergence of strategies than to additional 
differentiation. Universities with a lower level of research have started imitating the 
strategies of more successful institutions, securing contracts and grants more actively and 
increasing their relative share of external funds. 
Policy reforms aimed at increasing competition may thus foster the scientific output 
of the research system through the overall productivity effect of external funds, but not 
through distributional effects leading to the concentration of resources in the best 
institutions. If policy makers aim at increasing the research performance and the number of 
publications of all universities in the system, increasing the share of competitive funding 
might be the right measure. If, however, the aim is to diversify the higher education system 
further and concentrate most resources in a small number of worldwide leading universities, 
a different approach is probably needed. Rather than increasing overall competition, a 
feasible option would be to select a small number of universities in a structured process and 
then grant them special, long term funding. 
Moreover, while the overall increase in publications may be an argument in favor of 
more external funds, policy makers should pay particular attention to the interplay between 
the productivity and distributional effects of different types of funding. For instance, grants 
from the DFG have been found to be positively associated with scientific production, but the 
corresponding Balassa indexes did not change significantly over time. Competition for funds 
from the DFG has thus not considerably widened, probably because of the demanding 
selection criteria and the central role of reputation and previous performance for funding 
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allocation. In contrast, an increasing number of universities has started acquiring funds from 
the federal state, although this type of external funding is not always related to higher 
research production. Policy makers need to be aware of these differences and make sure that 
the types of external funding being expanded are related to the desired outcomes. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The goal of this study was to analyze two possible consequences of policy reforms aimed at 
more competition for research funding: the effect on the distribution of external funds among 
universities and the association of these funds with scientific production. The analysis 
differentiated between five types of external funding and two types of universities.  
In opposition to the general assumption that more competitive funding leads to a 
concentration of resources in the best institutions, no empirical evidence for increasing 
differentiation could be found. The only exception was a slight concentration of public 
external funds among the upper quartile of universities in Germany, probably related to the 
implementation of the Excellence initiative. Most of the findings rather pointed to a 
decreasing inequality among institutions and to a convergence of acquisition patterns, 
confirming the assumptions of strategic repertoire simplicity and institutional isomorphism. 
Universities without any remarkable research activities have adopted similar strategies as 
more research-oriented institutions, increasing their relative share of external funding. These 
developments are particularly pronounced among universities of applied sciences, which 
hints at their growing role as research institutions.  
As for the association of external funding and scientific production, the findings 
confirmed the positive effect of academic grants from national funding agencies among 
traditional universities, and of grants from international agencies among universities of 
applied sciences. Interestingly, external funding from the federal state proved to be 
positively related to the number of publications per person in universities of applied sciences, 
while a negative association was found in traditional universities. Positive association 
patterns were also found for industry contracts, although the observed relationship may be 
biased by endogeneity problems. 
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Policy makers need to be aware of both distributional and productivity effects when 
designing reforms. For instance, if their goal is to concentrate resources in few universities, 
simply increasing competition for external funds may not be the best option. Moreover, if 
they demand that universities acquire more external funds, they should be aware of the 
different effects that single types of funding may have for universities and universities of 
applied sciences. If reforms aim at increasing performance, a more nuanced approach that 
accounts for these differences may be useful.  
Among the main limitations of the study was the inability to observe association 
patterns of external funding and scientific production directly in such complex organizations 
as universities. Endogeneity remains a problem that cannot always be fully addressed, 
especially in cases where good instrument variables are missing. Nonetheless, the study 
demonstrated that in-depth analyses are possible at the aggregate level of universities and 
similar comparative studies could be repeated in other contexts at national and especially 
international level. To this end, however, comparable panel data over an adequate period of 
time needs to be collected. Such studies are often hindered by the lack of reliable databases 
at national level or substantial differences across countries in the way data is collected. For 
this reason, ongoing projects aimed at creating common international databases, such as the 
European Tertiary Education Register (ETER) are of particular importance.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Descriptive statistics for universities and universities of applied sciences in Switzerland 
(incl. graphs indicating the evolution of different types of third party funds) 
 
 
Universities 
      
 2000  2012 Change  
of mean 
N  Mean SD  Mean SD 
 
        
Students 8'032 5'666  11'476 6'830 43% 12 
Scientific staff 2'278 1'929  3'515 2'561 54% 12 
Publications 681 708  1'980 1'873 191% 12 
Total expenditures 371'259 299'710  607'406 479'961 64% 12 
Total external funds (EF) 71'620 51'185  133'187 102'351 86% 12 
EF to total expenditures 19% 11  22% 4 16% 12 
   
    
 
 
Universities of applied sciences 
      
 2006  2012 Change  
of mean 
N  Mean SD  Mean SD 
        
        
Students 6'197 3'500  9'266 5'547 50% 7 
Scientific staff 2'810 1'912  4'919 3'392 75% 7 
Publications 16 11  74 47 363% 7 
Total expenditures 195'959 114'834  332'552 197'857 70% 7 
Total external funds (EF) 30'398 12'323  50'306 18'935 65% 7 
EF to total expenditures 17% 6  17% 5 0% 7 
 
  
 
  
 
 
Total expenditures and total external funds are measured in 1'000 Swiss Francs at constant prices (2012 prices). 
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 Evolution of types of external funds 2000-2013: Swiss universities 
 (in 1'000 Swiss Francs and 2012 prices) 
 
 
 
 Evolution of types of external funds 2000-2013: Swiss universities 
 of applied sciences (in 1'000 Swiss Francs and 2012 prices) 
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Appendix 2 
 
Descriptive statistics for universities and universities of applied sciences in Switzerland at the level 
of single discipline groups 
 
 
Universities 
                
 
Humanities 
 
Social 
Sciences 
 
Natural 
Sciences 
 
Medicine & 
Health 
 
 
Engineering 
 2002 2012  2002 2012  2002 2012  2002 2012  2002 2012 
                              
Students 2'545 2'216  3'678 5'201  2'023 2'344  1'154 1'391  1'877 5'153 
Academic staff 410 504  472 911  967 1'058  610 865  873 1'983 
Total expenditures 42'149 46'193  47'480 83'755  134'418 163'334  130'619 171'558  107'037 227'844 
Total external funds (EF) 5'239 8'337  9'821 24'595  34'906 54'774  36'479 52'295  25'855 72'518 
EF to total expenditures 13% 19%  22% 29%  29% 34%  25% 29%  22% 24% 
              
Observations 8 10  12 11  9 11  7 8  5 3 
              
Universities of applied sciences 
                
 
Humanities 
 
Social 
Sciences 
 
Natural 
Sciences 
 
Medicine & 
Health 
 
 
Engineering 
 2006 2012  2006 2012  2006 2012  2006 2012  2006 2012 
                              
Students 485 838  2'874 4'200  1'644 1'951  438 1'276  413 599 
Scientific staff 226 346  1'060 1'469  527 941  444 785  190 349 
Total expenditures 13'556 60'601  71'510 90'265  71'510 114'068  14'603 38'553  16'592 27'346 
Total external funds (EF) 6'536 21'653  11'103 26'671  11'103 16'580  1'089 4'703  2'779 4'625 
EF to total expenditures 35% 36%  37% 30%  17% 16%  6% 14%  18% 18% 
              
Observations 2 2  7 7  7 7  5 5  7 7 
              
Total expenditures and total external funds are measured in 1'000 Swiss Francs at constant prices (2012 prices). 
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Appendix 3 
 
Distribution of single types of external funds among German universities: Gini coefficients and share 
of single quartiles, 1998 to 2012 
 
 Evolution of Gini coefficients 
 
 Federal state  DFG  EU/International 
   
 Business  Foundations  Other state institutions 
   
 all universities  lowest quartile  highest quartile 
 
 Share of single quartiles to total (in percent) 
 
  Federal state    DFG    EU/International  
  2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ  
               
Q1 1.56 3.04 1.48   1.82 2.02 0.20   0.82 3.41 2.59 
 
Q2 12.25 14.5 2.25   14.27 11.34 -2.93   9.26 13.00 3.74 
 
Q3 23.89 25.43 1.54   27.23 27.81 0.58   20.45 23.77 3.32 
 
Q4 62.3 57.03 -5.27   56.69 58.83 2.14   69.47 59.82 -9.65 
 
 
  Business    Foundations    Other state institutions  
  2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ  
               
Q1 1.65 2.85 1.2   0 2.39 2.39   0.51 0.83 0.32 
 
Q2 8.22 11.25 3.03   6.17 11.24 5.07   7.33 7.34 0.01 
 
Q3 16.62 20.52 3.9   25.12 25.1 -0.02   19.69 18.86 -0.83 
 
Q4 73.51 65.38 -8.13   68.71 61.27 -7.44   72.47 72.98 0.51 
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Appendix 4 
 
Distribution of single types of external funds among German universities of applied sciences: Gini 
coefficients and share of single quartiles, 1998 to 2012 
 
 Evolution of Gini coefficients 
 
 Federal state  DFG  EU/International 
   
 Business  Foundations  Other state institutions 
   
 all universities   highest quartile 
 
 Share of single quartiles to total (in percent) 
 
  Federal state    DFG    EU/International  
  2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ  
               
Q1 0.07 5.11 5.04   0 0 0   0 0.18 0.18 
 
Q2 6.68 14.67 7.99   0 0 0   1.17 6.82 5.65 
 
Q3 18.75 25.26 6.51   0.03 7.58 7.55   13.4 21.64 8.24 
 
Q4 74.50 54.96 -19.54   99.97 92.42 -7.55   85.43 71.36 -14.07 
 
 
  Business    Foundations    Other state institutions  
  2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ  
               
Q1 0.85 4.06 3.21   0 0 0   0 0 0 
 
Q2 10.47 11.89 1.42   0 4.72 4.72   2.98 2.64 -0.34 
 
Q3 25.24 20.77 -4.47   6.24 17.51 11.27   17.85 16.58 -1.27 
 
Q4 63.44 63.29 -0.15   93.76 77.78 -15.98   79.18 80.78 1.60 
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Appendix 5 
 
Distribution of total external funds among discipline groups of German universities (UNI) and 
universities of applied sciences (UAS): Gini coefficients and share of single quartiles, 1998 to 2012 
 
 Evolution of Gini coefficients 
 
 UNI: Social sciences  UNI: Sciences  UNI: Engineering 
   
 UAS: Social sciences  UAS: Sciences  UAS: Engineering 
   
 all universities   highest quartile 
 
 Share of single quartiles to total (in percent) 
 
  UNI: Social sciences    UNI: Sciences    UNI: Engineering  
  2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ  
               
Q1 2.97 5.57 2.60   2.44 2.94 0.50   0.07 0.25 0.18 
 
Q2 10.57 13.47 2.90   14.98 13.01 -1.97   5.06 6.34 1.28 
 
Q3 21.19 25.35 4.16   26.26 27.69 1.43   19.24 21.65 2.41 
 
Q4 65.28 55.62 -9.66   56.32 56.35 0.03   75.63 71.77 -3.86 
 
 
  UAS: Social sciences    UAS: Sciences    UAS: Engineering  
  2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ  
               
Q1 0 2.03 2.03   0 0.88 0.88   0.25 4.74 4.49 
 
Q2 3.48 10.13 6.65   2.72 6.25 3.53   7.35 14.01 6.66 
 
Q3 23.97 24.06 0.09   17.47 19.77 2.30   22.28 25.15 2.87 
 
Q4 72.55 63.78 -8.77   79.81 73.11 -6.70   70.11 56.1 -14.01 
 
 
As several institutions only acquire small amounts of funding, the lowest quartile has not been displayed. 
 
 
 
96 
Appendix 6 
 
Distribution of external funds among Swiss universities: Gini coefficients and share of single 
quartiles, 2000 to 2012 
 
 
 Evolution of Gini coefficients 
 
 Total external funds  Publications  Citations 
   
 all universities  lower half  upper half 
 
 Share of single quartiles to total (in percent) 
 
  Total external funds     Publications     Citations  
  1998 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ  
 
Q1 4.56 3.74 -0.82   0.77 2.93 2.16   0.45 1.10 0.65 
 
Q2 16.74 14.02 -2.72   12.18 10.66 -1.52   12.39 10.44 -1.95 
 
Q3 32.26 33.38 1.12   29.84 29.25 -0.59   30.57 30.36 -0.21 
 
Q4 46.44 48.85 2.41   57.21 57.16 -0.05   56.59 58.10 1.51 
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Appendix 7 
 
Distribution of different types of external funds among Swiss universities: Gini coefficients and share 
of single quartiles, 2000 to 2012 
 
 Evolution of Gini coefficients 
 
 Federal state  SNSF  EU/International 
   
 Business  Foundations  Other state institutions 
   
 all universities  lower half  upper half 
 
 Share of single quartiles to total (in percent) 
 
  Federal state    SNSF    EU/International  
  2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ  
               
Q1 0.91 3.29 2.38   0.67 2.56 1.89   0 1.31 1.31 
 
Q2 12.58 14.99 2.41   17.05 16.89 -0.16   7.39 7.06 -0.33 
 
Q3 26.78 31.67 4.89   37.11 36.37 -0.74   27.74 29.35 1.61 
 
Q4 59.74 50.05 -9.69   45.18 44.18 -1.00   64.87 62.28 -2.59 
 
 
  Business    Foundations    Other state institutions  
  2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ    2000 2012 Δ  
               
Q1 2.85 3.05 0.20   0 0 0   0.28 1.35 1.07 
 
Q2 16.26 13.95 -2.31   0 0.61 0.61   2.32 7.91 5.59 
 
Q3 30.98 29.99 -0.99   1.85 9.49 7.64   10.73 35.98 25.25 
 
Q4 49.91 53.01 3.10   98.15 89.9 -8.25   86.67 54.76 -31.91 
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Appendix 8 
 
Mean of Balassa indexes for different quartiles of German universities of applied sciences by type 
of external funding, 2002 (reference year for quartiles) and 2012 
 
 
 
 Balassa index 2002  Balassa index 2012  Δ Mean  Significance tests  
  mean sd   mean sd      t  WSR    
           
Total external funds 
          
Q1 0.135 0.047  0.351 0.19 0.216  5.853 *** 5 ***  
Q2 0.24 0.024  0.412 0.147 0.172  5.647 *** 13 ***  
Q3 0.331 0.031  0.524 0.245 0.193  3.705 *** 29 ***  
Q4 0.508 0.141  0.630 0.303 0.122  2.192 ** 91 *  
          
Federal state 
          
Q1 0.073 0.065  0.466 0.31 0.393  6.47 *** 5 ***  
Q2 0.243 0.036  0.674 0.376 0.432  5.436 *** 8 ***  
Q3 0.419 0.069  0.904 0.577 0.485  4.208 *** 38 ***  
Q4 0.895 0.32  1.025 0.963 0.13  0.614 140  
          
DFG 
          
Q1 0 0  0 0 0     
Q2 0 0  0.002 0.004 0.002  3.086 *** 0 ***  
Q3 0.002 0.003  0.075 0.123 0.073  2.892 *** 5 ***  
Q4 0.058 0.074  0.019 0.038 -0.038  -2.201 ** 249 ***  
          
International/EU 
          
Q1 0.007 0.013  0.635 0.916 0.628  3.348 *** 4 ***  
Q2 0.128 0.048  0.826 0.989 0.698  3.511 *** 36 ***  
Q3 0.354 0.072  0.416 0.54 0.062  0.584 172  
Q4 1.169 0.685  0.799 0.949 -0.37  -1.689 236 **  
          
Business 
          
Q1 0.075 0.067  0.549 0.698 0.474  3.242 *** 0 ***  
Q2 0.271 0.054  0.686 0.588 0.416  3.591 *** 31 ***  
Q3 0.446 0.057  0.516 0.388 0.07  0.904 136  
Q4 1.069 0.274  1.012 0.98 -0.057  -0.272 181  
          
Foundations 
          
Q1 0 0  0.043 0.059 0.043  3.571 *** 0 ***  
Q2 0.021 0.038  0.901 1.135 0.88  3.78 *** 1 ***  
Q3 0.274 0.081  0.352 0.489 0.078  0.762 168  
Q4 1.065 0.869  0.326 0.424 -0.738  -3.307 *** 260 ***  
             
In both 2002 and 2012, universities of applied sciences are divided in quartiles according to Balassa indexes 
in 2002. 
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Appendix 9 
 
Mean of Balassa indexes for lower (M1) and upper (M2) half of Swiss universities by type of 
external funding, 2002 (reference year for lower and upper half) and 2012 
 
 
 
 Balassa index 2002  Balassa index 2012  Δ Mean  Significance tests  
  mean sd   mean sd      t  WSR    
           
Total external funds 
          
M1 0.699 0.198  0.995 0.119 0.296  2.389 * 0 **  
M2 1.381 0.484  1.067 0.237 -0.314  -1.981 19 *  
          
Federal state 
          
M1 0.724 0.133  0.984 0.261 0.260  2.927 ** 1 *  
M2 1.387 0.344  1.001 0.473 -0.386  -2.269 * 20 *  
          
DFG 
          
M1 0.529 0.317  1.027 0.454 0.498  3.86 ** 0 **  
M2 1.453 0.425  1.490 0.044 0.036  0.211 10  
          
International/EU 
          
M1 0.24 0.238  0.701 0.694 0.462  1.665 3  
M2 1.265 0.963  1.211 0.646 -0.054  -0.306 11  
          
Business 
          
M1 0.57 0.360  0.749 0.226 0.179  1.159 6  
M2 1.523 0.575  1.132 0.540 -0.391  -2.525 * 18  
          
Foundations 
          
M1 0 0  0.525 1.287 0.525  1 0  
M2 23.466 54.982  9.660 17.452 -13.806  -0.576 12  
             
In both 2002 and 2012, universities are divided into a lower and an upper half according to Balassa indexes in 
2002. 
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Appendix 10  
 
First stage regression results of the 2SLS approach: universities 
 
 
Variables Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
 FE   FE   FE   FE   FE   FE  
                                   
fund_nat_tot 345.500***                
 (22.150)                
fund_nat_state    77.300 ***             
    (8.883)             
fund_nat_nat_ag       55.330 ***          
       (4.948)          
fund_nat_int_ag          114.200 ***       
          (26.890)       
fund_nat_busin             3.511 ***    
             (1.334)    
fund_nat_found                179.600 *** 
                (31.310)  
log(stud) -0.480***  -0.281 *  -0.343 ***  0.668 **  0.500 ***  -0.483 *** 
 (0.069)  (0.147)  (0.126)  (0.291)  (0.121)  (0.144)  
log(exp) 0.128**  0.103  0.474 ***  0.744 ***  0.696 ***  0.324 *** 
 (0.056)  (0.148)  (0.117)  (0.270)  (0.125)  (0.138)  
log(stud_staff) 0.336***  0.615 ***  0.782 ***  -0.624 **  -0.433 ***  0.525 *** 
 (0.069)  (0.154)  (0.139)  (0.305)  (0.120)  (0.145)  
log(soc_hum) -0.008  -0.348 ***  0.130 ***  0.063  -0.111 ***  0.021  
 (0.014)  (0.035)  (0.027)  (0.062)  (0.031)  (0.033)  
                  
                                    
N 1036   1036   1036   1036   1036   1036  
F-test of excl. 
instruments. 
243.33
  
75.73 
  
125.03 
  
18.04 
  
6.93 
  
32.89 
 
                 
Models 1 to 6 present the first stage results of the 2SLS regression (equation 3), with the fund_nat-variables indicating the 
instruments. The dependent variables are the different types of external funding log(fund). Standard errors are given in 
parentheses and significance levels are: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Appendix 11  
 
First stage regression results of the 2SLS approach: universities of applied sciences 
 
 
Variables Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
 FE   FE   FE   FE   FE   FE  
                                    
fund_nat_tot 343.600 ***                
 (43.410)                
fund_nat_state    158.900 ***             
    (15.680)             
fund_nat_tot       38.940          
       (38.060)          
fund_nat_tot          251.600 ***       
          (70.390)       
fund_nat_busin             367.500 ***    
             (61.870)    
fund_nat_tot                -282.100  
                (190.20)  
log(stud) 0.644 ***  -0.244  0.127  0.423 ***  0.103  2.085 *** 
 (0.097)  (0.216)  (0.083)  (0.155)  (0.293)  (0.417)  
log(exp) 0.196 ***  0.352 *  0.111 *  -0.375 ***  -0.228  0.992 *** 
 (0.073)  (0.181)  (0.066)  (0.121)  (0.211)  (0.329)  
log(stud_staff) 0.283 ***  -0.088  -0.132  0.538 ***  0.783 ***  0.399  
 (0.101)  (0.240)  (0.088)  (0.163)  (0.291)  (0.439)  
log(soc_hum) 0.007  0.016  -0.019  0.004  0.069  0.057  
 (0.020)  (0.050)  (0.018)  (0.033)  (0.059)  (0.088)  
                  
                                    
N 1159   1159   1159   1159   1159   1159  
F-test of excl. 
instruments. 
62.66 
  
102.70 
  
1.05 
  
12.77 
  
35.28 
  
2.20 
 
                 
Models 1 to 6 present the first stage results of the 2SLS regression (equation 3), with the fund_nat-variables indicating the 
instruments. The dependent variables are the different types of external funding log(fund). Because in the case of national 
agencies, international agencies, and foundations external funding only weakly correlated with the corresponding 
instrument variables we took fund_nat_tot as instrument. Standard errors are given in parentheses and significance levels 
are: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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A.3 
Setting the stage for university research: Varying approaches 
and best practices among funding agencies in Europe 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In the wake of reforms aimed at increasing competition among universities, 
funding agencies have become central players of science policy in charge of 
allocating a considerable share of public research funds. These agencies differ 
considerably across countries in terms of their organization and their funding 
schemes, placing the search for best practices high on the political agenda. 
Although scholars have repeatedly discussed possible consequences of different 
funding approaches, empirical evidence based on cross-country analyses is 
largely missing. The present study first proposes a framework for categorizing 
agencies according to their funding profiles. In a second step, it applies fuzzy-
set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to investigate best practices for the 
promotion of university research in Western Europe. It identifies four causal 
combinations of agency characteristics and context factors associated with high 
scientific production and comprising a focus on investigator-driven project 
funding, on fellowships, or on large excellence programs. Moreover, the results 
stress the importance of a high funding level and point to caveats related to 
thematic funding. These findings are particularly relevant in the context of the 
creation of a common European Research Area and the rapid expansion of 
funding at supranational level.  
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: university research, funding agency, Europe, cluster analysis, fuzzy-set QCA 
 
  
 
 
103 
1. Introduction 
 
In the last twenty to thirty years, most industrialized countries, as well as many developing 
ones, have implemented reforms to foster their higher education and research system, 
increasing not only its efficiency but also its responsiveness to external demands and 
expectations. Apart from granting universities more autonomy and introducing new 
accountability and performance measures (see e.g. Whitley and Glaeser 2007), governments 
have partially replaced traditional institutional funding by project funding in order to foster 
competition and allocate research funds more efficiently (Millar and Senker 2000, Lepori et 
al. 2007a). Moreover, an increasing focus on the returns of research spending has led 
governments to increase the share of research oriented towards societal, economic, and 
political needs at the expense of free academic research (see e.g. Braun 2003, Gulbrandsen 
2005). 
With the gradual shift from institutional university funding to project funding, the 
importance of funding agencies – i.e. the organizations in charge of allocating public funds 
for research and development (R&D) competitively – has considerably increased. Since the 
late eighties and nineties, many governments have created new funding agencies, reformed 
existing ones, expanded their budgets, and/or broadened the scope of their tasks and 
activities (OECD 2003, Lepori et al. 2007a). This expansion has often been accompanied by 
an increased tendency by authorities to earmark and specify the budget of funding agencies 
in greater detail (Skoie 1996, Lepori et al. 2007a), and to direct funding towards more applied 
research (Slipersaeter et al. 2007).  
Despite these common international trends, however, funding agencies have 
remained deeply embedded in national policies and national research systems (Slipersaeter 
et al. 2007). As a result, they vary considerably in terms of their degree of autonomy from 
the state, their organization, their mission and the funding streams they manage (Reale et al. 
2012). In the light of this great diversity, a highly relevant question is whether some models 
of funding agencies are better suited to foster research at universities, and whether best 
practices can be identified. To date several important conceptual and qualitative studies on 
funding agencies have been carried out (see e.g. Braun 1998, Benner and Sandström 2000). 
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However, there is a lack of systematic comparative studies at the international level based 
on quantitative data, focusing on different types of agencies, and identifying best practices.  
Given these premises, the study has two aims. First, it develops a framework for 
categorizing funding agencies according to their tasks, missions and, consequently, their 
funding schemes. It applies this framework to funding agencies in Western Europe, a 
particularly interesting sample for several reasons. In Western Europe, almost every state 
has its own funding agencies, which are deeply rooted in national research policies and thus 
very diverse (Lepori et al. 2007a). At the same time, the context they face has become very 
similar over the last years. With the creation of the European Research Area, research policy 
has become an important topic at European level, and countries have begun coordinating 
their policies and elaborating common goals (see for example Barré et al. 2013, Luukkonen 
and Nedeva 2010). The first research question can thus be stated as follows: how much do 
national funding agencies in Western Europe differ in terms of their funding schemes and 
can different types of agencies be determined?  
The second aim is to identify best practices. To do this, the study applies Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) to the sample of states included in the analysis. QCA is a 
rather recent method developed by Raging (1987, 2000) and increasingly applied in many 
academic disciplines, including political science, sociology, economics, and business. It 
combines qualitative approaches with quantitative data and focuses on cases instead of 
variables, allowing for both in-depth analysis and comparisons (Raging, 1987). In contrast 
to most quantitative approaches, it can be applied both to large and small numbers of 
observations (see e.g. Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Accordingly, the second research 
question is stated as follows: Which best practices can be identified and what do they imply 
for future research policy and funding approaches in single countries and at the European 
level? 
The availability of internationally comparable data on funding agencies and of a 
framework for categorizing them is highly relevant for both policy makers and the funding 
agencies themselves, as it paves the way for a better understanding of single agencies and 
their position within a broader international context. The identification of best practices takes 
such analyses one step further and allows for statements regarding the consequences of 
different funding approaches, the usefulness of reforms, and the potential for further 
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improvement. Such insights are particularly relevant in the context of international funding. 
With the remarkable expansion of the European Framework Programs for Research and 
Development (EFP), a new important actor in funding systems has appeared at the 
supranational level (see e.g. Kuhlmann 2001, Nedeva 2013). The European Commission 
draws – among other things – on national experiences and best practices at national level to 
design its own funding schemes, to develop the framework programs further, and to define 
the future orientation of European science policy. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two presents the 
theoretical background and discusses previous studies on funding agencies. It analyses 
previous classifications of funding agencies and suggests a novel approach for categorizing 
them. Section three introduces the empirical study by presenting and discussing the data 
collected. It applies cluster analysis to address the first research question and to identify 
different types of funding agencies. Section four addresses the second research question by 
explaining QCA as a method, discussing the performance indicator and the context factors 
considered, illustrating the calibration adopted, and presenting the results of the analysis. 
Chapter five discusses the findings of the study in a broader context, while chapter six 
concludes and proposes directions for further research. 
 
 
2. Theoretical background and framework 
 
2.1 Organization of public R&D funding  
 
The way public research is financed varies considerably across countries. Research funding 
systems can be distinguished according to the relative importance of three main 
organizational models: institutional funding, project funding and vertical integration (Lepori 
et al. 2009, Millar and Senker 2000). Every model is characterized by different coordination 
modes between the government, the scientific community and, in some cases, intermediary 
organizations (see Lepori 2011). The main features of the three approaches can be described 
as follows: 
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­ In the case of institutional funding, the state allocates a global budget to universities 
and other public research organizations to ensure their activities. Funding is not 
limited in time and – although a general service agreement with the government 
might exist – the organizations decide themselves on how to use the money.  
­ In the project funding mode, funding is allocated directly to the researchers and not 
to an institution. It is attributed based on the submission of a project proposal 
describing the research activities to be done and is limited in time and scope (Lepori 
et al. 2007a). Funding agencies play a central role in this mode as they are in charge 
of allocating a large part of project funding. 
­ In the vertical integration mode, a so-called “umbrella organization” with a generic 
research mandate receives a global budget that it internally allocates either as 
institutional funding or on a competitive basis (Lepori et al. 2009). Classic examples 
are public research organizations that conduct basic research outside universities, 
such as the National Center for Scientific Research in France (CNRS), or the Max 
Planck Society in Germany (MPG).  
The three organizational models represent ideal types, but in reality, their boundaries are 
fuzzy and overlapping. Moreover, they are not mutually exclusive and may coexist within 
the same research funding system. Most European countries have both institutional and 
project funding, and some of them also feature vertically integrated funding modes. 
However, large differences exist in the relative importance of different organizational 
models. For example, the United States represent a typical case of a system strongly based 
on project funding, while Italy and Spain can be clearly assigned to the vertical integration 
mode. Other European countries such as the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland have a 
particularly high level of institutional funding (Lepori 2011).  
As a consequence of reforms aimed at increasing competition among universities, 
the relative importance of different funding models has gradually changed in many countries, 
with project funding gaining importance at the expense of institutional funding of 
universities and other research organizations (Geuna 2001, Lepori et al. 2007a). At the same 
time, the rationales of scientific production have undergone considerable changes, shifting 
from a “Mode 1” to a “Mode 2” paradigm (Gibbson et al. 1994, Nowotny et al. 2001, 2003). 
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Under “Mode 1”, research funding was granted to both universities and scientists through 
“blind delegation” by the state (Braun 2003), with scientific quality being the main criterion 
for the allocation of funds within the scientific community (see also Rip 1994). By contrast, 
the “Mode 2” paradigm stressed the social relevance, applicability and accountability of 
science. 
The emergence of “Mode 2” approaches to science policy has led to the need of 
coordinating policies in order to overcome the paradox of steering research towards societal 
and economic needs while granting researchers enough autonomy. In the case of institutional 
funding of universities and umbrella organizations, coordination has taken place through 
contracts in which the state and the universities agree upon the service portfolio to be 
delivered (Braun 2003). In the case of project funding, the share of funds directed towards 
more applied research has increased at the expense of investigator-driven grants (see also 
Gulbrandsen 2005), and new funding schemes promoting, for example, networks of 
scientists and users have appeared (Lepori 2011, Braun 2003). The importance of funding 
agencies has thus increased not only in terms of the amount of resources they allocate, but 
also with respect to their role as platforms for combining societally and economically 
relevant research with purely academic goals (Van der Meulen 2003). 
 
 
2.2 Role and functioning of funding agencies  
 
Funding agencies encompass different types of organizations and may be agencies in the 
strict sense, councils, academies, or foundations. The common feature is that they are created 
by the state and are in charge of allocating public R&D funds competitively (Reale et al. 
2012). However, their role within the scientific system is far from restricted to the mere 
distribution of money. By setting the criteria for resource allocation, funding agencies 
significantly influence the behavior of scientists and contribute to constructing, reproducing, 
and changing the institutional order of academic research (Benner and Sandström 2000). 
They are often governed by boards composed of key stakeholders from the government, the 
scientific community, industry, and society, and may be in charge of implementing a part of 
research policy (Braun 2008). Recently, national funding agencies have also become 
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important strategic actors in research and innovation governance at the European level, 
mediating between the national and the international level (Kuhlmann 2001 cited in Reale 
et al 2012). 
Because of their role at the interface between policy and science, funding agencies 
have often been studied from the perspective of principal-agent theory (see for example 
Braun 1993, Guston 1996, van der Meulen 1998). Principal-agent theory is a widely used 
approach first developed in new institutional economics (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Pratt 
and Zeckhauser 1985) and then applied to many other fields of economics and business, 
sociology, and political science. It analyses interdependent relationships between two parties 
in which the first (the principal) assigns resources to the second (the agent) in order to 
perform some previously defined tasks. The agent possesses specific expertise that the 
principal lacks, and the ability of the principal to judge the work to be done is often limited 
(van der Meulen 1998). As the agent may have his own interests and pursue his own goals, 
which potentially conflict with those of the principal, the principal needs to monitor the 
activities of the agent and make sure that he fulfils his tasks correctly.1   
Funding agencies are in multiple relationships with the state and the scientific 
community, and have been analyzed both as the agents (Braun 1993) and as the principals 
themselves (Guston 1996, Gulbrandsen 2005). In their relationship to the governments, 
funding agencies take the role of agents with the task of implementing policies according to 
the interests of policy-makers. However, depending on how close their boards are to the 
scientific community, the interests of researchers may predominate (see for example Clark 
1983). In the “policy arena” (Braun 1998), where scientific boards and other policy 
committees define the strategy and program of the funding agency, goal conflicts between 
government representatives asking for more economically and socially relevant research and 
researchers advocating the autonomy of science may arise (Gulbrandsen 2005). 
  
                                                 
1 Another important component of principal-agent relationships is trust. Though trust is often neglected in the principal-
agent literature, it helps to create stability and continuity in long-term relations and multiple interactions (Shapiro 1987 
cited in van der Meulen 1998). 
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In their relationship to the scientific community, funding agencies may take the role 
of principals. Researchers will see them as providers of funding and implementers of 
government policies through their choice of instruments, priority areas, and selection 
mechanisms (Slipersaeter et al. 2007).2 Conflicts may arise in the “selection arena” (Braun 
1998), where the best proposals are chosen according to their scientific quality and 
relevance.3 Apart from adverse selection, that is, the risk of not choosing the right candidates 
for a project, there is a danger of moral hazard that needs to be addressed (Gulbrandsen 2005, 
Guston 1996). Researchers may adapt their proposals to match the requirements of specific 
calls even if their own goals do not completely match those of the funding agency. 
Consequently, they may not deliver the results that were initially agreed on, making a 
functioning monitoring and control system necessary.   
A third approach views funding agencies as intermediary organizations between 
policy-makers as principals and the scientific community as agents (van der Meulen 1998, 
2003). In this case, funding agencies represent a platform where the interests of the two 
groups can be formulated, and where coordination may be achieved. Policy-making within 
funding agencies is seen as an interaction process between scientists, administrators and 
politicians (Knorr-Cetina 1982, Rip 1988). In their role of intermediaries, funding agencies 
need to act as independent actors, maintaining a sufficient distance from both the 
government and the scientific community, and shaping the relationship between these two 
groups of stakeholders (Braun 1993, Guston 1996).4  
Any funding agency may adopt all of these roles depending on the situation at hand, 
but the frequency and intensity with which they emerge vary considerably in different 
institutional settings. The principal-agent approach helps to understand policy outcomes 
                                                 
2 However, many scholars still question the real influence of governments on funding agencies. Science policy has its 
limits, because loyalties towards the government are often mediated and modified by the necessary involvement of 
science (Slipersaeter et al. 2007). Political actors may influence distributive norms by formulating general policy ideas 
and guidelines, and by manipulating the general images guiding funding decisions. They may also set up an overall 
control system to enhance accountability (Braun 1998). However, they have only little influence on the program 
formulation and implementation at the operational level, on the selection process, and on the monitoring of research 
progress. 
3 While in a first step the scientific quality is usually evaluated by other scientists (peers) acting as reviewers, in a second 
step scientific and eventually political boards assess the relevance of the project proposals (Braun 1998).  
4 In a study on the divisions of the Research Council of Norway, van der Meulen (2003) identified three characteristics of 
particularly autonomous funding agencies, i.e. agencies that were able to implement their own strategies. First, they were 
especially oriented towards the users of research, i.e. industry or – in a broader sense – society. Second, they had extensive 
monitoring rights; and third, they were only accountable to one main ministry and not to several political actors. 
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resulting from the conflicting interests of government and researchers, such as the aim of 
funding more applied research or increased monitoring and reporting obligations. However, 
it does not say much about the consequences that these outcomes will have for research at 
universities. Depending on how close funding agencies are to the government or the 
scientific community, their funding schemes will vary, possibly affecting the research 
performance of universities.  
 
2.3 Typologies of funding agencies and funding instruments  
 
In order to investigate the implications of different funding approaches, one first needs to 
identify existing types of funding agencies. Previous literature has distinguished three main 
types of funding agencies that considerably differ in terms of their relationship to the 
government and to the scientific community, and their overall role in science policy (Braun 
1998): science-based agencies, political funding agencies, and strategic funding agencies. 
­ Science-based agencies represent the traditional form of academic funding bodies, 
strongly identifying with the research performers, especially those working at 
universities. They feature a high degree of autonomy from the state, they are 
structured according to disciplines, and they represent the scientific community in 
national institutions, serving their interests (Skoie 1996). Selection and monitoring 
are organized as peer-review processes that are dominated by the researchers 
themselves (van der Meulen 2003).5 Typical examples of such agencies are the 
German Research Foundation (DFG) or the Austrian Science Fund (FWF). 
­ By contrast, political funding agencies are characterized by a strong role of the 
government at both policy and operational level. These agencies serve the interests 
of a ministry, supporting applied research and development in close contact with 
users and government representatives (Scoie 1996). Although peers may be involved 
in the monitoring processes, the latter are primarily defined by the council as a 
                                                 
5 This approach assures the scientific quality of the projects. However, such peer review and disciplinary orientation may 
also foster mainstream research by selecting and funding reputed scientists within a disciplinary tradition, hampering the 
promotion of innovative and path-breaking projects (Braun 1998). Similar problems may arise in the peer review process 
of academic journals (for further critical discussions see e.g. Bedeian 2004, Tsang and Frey 2007). 
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“lieutenant of the government” (van der Meulen 2003).6 Examples of such political 
agencies are the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (Tekes) or 
the Commission for Technology and Innovation in Switzerland.  
­ Finally, strategic funding agencies, or so-called mission-agencies, are set up to 
promote research in specific areas of public interest, such as medicine, agriculture, 
or energy.  They promote and eventually execute basic research while improving the 
transfer of basic knowledge and its application outside academia (Braun 1993). 
Examples of such agencies are the UK research councils and the National Institutes 
of Health in the US.7  
With the recent reforms and the widening of the scope of many funding agencies, the 
distinctions between these three ideal types have become increasingly blurred. Especially 
scientific funding agencies have acquired new political tasks such as addressing 
governmental priorities and industry needs, and inducing more structural changes in the 
research base by means of research centers and large, long-term funding schemes (van der 
Meulen 2003). As the extent to which funding agencies have been affected by these changes 
differs considerably across countries, a more detailed differentiation is necessary.  
The status of funding agencies, their degree of autonomy from the state, and their 
mission directly translate into their operational tasks and the types of funding instruments 
they use (see also Slipersaeter et al. 2007). An obvious approach to categorizing and 
comparing funding agencies is thus to analyze the relative importance of their different types 
of funding instruments and to identify their funding profile. To do this, one needs to 
differentiate funding instruments according to those dimensions that best reflect the status 
of funding agencies and their mission.  
One first important dimension is the tension between bottom-up and top-down 
research funding. The former, also called responsive-mode funding, comprehends free, 
curiosity-driven projects that are initiated by the investigator. The latter is related to the 
                                                 
6  Political agencies often need to create hybrid communities in order to address politically defined problems and may thus 
give an opportunity to upcoming and innovative scientists to build up their own reputation (Braun 1998). At the same 
time, such innovative projects are also highly risky and political agencies are often forced to find a mix of conventional 
and innovative investigators. 
7 According to Braun (1998), strategic funding agencies combine both established scientists and more unconventional 
researchers, and may foster both settled disciplines and new, emerging fields. Although resource appropriation for 
idiosyncratic purposes remains a strong tendency, the author argues that these agencies offer the best opportunity to 
successfully combine both political and scientific interests in funding. 
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concept of thematic funding (Lepori et al. 2007b) and describes projects where topics and 
goals are largely defined in advance by the funding agency and – indirectly – by the 
government.8 Top-down funding is allocated by means of temporary calls that describe more 
or less in detail the goals of the project and may include additional requirements such as the 
involvement of external partners from other universities, from business and society, or from 
abroad.9 Although bottom-up and top-down processes are not mutually exclusive (van der 
Meulen 1998), this dimension is crucial for the characterization of funding agencies.10  
A second relevant dimension concerns the scale of funding. Apart from single 
projects, funding agencies may promote extensive programs with the aim of building up long 
lasting structures within a national research system (OECD 2014, Orr et al. 2011). Among 
other things, the goal of such programs is to foster excellent research and thematic focuses 
within single universities or groups of universities and research institutions, establishing a 
critical mass of researchers, infrastructure, and financial resources to ensure their high 
visibility at national and international level. As opposed to single projects, high amounts of 
funding are assigned to relatively few research groups for a significantly longer period of 
time that may last up to 10 or 12 years (see e.g. Aksnes et al. 2012, Braun and Benninghoff 
2003).11 Examples of such networks are the German Excellence Initiative, the National 
Centers of Competence in Research in Switzerland, and the Centers of Excellence funded 
by the Danish National Research Foundation (DNRF). 
                                                 
8 The separation of bottom-up and top-down funding partly reflects the traditional tension between fundamental and applied 
research (Gulbrandsen 2005). While this tension is of central importance for distinguishing science-based and political 
agencies, it is less crucial for the present study. The increasing focus of these agencies on user-inspired research is better 
captured by the concept of top-down funding than applied research, which describes a type of research that mainly takes 
place outside the classic universities. Moreover, the difference between basic and applied research is not always as clear 
as the terminology might suggest (for a semantic discussion of the concept of basic research see Schauz 2014). A clear 
distinction is thus rarely possible, especially within universities. 
9 The idea of bottom-up and top-down funding is closely related to the concept of aggregation and steering, with aggregation 
meaning institutionalized processes of agenda-building and decision-making involving the scientific community, and 
steering indicating the attempts of the state to get scientists to work towards state goals (Rip and van der Meulen 1996). 
10 When we compare the main funding institutions of Norway and Switzerland, it becomes clear that the relative importance 
of bottom-up and top-down research varies a lot among academic funding agencies in Europe. The Norwegian Research 
Council allocates less than 20 percent of funds as grants and free projects, while the Swiss National Science Foundation 
allocates about 80 percent of its funding through responsive-mode instruments (Slipersaeter et al. 2007). 
11 While research topics might be inspired by societal or economic challenges, the focus of the programs remains basic 
research at the technological frontier and the achievement of world-class academic excellence. Because of the high 
amount of resources involved and their importance for the national research system as a whole, representatives from the 
government are often involved in the definition of the broad characteristics of the programs and in the final approval of 
the beneficiaries selected by the scientific committees (see e.g. Kehm and Pasternack 2008). 
 
 
113 
Finally, an important dimension of academic funding agencies centers on the 
difference between fellowships for young talents and grants for specific projects. Funding 
agencies are not only in charge of funding research projects, but also of securing future 
generations of researchers and thus promoting individuals at different stages of their careers, 
including PhD students, postdocs, assistant professors, and full professors (van Arensberger 
et al. 2014). Usually, such fellowships include the description of planned research projects, 
whose scientific quality is assessed by peer reviewers. As opposed to project grants, 
however, the group of potential applicants is very limited and does not include leading 
scholars. While most fellowships are not restricted to specific topics and proposals may be 
submitted in a bottom-up process, previous publication performance and awards are still 
among the main criteria for grant allocation (van Arensbergen et al. 2014).  
Table 1 summarizes the dimensions of funding instruments identified, their main 
categories and characteristics. As every category of instruments has its own rationales and 
requirements, it should affect the research performance of individuals, groups of scientists, 
and whole universities in different ways (Potì and Reale 2007). For instance, bottom-up 
projects mainly serve academic goals and are thus expected to foster scientific productivity 
in terms of publications and citations more than top-down projects. These differences are 
probably less pronounced in the other dimensions, as they all primarily serve academic goals. 
One could argue that large programs may foster publications and citations more than single 
projects because they provide a critical mass for excellent research and the opportunity to 
profit from synergy effects (Orr et al. 2011). Similarly, project grants for established 
researchers may be related to higher research performance than fellowships because 
scientists selected for funding have a higher standing and may achieve better publications. 
On the other hand, young researchers that have been granted a fellowship may be more 
productive because of the need to publish in journals with high impact factors to advance 
their academic career. 
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Table 1:  Dimensions of funding instruments, their characteristics, and possible effects 
 on research performance 
 
 
Dimension Category Characteristics Effects 
    
Thematic 
orientation 
Bottom-up 
calls 
Researchers are free to define the 
content and goals of the projects.  
Strong effect on academic 
performance of single 
researchers, less transfer of 
results to business or society. 
 
Top-down 
calls 
The goals are defined in advance to 
varying degrees of detail. 
Higher transfer of the results but 
eventually lower effect on 
academic performance. 
    
Structural 
orientation 
Single 
projects 
Only one researcher or research 
group is funded for a rather short 
time period. 
 
 
Funded researchers may profit 
but there are not many synergy 
effects. 
Large  
programs 
Funding is granted to larger 
networks and for a longer time 
period. 
Scale and synergy effects may 
lead to higher academic impact. 
    
Talent 
orientation 
Project  
grants 
The quality and relevance of the 
project is the only rationale for 
funding allocation.  
 
 
Funding is granted to established 
and reputed scholars. High 
probability of major academic 
impact. 
Fellowships Promotion of young talents at 
different stages of their career is an 
important aim of funding.  
Funding is granted to young 
talents and serves their career 
advancement. Major academic 
impact is less certain.  
    
 
 
 
3. Categorization of funding agencies in Europe 
 
3.1 Sample definition and data collection 
 
The present study aims at identifying best practices among funding agencies in terms of their 
ability to foster university research. For this reason, it only focuses on those agencies that 
primarily grant funding to university researchers and thus contribute to their academic work. 
Purely political agencies fostering applied research and innovation, and granting funding to 
 
 
115 
researchers outside universities, are not included. Similarly, “umbrella organizations” such 
as the French CNRS and the German MPG are also excluded. Though these organizations 
may collaborate with universities, their main task is not to allocate competitive grants and 
they do not significantly shape the activities of university researchers. 
From a geographic point of view, the analysis is restricted to countries in Western 
and Northern Europe. The selected countries have all well-developed scientific systems and 
rather similar macroeconomic context factors. Although common research policies have 
been developed at European level, every country has its own funding system, which may 
considerably differ from those of other states (see e.g. Lepori et al. 2007a). Apart from very 
small countries with less than one million inhabitants, most governments have set up at least 
one or two funding agencies that are included in the analysis. The only exceptions are Italy, 
Spain and Greece, where research funding is directly allocated either to universities or to 
large “umbrella organizations”, namely the National Research Council in Italy (CNR), the 
Spanish National Research Council (CSIC), and the National Hellenic Research Foundation 
(NHRF). This left us with 25 funding agencies from 13 countries and one supranational 
organization, the European Union.12  
An in-depth analysis of funding agencies requires information about their operational 
and administrative resources, their different types of funding instruments, and the funding 
process itself. Collecting such comparative data on all funding agencies posed several 
challenges because data processing methods and reporting practices considerably differ 
across countries. 
To ensure comparability of the data collected, a two-step procedure was chosen. First, 
all publicly available information that could be found in annual reports, yearly accounts, 
information brochures, and websites of the agencies was collected and analyzed. In a second 
step, every agency was contacted and requested to clarify potential ambiguities and questions 
regarding the data already collected, and/or to provide additional information where data 
was missing. Most enquiries involved several attempts and repeated interactions. Moreover, 
                                                 
12 We included two funding agencies in charge of allocating grants within the European Framework Programs for Research: 
the European Research Council (ERC) and the Research Executive Agency (REA). Both the ERC and the REA grant a 
large share of their funding to university researchers. In contrast, many EU programs for applied research and programs 
that do not primarily focus on university research are managed either by the Directorate General or by other Executive 
Agencies, such as the Executive Agency for Small and Medium-size Enterprises (EASME) and the Innovation and 
Networks Executive Agency (INEA). 
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the funding agencies could not provide all information requested, either because they were 
not allowed to hand out the data or because they did not collect it at all. Nevertheless, the 
combination of desk research and targeted enquiries resulted in a rich dataset that allows for 
significant analyses and conclusions. 
 
 
3.2 Descriptive results 
 
Table 2 presents the funding agencies included in the analysis with their full English name 
and the current acronym, which is usually based on the national language. To provide an 
overall picture of the agencies, figures on total expenditures, their growth between 2009 and 
2013, and funding allocations per person are also displayed.13 Appendix 1 includes more 
detailed figures on the structure of the agencies, such as their administrative costs, and the 
number of personnel employed in their offices. Appendix 2 presents figures concerning the 
selection and funding processes, namely the number of yearly submissions, the number of 
projects granted, the acceptance rate, and the amount of money per project. 
First of all, substantial differences in the size of the agencies as measured by their 
budget stand out. The largest single funding agency is the German DFG with almost 2.7 
billion Euro expenditures, while taken together, the UK Research Councils have a budget of 
almost 4.2 billion Euro.14 However, the size of the countries and their research system also 
differ significantly. In relation to the countries’ population, funding agencies are particularly 
large in Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, while they are comparatively small in Austria, 
Belgium, France, and Germany (see appendix 1). 
 
  
                                                 
13 The year 2009 has been chosen as a reference point in order to exclude possible effects of the financial crisis in 2008, 
and because in many cases earlier data was not available. In many countries, a considerable increase in the budgets of 
the funding agencies had already taken place earlier, reflecting the growing importance of project funding.  
14 The overall budget of the UK Research Councils also includes own research laboratories and facilities, which are 
particularly important for the MRC, the NERC, and the STFC. 
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Table 2:  Indicators for expenditures and personnel of European research 
funding agencies (2013) 
 
 
Country Agency Acronym Total 
expenses 
Growth 
2009-2013 
Funding 
per FTE 
      
Austria Austrian Science Fund FWF 231.2 4.4 2.6 
Belgium Fund for Scientific Research FNRS 168.1 -0.8 2.7* 
Belgium Research Foundation - Flanders FWO 226.4 7.2 4.4 
Denmark Danish National Research Foundation DNRF 58.9 40.3 6.3* 
Denmark Danish Council for Independent Research DFF 163.8* -3.0* 4.1* 
France French National Research Agency ANR 596.0  -31.4 2.6 
Germany German Research Foundation DFG 2692.1 10.1 4.0 
EU Research Executive Agency REA 1439.8 106.7 2.6 
EU European Research Council ERC 1762.5 89.3 4.5 
Finland Academy of Finland AKA 338.6 18.7 2.4 
Ireland Science Foundation Ireland SFI 161.7 -13.7 3.2 
Netherlands Netherlands Org. for Scientific Research NWO 735.2 10.0 1.5 
Norway Research Council of Norway RCN 933.2 13.1 1.9 
Portugal Foundation for Science and Technology FTC 436.0 -13.6 1.7* 
Sweden Swedish Research Council SRC 698.8 55.9 3.9 
Sweden Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research SSF 133.2 113.4 8.7 
Switzerland Swiss National Science Foundation SNSF 780.3 57.4 3.9 
UK Arts and Humanities Research Council AHRC 129.1 -9.6 1.5 
UK Biotechnology and Biological Sciences RC BBSRC 610.5 -4.6 2.4 
UK Engineering and Physical Sciences RC EPSRC 1020.4 -7.9 4.4 
UK Economic and Social Research Council ESRC 262.5 -2.8 1.8 
UK Medical Research Council MRC 1026.6 -3.0 0.2 
UK Natural Environment Research Council NERC 517.4 -1.7 0.1 
UK Science and Technology Facilities RC STFC 615.0 -23.4 0.2 
      
      
Total/Mean   15’737.2 14.2  
      
* Estimate or approximation. 
Total expenses are in million Euro. Total expenses include both funding allocations and administrative expenses. 
Funding per full-time equivalent (FTE) includes only funding allocations. Growth 2009-2013 refers to real growth 
(2013 prices). 
The Irish Research Council (IRC) is not included in this overview because it could not provide figures on the 
personnel and the administrative costs of its office. With a total of 34 million Euro of funding allocations in 2013, 
the IRC is the smallest funding agency included in the analysis.  
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With respect to the change of expenditures between 2009 and 2013, we note that the 
budgets of funding agencies have increased by 14.2 percent on average. At the same time, 
different evolution patterns can be observed for single countries. While in Sweden and 
Switzerland the funding agencies’ budgets have considerably increased, in Ireland, Portugal, 
and the UK they have stagnated or slightly decreased. Moreover, the significant increase of 
funding at EU level stands out, as does the considerable reduction of the budget of the ANR 
in France.15  
The amount of funding per personnel also differs considerably among agencies and 
already hints at their main funding schemes. Funding per person will be lower if agencies 
fund numerous projects with rather small amounts, and higher if fewer but larger projects 
are funded. For example, the ERC, which allocates up to 2.5 million Euro per grant through 
its highly competitive Advanced Grants scheme, has a funding per personnel ratio which is 
almost twice as high as the one of the REA. Moreover, projects and grants in the natural and 
technical sciences are usually larger than in the social sciences and humanities, as they 
account for expensive laboratory equipment (Lin et al. 2014). It is thus not surprising that 
among the UK Research Councils, the BBSRC and the EPSRC display a higher funding per 
FTE than the AHRC and the ESRC. On the other hand, the very low funding per FTE 
displayed by the MRC, the NERC, and the STFC is due to the many research institutes and 
facilities belonging to these Research Councils and, consequently, their number of personnel 
being much higher than that of other funding agencies.  
As shown in appendix 1, administrative costs make up between 2.3 and 8.1 per cent 
of total expenditures. However, even though funding agencies often present them as 
performance indicators, these figures are hardly comparable. First, as no common 
approaches or guidelines exist at international level, every agency assesses its administrative 
costs autonomously using different parameters and including different items.16 Second, as in 
                                                 
15 Public research funding in France was dominated for a long time by the CNRS as a typical large umbrella organization. 
The ANR was only created in 2005 and initially saw its yearly budget increase up to about 850 million Euro in 2008 
(ANR 2009). However, from 2009 onwards a considerable downscaling took place in the wake of the financial crisis and 
a repositioning of the ANR in the context of a new innovation strategy that aimed at a stronger coordination between 
national and international funding (Ministry of Higher Education and Research 2013).  
16 Salaries of the personnel employed in the offices of the agencies are the main component of administrative expenditures, 
making up more than 50 percent of costs. Other items, such as board members remuneration, travel expenses, building 
occupancy expenses, or reviewer fees, differ considerably and are not equally considered by all funding agencies. 
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the case of funding per personnel, the percentage of administrative expenses strongly 
depends on the funding instruments and the average amount of funding granted per project.  
Another common performance indicator for funding agencies is the acceptance rate 
of project proposals (see appendix 2). Most acceptance rates lie between 15 percent and 30 
percent, with a few exceptions. While agencies that primarily manage large excellence 
grants, such as the DNRF and the ERC, display low acceptance rates of about 10 percent, 
the Belgian FNRS and the Swiss National Science Foundation have acceptance rates of 36 
percent and 52 percent, respectively. Overall, acceptance rates have decreased between 2009 
and 2013, indicating that competition for grants is growing. The most remarkable decrease 
in acceptance rates has occurred in Austria, Belgium (FWO), France, Finland, and at the EU 
level (REA).  
Finally, appendix 2 confirms that funding per project – as already mentioned – differs 
considerably among agencies and strongly depends on their funding instruments. As 
expected, the DNRF and the ERC feature a particularly high level of funding per project. In 
contrast, traditional academic agencies that focus on smaller projects and fellowships for 
PhD students and postdoc researchers have a rather small amount of funding per project. 
Finally, in several countries and at European level funding per project has increased between 
2009 and 2013, indicating that many agencies are moving away from their traditional tasks 
towards fewer, but larger grants. 
 
3.3. Categories of funding agencies 
 
In order to categorize funding agencies, information on the relative importance of their 
different funding schemes – as measured by their share to total funding allocations – was 
collected. For most agencies, these figures referred to the amount of funding allocated during 
2013. Where such figures were not available, the amount of funding granted in the same 
year was used.17 The single funding schemes were then assigned to the four categories 
                                                 
17 The amount of funding allocated in a given year is a better indicator for the overall orientation of an agency because it 
is less subject to yearly variations. For instance, calls for large, multi-year programs do not always take place on a yearly 
basis and might thus be under- or overrepresented if granted funding is used as indicator. To assess whether granted 
funding was a reliable measure it was necessary to control whether the figures were stable over the last five years. 
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representing the dimensions previously described, namely fellowships, bottom-up projects, 
bottom-up programs, and thematic or top-down instruments.18 
Table 3 presents the resulting share of the four types of instruments to total funding 
allocations, while the category “other” comprehends all funding schemes that could not be 
attributed to any of the four dimensions.19 Appendix 3 lists the absolute figures as expressed 
in million Euro.  
Groups of universities with similar funding profiles were identified using hierarchical 
cluster analysis (see for example Everitt et al. 2011, Mooi and Sarstedt 2011). Hierarchical 
clustering is usually preferred to other widespread methods when the sample size is small 
and the number of clusters is not defined in advance (for a similar application to universities 
see Seeber et al. 2015). The commonly used agglomerative approach starts by treating each 
observation as a separate cluster. The algorithm then merges the two most similar clusters 
and links them at the next level of the hierarchy. It repeats this procedure stepwise until only 
one cluster is left. The resulting sequences can be represented graphically as an evolutionary 
tree called dendogram that is used to identify the main clusters of interest.  
 
 
  
                                                 
18 Top-down projects and programs were included in the same category, as they could not always be clearly separated from 
each other and only very few instruments were unambiguously identified as top-down programs. 
19 On the one hand, these were smaller contributions not directly related to research projects, such as small grants for the 
organization of conferences and workshops, or for covering publication costs. On the other hand, the category also covers 
contributions for the acquisition of expensive equipment or for common infrastructures, including laboratories and 
facilities belonging to the agency itself. The latter types of expenditures often make up a larger part of funding allocations 
and explain the relative importance of the category “other” for agencies such as the NWO, the RCN, and most UK 
Research Councils. 
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Table 3:  Categories of funding instruments of academic research funding agencies 
 (in percent of total funding allocated or granted, year 2013) 
 
 
Country Agency Fellowships Projects Programs Thematic Other 
       
Austria FWF 35.2 48.5 4.4 3.0 8.9 
Belgium FNRS 72.6 21.4 0.0 0.0 6.0 
Belgium FWO 47.0 51.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 
Denmark DNRF 3.2 0.0 87.0 9.8 0.0 
Denmark DFF 42.8 54.1 0.0 0.0 3.1 
France ANR 11.5 36.6 0.0 51.9 0.0 
Germany DFG 10.0 28.4 43.0 9.3 9.3 
EU REA 64.7 0.0 0.0 35.2 0.0 
EU ERC 62.4 29.5 1.3 6.8 0.0 
Finland AKA 19.9 40.7 14.6 7.3 17.5 
Ireland SFI 29.7 11.5 0.0 51.1 10.8 
Ireland IRC 72.7 2.9 0.0 24.5 0.0 
Netherlands NWO 27.8 20.8 0.0 11.5 40.0 
Norway RCN 0.0 11.8 0.0 59.1 29.1 
Portugal FTC 45.6 24.6 0.0 8.8 21.0 
Sweden SRC 8.7 47.7 12.6 0.0 31.0 
Sweden SSF 21.7 0.0 0.0 77.9 0.3 
Switzerland SNSF 21.5 50.0 13.8 8.1 6.6 
UK AHRC 41.3 31.0 0.0 21.0 5.4 
UK BBSRC 10.8 32.8 0.0 10.4 46.0 
UK ESRC 24.9 18.6 0.0 24.5 32.0 
UK MRC 8.3 17.7 19.0 6.9 48.0 
UK NERC 7.0 16.1 0.0 19.3 57.6 
       
Two of the seven UK Research Councils were not included in the overview and the subsequent 
analysis. The EPSC could provide neither figures nor an estimate of the share of bottom-up grants 
to total grants. The STFC differs too much from the other funding agencies as it focuses on the 
provision of infrastructures and facilities. Consequently, most of its funding allocations had to be 
assigned to the category “other”. 
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The majority of hierarchical cluster analyses draw on the Euclidean distance measure 
to assess how similar, or different, the single observations are. The Euclidean distance 
measure can be interpreted as the physical distance between two points representing the 
observations in Euclidean space (Everitt et al. 2011) and is computed using the following 
formula: 
 
𝑑𝑖𝑗 =  [∑(𝑥𝑖𝑘 − 𝑥𝑗𝑘)2𝑝𝑘=1 ]
1/2
 
 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑘 and 𝑥𝑗𝑘 are the 𝑘th variable value of the observation units 𝑖 and 𝑗. In the present 
study, the shares of the four categories of funding instruments to total funding allocations – 
excluding those in the category “other” – served as variables. The distance between clusters 
with more than one observation was computed using Ward’s (1963) agglomerative 
approach, which is recommended if data is not influenced by outliers and equally sized 
clusters are to be expected (Mooi and Sarstedt 2011). At each stage of the merging process, 
Ward’s method minimizes the increase in the total within-cluster error sum of squares, which 
is given by 
 
𝐸 = ∑ 𝐸𝑚 = ∑ (∑ ∑(𝑥𝑚𝑙,𝑘 − ?̅?𝑚,𝑘)2𝑝𝑘𝑘=1
𝑛𝑚
𝑙=1 )
𝑔
𝑚=1
𝑔
𝑚=1  
 
where ?̅?𝑚,𝑘 = (1 𝑛𝑚⁄ ) ∑ 𝑥𝑚𝑙,𝑘𝑛𝑚𝑙=1  is the mean of the 𝑚th cluster for the 𝑘th variable and 𝑥𝑚𝑙,𝑘 is the score of the 𝑘th variable of the 𝑙th observation unit in the 𝑚th cluster (Everitt et 
al. 2011). 
Hierarchical cluster analysis suffers from two important limitations, namely high 
sensitivity to outliers and dropped observations, and the inability to modify poor cluster 
assignments in later steps (because once an observation is assigned to a cluster it will not 
change its position). To test the stability of the results, Ketchen and Shook (1996) suggest a 
two-step procedure. In a first step, hierarchical cluster analysis is applied to identify a 
reasonable number of clusters. This number is then used in a second analysis based on a 
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nonhierarchical approach such as the k-mean procedure. In the present case, the analysis 
based on the k-mean procedure identified the same clusters as the one based on Ward’s 
agglomerative approach.20 
Figure 1 shows the dendogram of the hierarchical cluster analysis computed using 
Ward’s method.21 As shown by the red cases, four clusters of agencies with similar funding 
profiles could be identified. Appendix 4 and 5 present the groups of agencies graphically by 
plotting the share of different types of instruments in a three-dimensional diagram.22  
 
Figure 1:  Categorization of funding profiles of agencies: hierarchical cluster dendogram 
 (based on Euclidean distance function and Ward’s method) 
 
 
 
The first cluster comprehends the ANR (France), the NERC (UK), the RCN 
(Norway), the SFI (Ireland), and the SSF (Sweden). These agencies have a rather strong 
focus on thematic funding, with top-down grants accounting for more than 40 percent of 
                                                 
20 Other common algorithms for agglomerative clustering, such as complete linkage, average linkage, and the centroid 
method, also delivered similar clusters. 
21 The statistical analysis, figures, and graphs in this paper have been computed using the statistical software R (R Core 
Team 2014). 
22 Appendix 4 includes the share of fellowships, while appendix 5 includes the share of bottom-up projects. As the clusters 
have been computed using all four variables, the two graphs need to be considered together. 
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total funding allocations. Though all of them also fund free research through fellowships 
and/or traditional project grants, thematic funding plays a dominant role. 
The second cluster only includes three agencies, namely the DNRF (Denmark), the 
DFG (Germany) and the MRC (UK). This group of agencies is characterized by a 
particularly high share of large-scale and long-term bottom-up programs. Especially the 
DNRF focuses almost exclusively on the creation of Centers of Excellence that receive from 
5 to 15 million Euro over a period of 10 years (DNRF 2010). The DFG has a rather mixed 
funding profile but displays a much higher share of bottom-up programs than other funding 
agencies due to the implementation of the German Excellence Initiative (DFG 2015). 
The third cluster represents a large group of agencies that allocate half of their 
funding or more through the traditional form of bottom-up project grants. Most of these 
agencies have a mixed funding profile. For instance, the AKA (Finland) and the SNSF 
(Switzerland) display funding instruments from every category, while the other agencies in 
the group feature significant shares of one other type of funding. Nevertheless, agencies in 
this group can be referred to as classic project-oriented funding agencies. 
Finally, the fourth cluster comprises those agencies that feature a particularly high 
share of fellowships. This group is composed of the two European agencies (REA and ERC), 
the IRC (Ireland), the FNRS (Wallonia region of Belgium), the FTC (Portugal) and others. 
The Research Executive Agency (REA) displays a high share of fellowships because it is in 
charge of the Marie Curie program of the EU, besides the Future and Emerging Technologies 
program and a series of other thematic grants.23 Several agencies in this group, such as the 
Dutch NWO and the two UK Research Councils AHRC and ESRC, also have a significant 
share of thematic grants and programs that make up about 20 to 30 percent of funding.  
 
  
                                                 
23 These include Space Research, Sustainable Resources for Food Security and Growth, Inclusive, Innovative and 
Reflective Societies, Safeguarding Secure Society, Spreading Excellence, Widening Participation, Science with and for 
Society. 
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4. Identification of best practices 
 
Identifying best practices among funding agencies is a very complex undertaking. Ideally, 
an in-depth analysis would require a direct link between the allocation of funding and the 
research output it produced. Although some agencies have started collecting data on 
publications or patents achieved through their funding (see e.g. DNRF 2014, MRC 2014), 
these data are far from complete and cannot be compared internationally.24 Moreover, one 
needs to be aware of the complexity of the research and publication process, in which 
different funding streams often overlap, making a clear attribution of research output to a 
specific funding source often impossible (Langfeldt et al. 2015).  Rather than being a simple 
input that leads to an output, external funding contributes to a more general process that 
eventually produces, among other things, papers and citations (Rigby 2011). 
Another problem for the identification of best practices is that context factors 
affecting the activities of funding agencies differ considerably from country to country. As 
already discussed, Germany or France feature large public research organizations outside 
the university sector, while for example Portugal has a lower GDP per capita than most other 
countries in the sample and thus arguably fewer public resources for higher education and 
research. Depending on these context factors, the role of funding agencies may vary and 
different funding approaches may prove more appropriate. 
To address these issues, the present study investigates best practices at country level, 
including the different funding approaches of agencies as one system feature among others. 
In those countries with more than one agency in charge of funding university research, the 
amount of funding in the different categories was summed up to create an overall funding 
profile for the country. Moreover, the analysis also accounts for those cases without a 
national funding agency by including Italy, Spain, and Greece. Consequently, a total of 16 
countries was examined. 
 
                                                 
24 Another option would be to rely on funding and grants acknowledgements in Thomson Reuter’s Web of Science 
publication database. The practice of acknowledging funding sources has been introduced by Thomson Reuter’s in 2009 
(see e.g. Rigby 2011) but is still subject to several biases. Funding acknowledgements are only present in a part of 
publications and considerably vary depending, among other things, on the scientific field, the journal type, or the authors’ 
country of origin (see e.g. Costas and van Leeuwen 2012, Díaz-Faes and Bordons 2014). 
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4.1 QCA 
 
In order to investigate best practices at country level the present study applies Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (Raging 1987, 2000, 2008). QCA originates from the social and 
political sciences, but has been increasingly applied in organization, management, and 
innovation studies in recent years (see for example Fiss 2011, Misangyi and Acharya 2014, 
Meuer et al. 2015). It fundamentally differs from standard statistical and econometric 
methods such as regression because it focuses on cases and set-theoretic relationships instead 
of variables (Raging 1987). In a first step, QCA assigns every case to different theoretically 
relevant sets, for example to the set of countries with a thematic-oriented funding agency. In 
a second step, it assesses necessity and sufficiency relationships between a condition or a 
combination of conditions, i.e. the inclusion or exclusion in one or more sets, and an outcome 
through the examination of subset-relationships (see e.g. Misangyi and Acharya 2014, Fiss 
2007).25  
QCA has two important features that make it an appropriate method for this study. 
First, it can be applied to both a small and a large number of cases (Raging 1987). Second, 
it allows for more than one combination of conditions to lead to the outcome of interest. This 
is the idea of “multiple causality” (Raging 1987, 2000, 2008) or “equifinality”, which states 
that “a system can reach the same final state from different initial conditions and by a variety 
of different paths” (Katz and Kahn 1978 cited in Fiss 2011, p. 394). This is particularly 
important for the identification of best practices at country level, as – depending on the 
context in which funding agencies act – there might be different approaches that lead to the 
desired outcome.26  
Two approaches to QCA have been widely applied in the literature: crispy-set and 
fuzzy-set QCA (see e.g. Rihoux and Raging 2009). The first approach only measures 
membership and non-membership in different sets, which it records using 1 and 0. The 
                                                 
25 A condition is necessary if the set of cases with the outcome is a subset of the cases with the condition, because all cases 
that feature the outcome need to feature the condition. By contrast, a condition is sufficient if the set of cases with the 
condition is a subset of the set of cases with the outcome, as the presence of the condition automatically leads to the 
outcome. 
26 Moreover, QCA accounts for “causal asymmetry” (Raging 2008), i.e. the fact that the absence of a condition has not 
necessarily the opposite effect of its presence. As Fiss (2011: 394) points out, “the causes leading to the presence of an 
outcome of interest may be quite different from those leading to the absence of the outcome”. 
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second approach is more nuanced and allows for different degrees of membership in each 
set. In fuzzy-set QCA, the data needs to be calibrated in order to assess to what extent a 
specific case is included in a given set. Calibration results in membership scores between 
zero and one, with zero indicating total exclusion from the set, one indicating total inclusion, 
and 0.5 representing the crossover point, i.e. the point of maximum ambiguity. Because most 
measures in the present study are continuous and a clear distinction of membership and non-
membership is not always possible, fuzzy-set QCA is used to identify best practices.  
Finally, QCA assesses the relevance of sufficient conditions using consistency and 
coverage measures as its two parameters of fit (see e.g. Schneider and Wagemann 2012). 
Consistency measures the proportion of cases that display both the conditions and the 
outcome, and thus describes the extent to which a causal combination leads to the outcome. 
Coverage, on the other hand, describes how many cases with the outcome also feature the 
condition of interest (Elliott 2013). While consistency fulfills a similar function to the 
parameters of significance in regression analysis, coverage can be compared to a parameter 
of strength such as the correlation coefficients and the total variance explained (Bara 2015).27 
Appendix 6 briefly describes how fuzzy-set QCA works and how consistency and coverage 
measures are calculated. 
 
4.2. Sets and membership scores 
 
Continuous variables can be calibrated and transformed into fuzzy-set membership scores 
by a piecewise logistic function (Thiem and Duşa 2012). This procedure implies the 
definition of the two thresholds for full exclusion and full inclusion, as well as the crossover 
point by theoretical considerations and expert knowledge (Raging 2000). 
The sets relating to the types of funding agencies in a country were calibrated 
according to the values of the observations in the four clusters previously identified. For the 
sets of countries with project- and fellowship-oriented agencies, the threshold for full 
inclusion was set at 70 percent, which roughly corresponds to the maximum values among 
                                                 
27 QCA may also compute consistency and coverage measures with respect to the necessity of conditions. However, the 
aim of this study is to identify those combinations of conditions that leads to the outcome of interest, focusing on 
sufficiency rather than necessity.  
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the agencies in the corresponding clusters. The threshold for full exclusion was set at zero 
and the crossover point midway at 35 percent. In doing so, all agencies in the two groups 
were identified as more in than out of the relevant set.28 
For the sets of program- and thematic-oriented agencies, a slightly lower threshold 
of full inclusion at 50 percent was used. As opposed to bottom-up projects and fellowships, 
which are traditional funding schemes that almost all agencies feature, large programs and 
thematic funding represent an additional focus of the agencies and account only for part of 
the funding allocations. With a threshold for full exclusion at zero and the crossover-point 
midway at 25 percent, all agencies in the corresponding clusters were identified as more in 
than out of the sets.29 
In order to identify best practices for funding agencies, it is necessary to measure the 
success of a whole higher education system in terms of research at public universities. To 
this end, an indicator based on the share of students at internationally highly reputed 
universities was constructed.30 The Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU, also 
known as Shanghai ranking), which is primarily based on research outputs (Marginson 
2006), served as a measure for the international reputation of universities. An institution was 
defined to be very successful if it was listed among the 200 best universities according to the 
ARWU. In total, 78 European universities belonged to this group in 2013, allowing for 
enough differentiation among single countries.31  
The student numbers of the top 200 universities in each country were summed up 
and divided by the total number of students in the corresponding country.32 This procedure 
led to values ranging from zero percent in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, where no top 
200 universities existed in 2013, to 36.7% in Switzerland. In order to calibrate the indicator 
                                                 
28 With a threshold at 70 percent, full inclusion was only possible if one of the two funding schemes clearly dominated all 
others. In the case of fellowships, Belgium and Portugal proved almost fully in the set, while in the case of project 
funding, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK had membership scores of 0.8 or higher. 
29 In the case of program-oriented agencies, Germany proved almost fully in the set, while for thematic-oriented agencies 
this was the case for France, Ireland, and Norway. 
30 By normalizing for the number of students of a country instead of its population, this measures accounts for the fact that 
different countries have very different education systems and different university enrolment rates (OECD 2015).  
31 As US universities dominate the highest positions of the ranking, a threshold at top 200 represents a reasonable 
compromise between too tight a selection and too broad a widening. 
32 In some countries, such as Austria, Germany and Switzerland, universities of applied sciences exist, which focus more 
on education and applied research. One could argue that the above-mentioned measure should not account for students 
of these universities. However, universities of applied sciences increasingly attract research funds and their students are 
thus included in the assessment of the performance of the countries’ higher education systems. 
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into membership scores, Switzerland served as a benchmark, implying a threshold for full 
inclusion at 36.7. The threshold for full exclusion was set at zero and the crossover point 
midway at 18.35. Countries that were more in than out of the set of successful university 
systems were Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden, with membership scores 
ranging from about 0.6 to 0.8, while Germany and the UK had a membership score close to 
0.5.   
In order to account for the national context of funding agencies, the analysis included 
four context factors that may affect the research performance of universities. First, abundant 
resources are a key condition for successful research universities (see e.g. Lin et al. 2014, 
Salmi 2009, 2011). In countries with an overall high level of resources, as measured by GDP 
per capita, universities may be able to invest more into research. In order to calibrate the 
measure into membership scores, the average GDP per capita of the European Union, USD 
35’000, was used as crossover point. The thresholds of full inclusion and full exclusion were 
set at 50’000 USD and 20’000 USD, respectively, i.e. about 40 percent above and below the 
average.33  
Second, in countries that are more technology-oriented, universities may acquire 
more funds from both public and private sources. Cases were assigned to the set of 
technology-oriented countries according to their share of research and development (R&D) 
expenditures to GDP, which represents another key factor for the development of successful 
universities (see e.g. Aghion et al. 2008).34 In its growth strategy Europe 2020, the European 
Commission set the target of investing 3 percent of GDP in R&D (European Commission, 
2010). For this reason, we chose 3 percent as the threshold of full inclusion in the set of 
countries with high R&D expenditures. The threshold for full exclusion was set at 1 percent, 
and the crossover point at 2 percent.35  
                                                 
33 Only Switzerland and Norway proved to be fully in the set of rich countries, with Austria, Ireland and the Netherlands 
in second place, reaching a score of about 0.8. Most other countries proved more in than out of the set, with only Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain scoring less than 0.5. 
34 Like GDP per capita, the share of R&D expenditures to GDP indicates the amount of resources that are potentially 
available for university research. The distinction is nevertheless important, as countries with above-average GDP and a 
very low share of R&D expenditures may provide insufficient funding for university research 
35 Five countries, namely, Austria, Germany, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland, proved to be fully or almost fully in the 
set, displaying membership scores of 0.9 or higher. Except for Belgium and France, which reached a membership score 
of about 0.6, all other countries proved to be more out than in the set. 
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Third, as already noted, the share of public research conducted at universities 
considerably differs across countries, being lower in those with large public research 
organizations such as the CNRS in France or the MPG in Germany. For this reason, the 
analysis accounted for the share of public research spending within universities to the 
country’s total public research spending. As expected, Germany and France scored rather 
lowly, with only about 50 percent of public research funding managed by universities. In 
contrast, in Denmark and Switzerland universities receive almost 90 percent of public 
research funding. Given these figures, the threshold for full inclusion was set at 80 percent, 
the threshold for full exclusion at 50 percent, and the crossover point midway at 65 percent.36  
Finally, in order to assess best practices among funding agencies, it is necessary to 
account for their relative importance. In countries where universities receive most research 
funds through institutional funding, agencies that allocate research grants competitively will 
play a minor role. The analysis thus includes the share of their budget to total public research 
expenditures in universities. Although universities may also compete for other third party 
funds, funding agencies remain the main source of external funding. Their relative 
importance thus reflects the role of competitive grants within the research system. The UK 
proved to be the country with the highest share of competitive public research funding, with 
its Research Councils accounting for over 50 percent of university R&D expenditures. In 
contrast, in countries such as Austria, Denmark, and France, this figure only amounts to 
about 10 percent. Accordingly, the threshold for full inclusion was set at 50 percent and the 
one for full exclusion at 10 percent, with a crossover point at 30 percent.  
The data on the performance measure and context factors is summarized in table 4, 
while the corresponding membership scores after calibration are presented in appendix 7. 
Figures on GDP per capita, total research expenditures of a country, and the public research 
expenditures within universities stem from the online database of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In the case of GDP per capita, the data 
is expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars to allow for comparison between 
countries.37   
                                                 
36 Using these thresholds, only Denmark and Switzerland achieved full membership, and the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Sweden reached a score of about 0.8. In contrast, Germany and France, along with Austria, Greece, and Spain, scored 
very lowly. 
37 The full QCA analysis was computed using the package “QCA” (Duşa and Thiem 2014) for the statistical software R. 
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Table 4:  Performance measure and context factors used in the analysis 
 
Country 
 
Top 200 students 
(percent) 
GDP per capita 
(USD PPP) 
Total R&D  
to GDP 
HE share of 
public R&D  
Agency to 
HE R&D 
      
Austria 23.33 430380 2.81 56.18 11.62 
Belgium 28.2 393366 2.28 60.85 29.27 
Switzerland 36.7 525453 2.96 88.63 20.52 
Germany 16.69 410774 2.94 50.03 22.47 
Denmark 35.86 414635 3.06 86.97 10.46 
France 11.04 363838 2.23 51.97 6.87 
Finland 11.39 377131 3.32 66.09 29.04 
Ireland 0 436354 1.58 67.62 30.34 
Netherlands 23.18 439590 1.98 72.01 15.37 
Norway 6.83 583292 1.66 60.97 52.01 
Sweden 29.77 424267 3.3 73.13 24.12 
UK 19.18 366100 1.63 59.24 36.67 
Italy 8.49 327185 1.25 59.37 0 
Spain 0 310854 1.24 48.85 0 
Portugal 0 254919 1.36 72.66 44.93 
Greece 0 238713 0.78 51.64 0 
      
Data sources: national statistical offices (number of students in single universities and total number of 
students in a country), OECD online database (GDP per capita, total R&D expenditures, public research 
expenditures within universities). 
Year: 2013 or (if not available) 2012. 
 
 
4.3. Results 
 
Table 5 presents five combinations of conditions that proved to be sufficient for high 
performance university research. The combinations result from the truth table included in 
appendix 8 and were selected using a consistency threshold of 0.8, which is commonly 
accepted in QCA studies (Fiss 2011, Schneider and Wagemann 2012). As proposed by 
Raging and Fiss (2008), black circles indicate the presence of a condition, while white circles 
with a cross indicate its absence. As only 16 observations were included in the analysis, table 
5 shows all conditions appearing in the complex solution, the solution derived from the 
observed cases only. Larger circles indicate those conditions also appearing in the 
intermediate solution, which includes instances of combinations not covered – so-called 
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logical reminders – for which directional expectations have been formulated (see Thiem and 
Duşa 2012). The parsimonious solution that results from the inclusion of all possible logical 
reminders would simplify the combination too much and is only mentioned in the comments. 
 
Table 5:  Results of the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis  
 
 Configurations related to high research performance 
 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Funding agency profiles 
    
 
 Focus on fellowships      
      
 Focus on bottom-up projects      
      
 Focus on programs      
      
 Focus on thematic research      
      
Context factors      
 Above-average GDP 
    
 
      
 High R&D expenditures      
      
 Most public R&D in HE      
       
 Competitive HE funding      
      
Cases AT/BE NL CH/DK/ 
FI/SE 
DE UK 
Consistency (inclusiveness) 0.921 0.886 0.893 0.909 0.807 
Raw coverage 0.277 0.144 0.416 0.143 0.127 
Unique coverage 0.074 0.024 0.238 0.059 0.077 
      
Overall solution consistency (incl.) 0.901     
Overall solution coverage 0.689     
      
Black circles indicate the presence of a condition, and white circles with a cross indicate its absence. Large circles 
indicate conditions appearing in the intermediate solution, while small circles indicate additional conditions of the 
complex solution. The parsimonious solution corresponds to absence of “Focus on thematic research” and presence 
of “Above-average GDP”. 
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Two conditions are present in all five solutions. First, all combinations feature an 
above-average GDP, which points to the importance of an overall high level of resources 
potentially available. Only richer countries seem to have the necessary economic resources 
– both private and public – to provide a suitable environment for successful university 
research. Second, in none of the countries identified as best practice the funding agencies 
included in the analysis focused on thematic research. Too strong an orientation towards 
thematic funding thus seems to be negatively associated with the research performance of 
universities. 
With respect to the other conditions, the first three solutions display several 
similarities. They all occur in medium sized countries known for the quality of their higher 
education and research system, namely, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. The three agency profiles identified all represent variations 
of traditional funding schemes with a focus on fellowships (solution 2), on bottom-up 
projects (solution 3), or on both (solution 1). Analogous variations can be observed among 
the context factors. Apart from the high level of GDP per capita, the seven countries are 
characterized by high R&D expenditures (Austria and Belgium), by most public research 
being done within universities (The Netherlands) or by both (Switzerland, Denmark, 
Finland, and Sweden). These findings point to the importance of an overall high level of 
university funding, which may result from the interplay of different conditions.38   
Solution number 4 only occurs in Germany, and differs from traditional agency 
profiles because of its focus on large programs rather than fellowships or projects. This new 
approach to research funding thus seems a valid option and may prove particularly helpful 
in cases such as Germany, where a large part of public research takes place outside the 
university sector. Germany also differs from the other countries in terms of the size of its 
research systems. Major research programs may be more likely in large countries due to the 
availability of enough resources, and more relevant because spontaneous cooperation 
between institutions may occur less frequently due to geographic distance. 
Finally, solution number 5 comprises only the UK. As in other countries, its agencies 
mainly focus on projects and, although thematic grants exist, they do not dominate other 
                                                 
38 As the example of the Netherlands shows, universities may still profit from a high level of funding even if the share of 
R&E expenditures to GDP is rather low, as long as they account for most public research. 
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funding schemes. However, the UK represents the only case with neither a particularly high 
level of R&D expenditures nor most public research being done within universities. It is also 
the only country among the selected ones that features a rather high level of competitive 
funding, with the UK Research Councils accounting for a large share of public R&D funds 
in universities. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
All cases in the set of countries with high performance research universities featured a 
funding agency for university research, a result that may point to the necessity of such 
agencies. However, in the sample at hand, those countries without any funding agencies were 
also those with GDP per capita below European average and which featured a low share of 
R&D funding to GDP and/or a low share of public research conducted at universities. In 
other words, no cases of rich countries without funding agencies were present. The low 
performance of research within universities may thus be due to the overall lack of financial 
resources rather than the absence of a funding agency (see also Aghion et al. 2007).   
Among the best practice cases identified, all medium sized countries featured rather 
traditional funding agencies with a focus on fellowships and bottom-up projects. The 
positive association of such funding schemes to research performance has repeatedly been 
shown at the level of single researchers (see e.g. Arora and Gambardella 2005, Jacob and 
Lefgren 2011) and the present study confirms these findings at the country level. The two 
core tasks of funding agencies, namely, fostering research through grants for investigator-
driven projects and promoting the career of young talents through fellowships, are both 
relevant and none of them can be prioritized. Both are based on peer reviews of bottom-up 
submissions, focus on academic excellence, and consider previous performance as a 
selection criteria (Potì and Reale 2007, van Arensbergen et al. 2014). Although young talents 
usually have less research experience, they may make greater efforts to publish in order to 
foster their prospective careers.  
With respect to the new types of funding schemes, a stronger focus on program 
funding proved to be a viable alternative to the traditional focus on fellowships and project 
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grants. Program funding also focuses on academic excellence and selects candidates based 
on peer review and previous research performance. Its specific aims of concentrating 
funding, promoting networks, and ensuring a critical mass of resources may further optimize 
the framework conditions for university research (OECD 2014, Orr et al. 2011). With 
Germany as a clear example of such a system, one may expect program funding to be 
particularly suited to large countries with a high share of public research conducted outside 
the university sector. However, because the sample does not include other cases with such a 
strong focus on program funding, it remains unclear whether these conclusions also apply to 
smaller countries with a different organization of public research.  
QCA not only identifies conditions that need to be present in order to achieve a 
desired outcome, but also those that need to be absent (see e.g. Raging 1987). For instance, 
none of the best practice countries focused on thematic research, while several other 
countries with similar context factors and a focus on thematic research did not perform 
particularly well in terms of university research.39 Accordingly, the analysis identified the 
absence of a focus on thematic funding as a sufficient condition in both the intermediate and 
parsimonious solutions. This finding reflects the concern that too strong a focus on thematic 
funding may hinder academic research and negatively affect the academic reputation of 
universities (Potì and Reale 2007).  
As a first policy implication, one should thus stress the importance of traditional 
funding schemes for the research performance of universities. In best practice countries, 
funding agencies focus on fellowships, on bottom-up project grants, or on both. While 
successful countries may also feature a high share of program funding, too strong a focus on 
thematic grants may affect university research negatively. However, one needs to keep in 
mind that the present study identified best practices in terms of academic performance. 
Thematic funding also serves knowledge transfer from academia to society and addresses 
current societal, economic and political problems (Lepori 2007b). The analysis did not 
consider such issues and the question whether thematic funding is better suited to address 
them remains unanswered.  
                                                 
39 Examples of such countries are France, Ireland, and Norway. 
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These implications are particularly relevant in the context of the strong increase of 
funding at the European level.40 A large part of the European Commission’s Framework 
programs for research and development are allocated through specific thematic calls. The 
ERC with its focus on excellent, investigator-driven research represents only 17 percent of 
the total budget of the current eight Framework program Horizon 2020, while the Marie 
Curie fellowships managed by the REA account for only 8 percent (European Commission 
2013). The European Framework programs would thus be clearly classified as a thematic 
funding agency. If the European Commission aims at taking over traditional funding tasks 
from national agencies and fostering a common European Research Area with high 
performance research universities (see e.g. Barré et al. 2013, Luukkonen and Nedeva 2010), 
the results of this study suggest that a major focus on bottom-up projects, fellowships, and 
eventually excellence programs may be more appropriate. 
Finally, the study also stresses the importance of an adequate level of university 
funding. All best practice countries displayed an above-average GDP. While this result 
points to the importance of an overall high level of economic development for university 
research performance, causality may also work in the opposite direction. Successful research 
universities may foster economic development by enabling innovations and improving 
competitiveness of the local industry, providing highly qualified workforce, and attracting 
high technology and research-based enterprises (see e.g. Rosenberg and Nelson 1994). 
Nevertheless, the importance of sufficient university funding is also emphasized by the 
presence of a high share of R&D expenditures, a high share of university research spending, 
or both in almost all best practice countries.41  
The United Kingdom represents the only exception among best practice countries in 
terms of university funding. The analysis suggests that it may compensate the rather low 
share of R&D expenditures and university research spending by a high share of research 
funds allocated through agencies and thus by a particularly competitive funding 
environment.  However, empirical evidence is too small to confirm that a high degree of 
                                                 
40 While the annual allocations under the first European framework program amounted to 593 million Euro in 1984, they 
increased to around 10 billion Euro in 2013 (State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation 2013). 
41 An above-average GDP and a high share of R&D or university research expenditures are important factors, but not 
sufficient for highly successful research universities. For instance, France, Ireland, and Norway dispose of similar 
resources to the best practice cases, but do not fall into the set of countries with high performance research universities. 
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competition fosters research performance. Moreover, there might be other reasons for the 
success of UK research universities apart from the funding system. First, international 
rankings are said to be biased towards universities in English-speaking countries, making it 
easier for the UK to achieve better positions (Hazelkorn 2015).42 Second, the UK features a 
small number of universities with a long tradition of excellence and a worldwide reputation. 
These universities are among the few institutions in Europe that dispose of considerable 
endowments and are thus less dependent on the design of the national funding system.43  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The present study aimed at providing a better understanding of public agencies in charge of 
funding university research. It represents a first attempt to study these agencies empirically 
from a broad international comparative perspective. In a first step, comparable data across 
several Western European countries were collected in order to provide an overview of the 
broad characteristics of existing funding agencies. By means of cluster analysis, four types 
of funding agencies were identified based on their funding profiles. In a second step, a fuzzy-
set QCA analysis helped to identify best practices at country level. While best practice 
countries featured either a focus on traditional funding schemes, namely, fellowships and 
bottom-up projects, or large programs, a focus on thematic grants proved to be associated to 
lower performance of research universities.  
The analysis confirmed that, although great differences across countries exist, 
common patterns can be found, and comparative investigations of funding approaches at 
national level are possible. Specifically, QCA allows for multiple causal combinations of 
conditions to explain an outcome of interest and thus accounts for the different societal, 
economic and political context factors in which funding agencies and research universities 
act. The approach thus led to differentiated findings that can be translated into relevant policy 
implications. Apart from the importance of traditional approaches to research funding and 
                                                 
42 To measure research performance, most international university rankings, such as the ARWU, employ data from 
Thomson Reuter’s Web of Science database, which mainly lists English-speaking publications. 
43 As shown by Michael (2005), endowment is highly correlated to research performance, as it gives universities additional 
resources that they can freely allocate internally and strengthens them in the competition for third party funds. 
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the problems that too strong a focus on thematic grants may cause, the findings confirm that 
a high level of university funding is essential for an internationally highly reputed university 
research system.  
Although the study provided remarkable empirical results, it was also subject to 
several important limitations that call for further research. First, the extraordinary 
complexity and diversity of funding systems could only partly be addressed. Several 
simplifications had to be accepted and other factors that possibly affect research performance 
were not included in the analysis. For example, an analysis of the internal organization of 
funding agencies, the composition of their boards, and their decision processes was far 
beyond the scope of this study. Similarly, several context factors at country level, such as 
possible effects of other funding sources, were not included due to the lack of internationally 
comparable data. Future studies may thus examine specific organizational features of 
funding agencies, and focus more on the context in which they act, investigating their 
relationship to the state and to other external funding sources for university research. 
Second, several data issues hindered the analysis and finding viable solutions was 
very laborious. For instance, it proved difficult to collect internationally comparable figures 
on funding agencies due to different definitions of the data at hand and varying reporting 
practices across countries. Many funding agencies did not collect some of the figures 
requested, or did not provide access to all information. Given that these agencies manage 
very large amounts of research funding and that a growing interest in empirical, comparative 
studies exists, the introduction of common data collection and data management practices is 
strongly recommended. The full availability of comparable figures would allow for more 
detailed analyses and meaningful conclusions. 
Finally, the empirical lack of specific combinations of conditions represents a 
common problem in QCA analyses, especially if the number of cases is small. Some of the 
association patterns identified could not be further investigated because only one country 
displayed the corresponding combination and no counterfactual cases were available. One 
possible way to address this problem would be to widen the scope of the study including 
further funding agencies from other geographic regions and thus increasing the diversity of 
the sample.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Indicators for expenditures and personnel of European academic research funding agencies (2013) 
 
 
Country Agency Total 
expenses 
Growth 
2009-2013 
Administr. 
costs 
As % of tot. 
expenses 
FTE Funding 
per FTE 
        
Austria FWF 231.2 4.4 9.3 4.0 84.01 2.6 
Belgium FNRS 168.1 -0.8 8.8 5.2 58.8* 2.7* 
Belgium FWO 226.4 7.2 7.2 3.2 50 4.4 
Denmark DNRF 58.9 40.3 2.1 3.6 9* 6.3* 
Denmark DFF 163.8* -3.0* 3.1* 1.9* 39 4.1 
France ANR 596.0  -31.4 33.1 5.6 245 2.6 
Germany DFG 2692.1 10.1 61.2 2.3 654.75 4.0 
EU REA 1439.8 106.7 45.9 3.2 545 2.6 
EU ERC  1762.5 89.3 40.1 2.3 379 4.5 
Finland AKA 338.6 18.7 14.8 4.4 135.3 2.4 
Ireland SFI 161.7 -13.7 9.2 5.7 47 3.2 
Ireland ICR 36.5*       
  
Netherlands NWO 735.2 10.0 53.5 7.3 440 1.5 
Norway RCN 933.2 13.1 76.0 8.1 448 1.9 
Portugal FTC 436.0 -13.6 12.6 2.9 256* 1.7 
Sweden SRC 698.8 55.9 43.3 6.2 169 3.9 
Sweden SSF 133.2 113.4 5.6 4.2 14.6 8.7 
Switzerland SNSF 780.3 57.4 32.7 4.2 193 3.9 
UK AHRC 129.1 -9.6 8.6 6.7 82 1.5 
UK BBSRC 610.5 -4.6 21.9 3.6 247.6 2.4 
UK EPSRC 1020.4 -7.9 37.6 3.7 225 4.4 
UK ESRC 262.5 -2.8 12.8 4.9 138 1.8 
UK MRC 1026.6 -3.0 305.4 29.7 4101 0.2 
UK NERC 517.4 -1.7 241.3 46.6 2328 0.1 
UK STFC 615.0 -23.4 266.6 43.4 1723 0.2 
        
* Estimate or approximation. 
Total expenses are in million Euro. Total expenses include both funding allocations and administrative expenses. 
Funding per full-time equivalent (FTE) includes only funding allocations. Growth 2009-2013 refers to real growth 
(2013 prices). 
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Appendix 2 
 
Indicators for submissions and grants of European academic research funding agencies (2013) 
 
 
 
 
  
Country Agency Sub-
missions 
Projects 
granted 
Money 
granted 
Acceptance rate Money per 
project 
Growth 
2009-2013 2013 2009 
         
Austria FWF 2386 632 202.6 26 35 320.6 19.7 
Belgium FNRS 566 203   36     
Belgium FWO 2967 785   26 35 
 
 
Denmark DNRF 200* 17 101.1 9* 5* 5944.6 -13.8 
Denmark DFF 2347 457 160.7 19 18 351.5 23.1 
France ANR 7209 1068 588.6 15 21 551.1 -16.9 
Germany DFG 11322 3521 685.6 31 47 194.7 -13.4 
EU REA 14068 2044 1741.1 15 28 851.8 55.5 
EU ERC 9928 981 1800.0 10 13 1834.9 2.2 
Finland AKA 3477 1030 334.9 30 38 325.1 62.5 
Ireland SFI 2013 307 297.2 15 17 968.1 116.9 
Ireland ICR 1449 287 22.3 20  77.7  
Netherlands NWO 5268 1318   25 30    
Norway RCN 5474 1049 769.2 19 21 733.3 28.6 
Sweden SRC 6800 935 396.2 14 15 423.7 38.8 
Sweden SSF 500* 100* 55.7 20* 20*  557* 110.6* 
Switzerland SNSF 5360 2769 664.6 52 58 240.0 31.1 
UK AHRC 978 333 85.3 34 17 256.3 54.9 
UK BBSRC 1865 511 307.2 27 22 601.2 9.7 
UK EPSRC 1918 620 430.7 32 41 694.7 15.6 
UK ESRC 334 82 40.8 25 16 497.7 122.1 
UK MRC 1360 306 316.8 23 19 1035.3 24.8 
UK NERC 937 172 61.6 18 19 358.4 19.1 
         
* Estimate, average, or approximation. 
Money granted and money per project are in million Euro. Empty cells indicate missing information. The data is only 
partly comparable as not all agencies report the same type of submissions and grants. The FTC (Portugal) and the STFC 
(UK) are excluded from the table, as the corresponding figures could not be gathered.  
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Appendix 3 
 
 Categories of funding instruments of academic research funding agencies (for the Year 2013) 
 
 
Country Agency Fellowships Projects Programs Thematic Other Total 
Euro % Euro % Euro % Euro % Euro % Euro 
             
Austria FWF 77.5 35.2 106.9 48.5 9.7 4.4 6.6 3.0 19.5 8.9 220.2 
Belgium FNRS 116.8 72.6 34.5 21.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.6 6.0 160.9 
Belgium FWO 102.9 47.0 111.6 51.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3 2.0 218.8 
Denmark DNRF 1.8 3.2 0.0 0.0 49.4 87.0 5.6 9.8 0.0 0.0 56.7 
Denmark DFF 68.8 42.8 86.9 54.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 3.1 160.7 
France ANR 49.4 11.5 157.7 36.6 0.0 0.0 223.4 51.9 0.0 0.0 430.5 
Germany DFG 263.6 10.0 749.1 28.4 1131.7 43.0 244.2 9.3 244.6 9.3 2633.2 
EU REA 902.6 64.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 491.4 35.2 0.0 0.0 1394.0 
EU ERC 612.0 62.4 289.0 29.5 13.0 1.3 67.0 6.8 0.0 0.0 981.0 
Finland AKA 66.6 19.9 135.9 40.7 48.7 14.6 24.4 7.3 58.3 17.5 333.9 
Ireland SFI 45.3 29.7 13.0 11.5 0.0 0.0 77.9 51.1 16.4 10.8 152.6 
Ireland ICR* 24.9 72.7 1.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 8.4 24.5 0.0 0.0 34.3 
Netherlands NWO* 159.0 27.8 119.0 20.8 0.0 0.0 66.0 11.5 229.0 40.0 573.0 
Norway RCN 0.0 0.0 111.7 11.8 0.0 0.0 558.5 59.1 275.6 29.1 945.8 
Portugal FTC 192.9 45.6 104.3 24.6 0.0 0.0 37.4 8.8 88.8 21.0 423.4 
Sweden SRC 57.3 8.7 312.6 47.7 82.4 12.6 0.0 0.0 203.3 31.0 655.6 
Sweden SSF 13.2 21.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 47.5 77.9 0.2 0.3 60.9 
Switzerland SNSF 134.7 21.5 313.2 50.0 86.6 13.8 50.5 8.1 41.1 6.6 626.2 
UK AHRC 49.7 41.3 37.3 31.0 0.0 0.0 26.4 21.9 6.5 5.4 119.9 
UK BBSRC* 61.6 10.8 368.5 64.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 140.7 24.7 570.8 
UK EPSRC 266.4 27.1   0.0 0.0   19.5 1.5 1050.1 
UK ESRC 62.1 24.9 46.4 18.6 0.0 0.0 61.2 24.5 79.8 32.0 249.6 
UK MRC* 82.3 8.3 176.7 17.7 189.3 19.0 68.9 6.9 478.3 48.0 995.4 
UK NERC 33.9 7.0 78.6 16.1 0.0 0.0 94.2 19.3 280.4 57.6 487.1 
UK STFC 26.4 3.7 120.8 17.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 562.6 79.3 709.8 
             
* Includes estimations. 
The amount of funding is measured in million Euro. The EPSC could provide neither figures nor an estimate of the share 
of bottom-up grants to total grants. The 686.7 million Euro allocated through research grants (correspond to 69.9 percent 
of total funding) are thus not reported in the table.  
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Appendix 4 
 
 
Relative funding for bottom-up programs, thematic research, and fellowships in the four clusters 
identified 
 
 
 
 
 
First cluster: high share of thematic research 
Second cluster: high share of bottom-up programs 
Third cluster: high share of bottom-up projects 
Fourth cluster: high share of fellowships 
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Appendix 5 
 
 
Relative funding for bottom-up programs, thematic research, and bottom-up projects in the four 
clusters identified 
 
 
 
 
 
First cluster: high share of thematic research 
Second cluster: high share of bottom-up programs 
Third cluster: high share of bottom-up projects 
Fourth cluster: high share of fellowships 
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Appendix 6 
 
 
Short description of QCA 
 
 
In a first step, QCA creates a so-called truth table that displays all possible combinations of 
conditions and outcomes. The full truth table has thus 2k rows, with k being the number of 
conditions used (Fiss 2011). All cases included in the analysis are then sorted into the rows 
of the truth table according to their membership scores in each set. Usually, not all possible 
combinations can be observed empirically and many rows remain wide. 
In a second step, QCA selects the rows that display a minimum number of cases, 
which has been defined in advance. In the present study, the minimum number of cases is 
set at 1, as the analysis only covers 16 cases. Moreover, these combinations need to reach a 
specific consistency level, with the minimum recommended threshold being at 0.75 (see e.g. 
Raging 2008). The consistency level measures the degree to which the empirical cases match 
the combination they were assigned to. In fuzzy-set QCA, the consistency of sufficient 
conditions is calculated as follows (Schneider and Wagemann 2012): 
 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑆𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 (𝑋𝑖≤𝑌𝑖) = ∑ min (𝑋𝑖, 𝑌𝑖)𝐼𝑖=1∑ 𝑋𝑖𝐼𝑖=1  
 
where 𝑋𝑖 and 𝑌𝑖 are the membership scores of each case in the sets representing the 
conditions and the outcome of interest. A related measure is coverage, which indicates how 
much of the outcome is covered by a specific condition. It can be computed using the 
following formula (Schneider and Wagemann 2012): 
 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑆𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 (𝑋𝑖≤𝑌𝑖) = ∑ min (𝑋𝑖, 𝑌𝑖)𝐼𝑖=1∑ 𝑌𝑖𝐼𝑖=1  
 
In a third step, QCA applies Boolean algebra to reduce the selected combinations and 
to identify the conditions that are sufficient (or necessary) for an outcome to occur.  
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Appendix 7 
 
 
Set-memberships in different conditions included in QCA after calibration 
 
 
Country Fellow. Proj. Progr. Them. GDP R&D 
HE to 
R&D 
Agency 
to HE  
OUT 
          
Austria 0.55 0.76 0.10 0.07 0.77 0.91 0.21 0.04 0.64 
Belgium 0.86 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.64 0.36 0.48 0.77 
Switzerland 0.33 0.76 0.30 0.17 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.26 1.00 
Germany 0.16 0.45 0.95 0.20 0.70 0.97 0.00 0.31 0.45 
Denmark 0.47 0.58 0.46 0.05 0.72 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.98 
France 0.16 0.52 0.00 1.00 0.55 0.62 0.07 0.00 0.30 
Finland 0.35 0.70 0.35 0.18 0.59 1.00 0.54 0.48 0.31 
Ireland 0.59 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.79 0.29 0.59 0.51 0.00 
Netherlands 0.66 0.49 0.00 0.38 0.80 0.49 0.73 0.13 0.63 
Norway 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.37 1.00 0.19 
Sweden 0.20 0.87 0.32 0.19 0.75 1.00 0.77 0.35 0.81 
UK 0.33 0.80 0.15 0.26 0.55 0.32 0.31 1.00 0.52 
Italy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.13 0.31 0.00 0.23 
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Portugal 0.82 0.45 0.00 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.76 0.87 0.00 
Greece 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 
          
OUT indicates the performance measure used to identify best practices, i.e. the relative number of students at 
internationally renowned universities. 
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Appendix 8 
 
 
Truth table resulting from the QCA analysis (only covered cases) 
 
 
Fellow. Proj. Progr. Them. GDP R&D 
HE to 
R&D 
Agency 
to HE  
 
OUT 
 
n Consist. PRI Cases 
               
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
 
1 
 
2 0.921 0.749 AT, BE 
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
 
1 
 
1 0.909 0.000 DE 
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
 
1 
 
4 0.893 0.827 CH, DK, FI, SE 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 
1 
 
1 0.886 0.693 NL 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
 
1 
 
1 0.807 0.179 UK 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
 
0 
 
1 0.692 0.000 FR 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
 
0 
 
1 0.569 0.183 PT 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
 
0 
 
1 0.364 0.028 IE 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
 
0 
 
1 0.363 0.000 NO 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 
 
3 0.262 0.000 IT, ES, GR 
        
 
 
 
    
 OUT indicates the performance measure used to identify best practices, i.e. the relative number of students at 
internationally renowned universities. 
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